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ABSTRACT 
 
Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of capital to firms improve their 
chances of getting a return on their investment (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)).  In this dissertation, 
I analyze three aspects of governance that impact the incentives, policies, and decisions of the 
firm.  In the first essay, Blockholder Attention, I recast the study of blockholder monitoring from 
a question of whether firms will listen to one that additionally asks are investors willing to talk.  
Given resource constraints, investors cannot talk to all of the firms they own and allocate their 
attention to those positions in which they have the most capital invested.  Once I isolate blocks 
that receive the requisite attention, I find robust evidence of effective monitoring: firms with one 
of these High Attention Blocks experience significant improvements in compensation policies, 
turnover decisions, and acquisitions.  Firms with blocks of relatively less importance do not 
enjoy any of these gains.  In the second essay, CEO Skill in Corporate Acquisitions, I, along with 
my co-authors, Jeff Jaffe and Torben Voetmann, examine the incidence of differential skill in 
acquisition decisions.  While we find significant evidence of persistent bidder returns when a 
firm retains the same CEO for consecutive acquisitions, it appears negative skill, or the repeated 
act of conducting value-destroying acquisitions, is the dominant trait.  In the third essay, The 
Price Effects of Event-Risk Protection: The Results from a Natural Experiment, my co-authors, 
Karl Okamoto and Natalie Pedersen, and I use court rulings related to the $48.5B LBO of Bell 
Canada to isolate the pricing effects of change-in-control covenants.  Consistent with the existing 
literature, we find significant evidence that these covenants are priced and this judicial 
intervention upset the existing bargain between bondholders and issuers.               
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Abstract 
 
The supply of blockholder effort is limited.  Yet, the theoretical and empirical literature assume 
blockholders are unconstrained.  In this paper, I study how resource constraints impact the ability 
of blockholders to monitor the firms they own.  I hypothesize that a blockholder allocates its 
monitoring resources on the basis of the relative position a block holds within its portfolio and is 
more likely to monitor blocks in which it has a large percentage of its capital invested.  I define 
High Attention Blocks as those blocks that rank within the top ten percent of a blockholder’s 
portfolio and Non-High Attention Blocks as those outside the top ten percent.  After controlling 
for selection issues, I find firms with High Attention Blocks lower the compensation of overpaid 
CEOs, reduce pay-for-luck for overpaid CEOs, strengthen the relation between CEO turnover 
and firm performance, and decrease their propensity to make value destroying acquisitions.  
Non-High Attention Blocks are not associated with any of these effects.  Moreover, the effects of 
High Attention Blocks, along each of these four dimensions, are all significantly stronger than 
those of the Non-High Attention Blocks.  Overall, there is a strong correlation between the 
attention a block receives and observable changes in firm governance. 
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This paper analyzes how resource constraints impact the ability of blockholders to 
monitor the firms they own.1  Although the empirical evidence is mixed as to the effectiveness of 
blockholders (see Holderness (2003) for a summary), theoretical work finds an important role for 
blockholders in the governance of the firm, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Edmans (2009).  
Through effective monitoring, either directly through intervention or indirectly through the threat 
of exit, blockholders have the ability to align the interests of the firm’s managers with those of its 
owners and, consequently, increase the value of the firm.  To fulfill this role, blockholders must 
deploy the resources necessary to understand the policies and decisions of the firm and, 
potentially, to persuade its executives and board that change is necessary.  Without providing the 
proper attention, a blockholder has little chance to affect the prospects of the firm.     
 Prior literature models the supply of blockholder effort as unconstrained.  For each firm it 
owns, the blockholder chooses the optimal level of monitoring effort based on a tradeoff between 
the costs and benefits of monitoring (see, for example, Shleifer and Vishny (1986)).2  Often, the 
key determinant of effort is the percent of the firm’s equity the blockholder owns (“block size”).  
Since monitoring is a public good, for which the monitor bears the full cost, atomistic 
shareholders have little incentive to invest in monitoring.  A large block of shares, however, 
yields a greater share of the gains from monitoring and, thus, induces more effort.  The implicit 
assumption is that the resources available to monitor one firm are independent of the resources 
devoted to all of the blockholder’s other tasks.  Consequently, blockholders are not subject to a 
constraint on the overall amount of effort at their disposal. 
                                                 
1 All references to blockholders relate to non-managerial investors that own at least five percent of a firm’s equity. 
2 Throughout the analysis, I focus primarily on intervention as the channel through which blockholders influence 
firm policies.  The concept of limited attention, however, applies equally well to information acquisition activities 
that inform the decision of blockholders to exit the firm (for theoretical models of exit and firm governance, see 
Edmans (2009) and Admati and Pfleiderer (2009)). 
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 Blockholders are, however, constrained.  Scarce resources, such as time and skilled 
human capital, force blockholders to allocate their attention and effort amongst various tasks, 
which, in addition to monitoring their existing holdings, include identifying new investment 
opportunities and raising capital.  Consistent with these inherent limitations, the results of a 
recent Institutional Shareholder Services’ (ISS) survey of institutional investors indicates that 
resource constraints are the most significant obstacles to the engagement of management (see 
Goldstein (2011)).  For instance, 79% of asset managers list time considerations as a major 
impediment to engagement, while 65% cite staffing considerations as a problem.  Incorporating 
these limitations into the existing theory, the determination of the optimal level of effort to 
devote to each task is constrained by the investor’s aggregate resources.  If the constraint binds, 
then attention spent on one task reduces attention available to all other tasks.  Ultimately, a 
blockholder with limited resources may not devote the requisite level of effort to monitoring 
each of the firms in its portfolio and, hence, may not always serve as an effective monitor. 
In this paper, I identify firms that are most likely to receive a blockholder’s attention.  
According to the ISS survey, investors “focus on the composition of their portfolios” when 
choosing with which companies to engage on governance issues and are more likely to “engage 
with their larger holdings” (Goldstein (2011)).  Based on this evidence, I hypothesize that a 
blockholder allocates its monitoring resources on the basis of the relative position a block holds 
within its portfolio.  A blockholder is thus more likely to monitor blocks in which it has a large 
amount of its capital invested.  Approximately half of all blockholdings in the sample fall within 
the top ten percent of a blockholder’s portfolio, when ranked on the basis of the market value of 
the holdings.  I refer to these blocks as High Attention Blocks and to the blocks below the top ten 
percent as Non-High Attention Blocks.  
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To test the relation between attention and governance, I analyze the effect of new 
blockholders on a firm’s compensation policies, turnover decisions, and acquisitions.  Firms with 
High Attention Blocks lower the compensation of overpaid CEOs, reduce pay-for-luck for 
overpaid CEOs, strengthen the relation between CEO turnover and firm performance, and 
decrease their propensity to make value destroying acquisitions.  These results are robust to 
controls for both selection effects and firm effects.  Non-High Attention Blocks are not 
associated with any of these effects.  Moreover, the effects of High Attention Blocks, along each 
of these four dimensions, are all significantly stronger than those of the Non-High Attention 
Blocks.  Overall, there is a strong correlation between the position a block holds within a 
blockholder’s portfolio and observable changes in firm governance.  
This research makes several contributions to the literature.  First, I provide evidence that 
blockholders are yet another economic agent that suffers from the unavoidable effects of limited 
attention.  Second, I introduce a simple empirical measure, based on the value of the holdings in 
a blockholder’s portfolio, to identify blocks that are likely to receive attention.  Lastly, I add 
blockholder attention to the growing list of heterogeneous characteristics that moderate the 
effects of blockholder monitoring.  
    The remainder of this article is organized as follows.  Section I reviews the related 
literature and develops the main hypothesis.  Section II summarizes the data and sample used in 
the empirical analysis.  Section III reports the results from the main empirical models.  Section 
IV includes robustness tests and Section V concludes. 
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I. Hypothesis Development 
 Theoretical work has long placed large shareholders in a prominent role within the 
governance structures of the firms they own.  Shleifer and Vishny (1986) focus on the ways in 
which large shareholders bring about value-increasing changes through monitoring and, if 
necessary, takeovers.3  The ability of these blockholders to identify value-increasing 
improvements rests on the “research intensity,” or effort, they devote to monitoring the firm.  
Within the Shleifer-Vishny framework, effort is positively related to the size of the investor’s 
ownership position.  This is consistent with much of the literature that links effort to block size 
(e.g., Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner (1994), Kahn and Winton (1998), and Gorton and Kahl 
(2008)).  Another current running through the theoretical literature is, in the words of Admati et 
al (1994), an assumption of “firm specific” monitoring, in which each monitoring activity 
“affects the expected payoffs of exactly one security, without any effect on the expected payoff 
of others.”  Thus, the optimal level of monitoring effort is independent of any spillover effects on 
other firms the blockholder owns.  Within each of these firm-specific silos, the various 
theoretical models find large shareholders can have a meaningful impact on the value of the firm. 
Whether shareholders fulfill their role as monitors has intrigued scholars for decades.  
Several empirical studies find little relation between blockholders and firm policies: for example, 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) analyze firm value (Tobin’s Q), Mehran (1995) tests profitability 
(ROA), and Mikkelson and Partch (1989) and Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) both study 
takeovers.  In contrast, there are many studies that find significant blockholder effects: Mehran 
(1995) models equity-based CEO pay, Denis and Serrano (1996) look at asset restructuring, 
Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) focus on CEO compensation, and Dlugosz et al (2006) 
                                                 
3 Recent studies posit a role for external blockholders even when intervention is constrained (see Edmans (2009) and 
Admati and Pfleiderer (2009)).       
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examine firm value (Tobin’s Q).  Overall, the evidence is, at best, mixed as to the effectiveness 
of large shareholders as monitors.4 
Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) argue that one explanation for the lack of a systematic 
effect in the empirical literature is that large shareholders differ from each other along various 
dimensions, such as beliefs, skills, and preferences, and that many studies do not incorporate this 
heterogeneity into the analysis.  The authors find the inclusion of blockholder fixed effects 
significantly increases the explanatory power of models of corporate investment, financial, and 
compensation policies.  Moreover, the distribution of these fixed effects suggests the impact of 
some blockholders is economically large.  Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) was one of the first 
studies to analyze differences in blockholder incentives.  Their results indicate institutions with 
fewer potential business ties to a firm are more likely to oppose management-initiated 
antitakeover amendments than are institutions more subject to managerial influence.  Another 
recent study that accounts for this heterogeneity is Chen, Harford, and Li (2007).  These authors 
show that only independent long-term institutional investors have a material impact on post-
merger performance.  Thus, the literature’s shift toward examining shareholder heterogeneity 
yields support for the role of shareholders in optimizing a firm’s governance. 
 Another dimension of blockholder heterogeneity that impacts a blockholder’s ability to 
monitor is the amount of resources it deploys collecting information about the firm’s policies and 
operations and, potentially, persuading the firm to make changes.  A blockholder, whether it is 
an activist investor or an institution comprised of financial professionals, is subject to basic 
cognitive limitations.  Kahneman (1973) summarizes the substantial evidence that humans are 
                                                 
4 One exception is the literature on blockholders with seats on the board of directors, which consistently finds 
significant effects related to blockholder directors (see Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Agrawal and Nasser 
(2010)).  Taking a directorship likely signals the strength of a blockholder’s intent to monitor and provides direct 
access to management.  As discussed in Section IV, very few of the blockholders studied herein hold seats on the 
board. 
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limited in their ability to process information and to perform multiple tasks simultaneously.  
Consequently, the total amount of effort one can deploy at any time is limited and attention spent 
on one task reduces attention available to all other tasks.           
The literature has incorporated the effects of limited attention into numerous recent 
studies.  Fich and Shivdasani (2006) analyze the effects of “busy directors” on corporate policies. 
The authors find that boards in which a majority of directors hold three or more directorships are 
associated with weaker corporate governance.  Thus, as the number of outside directors sitting on 
multiple boards increases, boards are inclined to become “distracted and monitoring intensity is 
likely to suffer.”  Corwin and Coughenour (2008) examine how NYSE specialists allocate their 
attention across the stocks they trade.  Their results indicate that specialists allocate effort toward 
their largest, most active stocks during periods of increased activity, which results in less 
frequent price improvement and increased transaction costs for their remaining stocks.  Agarwal 
and Ma (2010) investigate the impact of multitasking, i.e., the management of multiple funds, on 
the performance of mutual fund managers.  After a manager switches to multitasking, the authors 
find a striking decline in the annualized risk-adjusted performance of funds the manager handled 
prior to multitasking.  The authors attribute this effect to the limited attention and efforts of 
managers.  Pinheiro (2012) develops a model of venture capital, in which venture capitalists 
suffer from capacity constraints due to the shortage of skilled professionals able to work as 
venture capital managers.  This constraint implies venture capitalists can only handle a limited 
number of new projects at once and, therefore, take current projects public in order to capitalize 
on new opportunities.   
Similar to these directors, specialists, mutual fund managers, and venture capitalists, 
blockholders suffer from a limited supply of attention and resources.  Although blockholders 
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may scale up certain factors of production as their portfolios grow, factors, such as skilled human 
capital and time, are inherently in short supply.  Thus, they must choose how to allocate their 
resources to not only monitoring the firms in their portfolios, but also identifying new investment 
opportunities and raising capital.  These constraints are evident in the results of a recent ISS 
survey of institutional investors, in which the respondents are asked to identify the obstacles to 
engaging with management.  79% of asset managers say time is a major impediment to 
engagement, while 65% cite staffing considerations as a significant problem (See Goldstein 
(2011)).  Thus, a limited supply of time and skilled labor impedes these investors’ desire to exert 
additional effort monitoring their firms.    
 The existing blockholder theory is silent on this constraint.5  Incorporating this constraint 
into the theoretical construct, a blockholder must choose how to allocate its resources to 
monitoring the firms in its portfolio.  A rational investor will choose to allocate its effort toward 
the firms that generate the highest expected net benefit from monitoring.  As compared to the 
unconstrained blockholder in the literature, an investor with limited resources may fail to allocate 
the requisite amount of attention toward some of its firms. 
 To measure the effects of scarce resources on a blockholder’s ability to monitor, one 
must identify blocks that are likely to receive attention.  In contrast to the optimization process 
described above, blockholders, in practice, may simply rely on heuristics to allocate their 
attention.  This is consistent with Radnor and Rothschild (1975) who find it untenable that 
managers with limited attention will “formulate complete preference orderings, find optimal 
                                                 
5 Gorton and Kahl (2008) is the closest theoretical work to this study.  In their model, effective blockholders are 
scarce.  Rather than scarcity based on limited resources, however, Gorton and Kahl divide outside blockholders 
between effective and ineffective monitors.  The authors assume “rich investors” are more effective than 
institutional investors and analyze the allocation of effective monitors in the economy.  Although they introduce the 
issue of “agency cost-free capital,” Gorton and Kahl do not provide a rationale for “why some investors are better at 
increasing firm value” and simply “take this [assumption] as given.”  Consistent with this study, the Gorton and 
Kahl model is built on the premise that not all blocks are the same. 
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strategies, and pursue them.”  Instead, they argue that due to “competing and imperfectly 
articulated goals, limits on computational ability, organizational slack, and possible pure sloth” it 
is “reasonable that real decision-makers follow attractive, simple rules rather than optimal 
strategies.”        
The ISS survey of institutional investors sheds light on the manner in which blockholders 
actually allocate their resources.  According to the survey, investors “focus on the composition of 
their portfolios” when choosing which companies to engage on governance issues and are more 
likely to “engage with their larger holdings” (Goldstein (2011)).  Based on this evidence, I 
hypothesize that a blockholder allocates its monitoring resources on the basis of the relative 
position a block holds within its portfolio.6  A blockholder is thus more likely to monitor blocks 
in which it has a large percentage of its capital invested.7  I refer to this as the Blockholder 
Attention Hypothesis.  In the data, approximately half of all blockholdings fall within the top ten 
percent of a blockholder’s portfolio, when ranked on the basis of the market value of the 
holdings.  I classify these blocks as High Attention Blocks and blocks in the bottom ninety 
percent of the blockholder’s portfolio as Non-High Attention Blocks.  According to the 
Blockholder Attention Hypothesis, firms with High Attention Blocks are more likely to improve 
firm governance, in the form of better compensation policies, turnover decisions, and 
acquisitions, than are firms with Non-High Attention Blocks.   
 
 
                                                 
6 Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner (1994) is the only theoretical study, of which I am aware, that models monitoring 
activities of large shareholders within a portfolio setting.  Although the authors allow for spillover effects through 
product market competition, they do not model monitoring effort as a scarce resource that the investor allocates 
amongst its holdings. 
7 This is similar to the specialists of Corwin and Coughenour (2008) who allocate their attention toward the largest, 
most active stocks in their portfolio, as these are the positions in which they have the most capital at risk.   
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II. Data and Sample Construction 
A. Data 
To test the Blockholder Attention Hypothesis, I analyze a sample of non-financial S&P 
1500 firms over the period 1998 to 2008.  For each firm, I collect data on the identity and 
compensation of the CEO from ExecuComp, firm characteristics from Compustat, security 
returns from CRSP, and acquisitions from Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) Mergers and 
Acquisition database.  Firms with dual class shares and firm-years in which the relevant data are 
unavailable are excluded.     
 I next identify firms with outside blockholders.  While external blockholders include both 
activists and institutional investors, only the latter are required to disclose their holdings.  Since I 
require the composition of a blockholder’s portfolio to measure blockholder attention, I focus 
exclusively on institutional blockholders.  This adds to the literature that studies the impact of 
institutional investors on firm governance (see Gillian and Starks (2007) for a summary).   
 Data on the portfolios of institutional blockholders come from Thomson Financial’s 
Institutional Holdings (13F) database, which includes quarterly equity holdings of institutional 
investment managers with over $100M under their control.  A wide spectrum of institutions, 
including banks, endowments, hedge funds, independent investment advisors, insurance 
companies, mutual funds, and pension funds, file 13F holding reports.  These institutions report 
their holdings in the aggregate, regardless of the number of underlying fund portfolios in their 
complex.  Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) note that such aggregation, which primarily affects 
mutual funds, complicates the analysis because fund managers may not have the same 
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objectives, share information, or coordinate effort.  For this reason, I exclude mutual funds from 
the analysis.8,9 
 As outlined in Section I, I assume blockholders allocate resources based on the relative 
position a block holds within the institution’s portfolio.  To quantify the relative importance of a 
block, I rank all of the institution’s holdings by their market values (shares held multiplied by 
price per share).  For example, the holding with the highest market value amongst all positions in 
the institution’s portfolio as of the end of the quarter is assigned a rank of one, the second highest 
a rank of two, and so forth.  I then calculate the percent of the institution’s other holdings with a 
lower rank (“portfolio percentile”).  Based on this ranking procedure, the institution’s largest 
holding has a portfolio percentile of 100%, while its smallest holding has a portfolio percentile of 
0%.  Given the definition of a High Attention Block, as one that ranks in the top ten percent of 
the blockholder’s portfolio, High Attention Blocks have a portfolio percentile of 90% or greater 
and Non-High Attention Blocks have a portfolio percentile of less than 90%.           
 Of the 11,838,207 institution-firm-quarter observations in the Thomson data during the 
sample period, 29,716 are blockholdings of S&P 1500 firms.  The median S&P 1500 
blockholding has a portfolio percentile of 88%.  Thus, approximately half of all S&P 1500 
blockholdings fall within the top ten percent of a blockholder’s portfolio.  Splitting these blocks 
by their portfolio ranking, High Attention Blocks have an average portfolio percentile of 96.3%, 
while Non-High Attention Blocks have a mean portfolio percentile of 69.7%.  Hence, relatively 
few positions in an institution’s portfolio rank higher than a High Attention Block.  Conversely, 
almost a third of an institution’s holdings rank above a typical Non-High Attention Block.  
Subject to limited resources, institutions, which allocate attention to their largest holdings first, 
                                                 
8 Mutual funds are defined as institutions that appear in Thomson Financial’s Mutual Fund Holding database, which 
includes holding information for all registered mutual funds that report their holdings with the SEC. 
9 For the remainder of the paper, I refer to the set of non-mutual fund institutions as institutional investors. 
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are more likely to monitor High Attention Blocks than they are to monitor Non-High Attention 
Blocks. 
 After classifying High Attention Blocks and Non-High Attention Blocks, I merge the 
blockholder data with the sample of S&P 1500 firms.  Firm-years in which either aggregate 
institutional ownership exceeds 100 percent (4.8% of the sample) or institutional ownership data 
is missing (0.7%) are excluded.  In nearly a third of the firm-year observations in the S&P 1500 
sample, the firm has a blockholder.  Approximately half of these blocks are High Attention 
Blocks.  For each of these blocks, I use the Thomson data to calculate the percent of the firm’s 
shares the institution owns (“block size”), as well as the total value of the blockholder’s 13F 
holdings (“assets under management”), the total number of holdings and blockholdings in the 
blockholder’s portfolio, and the percent of the blockholder’s assets invested in blocks.  
 
B. Sample Construction 
The aim of this study is to establish whether attention moderates a blockholder’s ability 
to change the governance practices of the firms they own.  Frequently, the channels through 
which shareholders engage management are unobservable (see Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach 
(1998) and Becht et al (2010)).  Thus, researchers look for indirect evidence that blockholders 
engender good governance.  The traditional research design is to measure the relation between 
the presence of a blockholder (or the size of its ownership position) and the level of various firm 
policies (see Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) for a summary).    
Blockholders are not, however, randomly assigned to firms.  The choice to own a large 
block of shares is an endogenous decision based on the tradeoff of the costs and benefits of 
ownership.  In this paper, I hypothesize that blockholders actively work to improve the firm’s 
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governance (“influence hypothesis”) in order to increase the value of the firm.  As the literature 
notes, however, institutional investors have a preference for certain types of governance 
structures and thus often screen investments based on the firm’s governance (“selection 
hypothesis”)  (see Chung and Zhang (2011)).  Under the selection hypothesis, blockholders are 
more likely to invest in firms that already have strong governance policies.  This may be 
particularly true of institutions with High Attention Blocks, as they invest a significant 
percentage of their assets in the firm.   
To infer the direction of causality, I use a difference-in-differences (DID) approach.  
Within the DID structure, I compare changes in firm policies and investment decisions around 
the time a blockholder joins the firm to changes in these measures at a similar firm without a 
blockholder.  Figure 1 illustrates the approach using CEO Pay as the representative firm policy.  
The pre-treatment period is the two-year window prior to the blockholder establishing its block 
position, while the treatment period is the subsequent two years.  The main advantage of this 
approach is that it establishes the timing of these changes, relative to when the blockholder takes 
its position, and avoids the problem of omitted trends by comparing two groups over the same 
time period (see Roberts and Whited (2011)).10  A significant difference in differences provides 
strong evidence that blockholders cause firms to adopt better governance policies. 
To implement the difference-in-differences model, I first identify all years in which a 
firm shifts from the no-blockholder state to the blockholder state (“new blockholder”).11  Within 
the sample period, there are 729 occurrences of a new blockholder joining a firm.  Of these, 362 
are High Attention Blocks and 367 are Non-High Attention Blocks.  Table 1 lists the 
                                                 
10 The key assumption for consistency of the difference-in-differences estimator is the parallel trends assumption: in 
the absence of the treatment, the average change in the response variable would have been the same for both the 
treatment and control groups (Roberts and Whited (2011)).   
11 Since I focus exclusively on institutional blockholders, firms in the no-blockholder state may, in fact, have a non-
institutional blockholder, such as an insider or activist investor.   
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characteristics of firms attracting blockholders, characteristics of the institutions owning the 
blocks, and characteristics of the blockholders’ investments.  Of note, blockholders, on average, 
hold 31 different blocks in their portfolios and invest approximately 30% of their assets in block 
positions at the time they enter the sample.  Interestingly, High Attention Blocks and Non-High 
Attention Blocks have similar block sizes.  If differences arise in the effectiveness of the two 
groups of blockholders, it is unlikely the differences are due to the size of the blockholder’s 
ownership position. 
In total, there are 204 unique institutional blockholders in the sample.  Below is a list of 
the top five blockholders with High Attention Blocks and Non-High Attention Blocks, based on 
the number of new blockholdings each institution holds in the sample: 
 
High Attention Blocks Non-High Attention Blocks 
Neuberger Berman Neuberger Berman 
AMVESCAP PLC Private Capital Management, Inc. 
EARNEST Partners PRIMECAP Management Company 
GAMCO Investors Perkins, Wolf, McDonnell & Company 
Private Capital Management, Inc. EARNEST Partners 
 
 Since the attention measure is based on the ranking of a block within an institution’s 
portfolio, some blocks rank near the top of an institution’s portfolio, while others rank lower.  
Thus, the High Attention Block measure does not capture the nature, objectives, or skill of the 
institution.  Rather, it identifies instances in which institutions are likely to devote resources to 
monitoring the firms they own.  Not surprisingly, nearly three-quarters of the blockholders fall 
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into both categories.  Other notable institutions with High Attention Blocks include Berkshire 
Hathaway, General Electric Company, Goldman Sachs Asset Management, Greenlight Capital, 
LSV Asset Management, and the State of Wisconsin Investment Board.          
A key feature of the DID structure is the use of control firms to capture market-driven 
changes in governance policies unrelated to blockholder monitoring.  To match each new 
blockholder firm to a control firm without a blockholder, I use a propensity score model.  The 
model uses the following independent variables to assess the likelihood a firm will have a 
blockholder.  Each variable is measured as of the year prior to the blockholder’s decision to 
invest: 
 Firm Size: According to the literature (see Becker, Cronqvist, and Fahlenbrach 
(Forthcoming)), blockholders often select smaller firms, either due to the increased cost 
to acquire a block in a large firm or the possible benefits from monitoring a smaller firm 
that has attracted less attention.  I proxy for firm size with the natural log of the firm’s 
market value of equity as of the end of the year.   
 Book-to-Market: Since Klein and Zur (2009) find that activists target firms with relatively 
low market-to-book ratios, I also include the firm’s book-to-market ratio, calculated as 
the inverse of Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach’s (2009) Tobin Q measure.12   
 Firm Performance: The effect of firm performance on blockholder ownership is more 
ambiguous.  Brav et al (2008) and Klein and Zur (2009) both find that hedge funds target 
better-performing firms, while Gillian and Starks (2007) and Klein and Zur (2009) 
conclude that non-hedge fund investors concentrate on firms with relatively poorer 
                                                 
12 Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) define Q as the market value of assets divided by book value of assets, where 
the firm’s market value of assets equals the book value of assets plus the market value of common equity less the 
sum of the book value of common equity and balance sheet deferred taxes.   
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performance.  The firm’s one-year stock return and ratio of EBIT to total assets (ROA) 
proxy for firm performance.   
 Leverage: Edmans (2011) argues that debt elicits a concentration effect, in which 
leverage increases a large investor’s stake in the firm and thus her monitoring incentives 
(all else equal).  I use the ratio of long-term debt to total assets as a measure of the firm’s 
leverage.   
 Liquidity: Maug (1998) finds liquidity encourages large investors to hold block positions, 
as it enables them to exit the position as needed.  To proxy for the firm’s market liquidity, 
I use Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure.   
 Inside Ownership and Chairman-CEO Duality: Insider ownership and entrenchment 
impact the monitoring costs of a potential blockholder.  Regardless of the effort the 
blockholder exerts, CEOs that own a significant portion of the company and those that 
are also Chairman of the firm are better positioned to resist any proposed changes to firm 
policies. Thus high CEO ownership and Chairman-CEOs reduce the incentive for a 
blockholder to invest in the firm.  In addition, CEO ownership reduces the float, limiting 
the shares available to a potential blockholder.   
 CEO Compensation: To control for the level of CEO pay prior to blockholder 
intervention, I include the natural log of total CEO compensation.   
 Industry and Time Series Effects: I use industry (two-digit SIC code) and year effects to 
control for industry differences and time series shifts in blockholder ownership, 
respectively. 
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Since blockholders may target different types of firms, conditional on the level of 
attention they expect to allocate to the investment, I estimate separate probit models for High 
Attention Blocks and Non-High Attention Blocks using the following specification: 
PሺBlockholderitሻ ൌ Φሺ߰i ൅ ߯t ൅ ߚXXit‐1ሻ 
where Blockholderit is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i has a blockholder in year t, i 
are industry fixed effects, t are time fixed effects, and Xit-1 are firm- and CEO-specific variables 
including firm size, book-to-market, stock return, ROA, leverage, illiquidity, CEO ownership, 
Chairman-CEO duality, and the natural log of total CEO compensation measured as of time t-1. 
Table 2 presents the results.  Model 1 (2) includes firms with a blockholder owning a 
High (Non-High) Attention Block and firms without a blockholder.  Consistent with the theory, 
firm size and CEO ownership reduce the likelihood a firm has a blockholder, while leverage 
increases it.  Illiquidity (i.e., an increase in the Amihud measure) and the book-to-market ratio 
have a negative and significant effect on the probability a firm will have High Attention Block.  
Across these variables, firm size has unquestionably the largest economic significance: a one 
standard deviation increase in the size of the firm reduces a blockholder’s propensity to invest by 
9.5% and 14.6% for High Attention Blocks and Non-High Attention Blocks, respectively.  The 
marginal effect of all other significant variables varies between 0.9% and 2.7%.  Overall, a 
shareholder’s decision to acquire a large position in a firm is multifaceted and, thus, the 
propensity score matching model provides an appropriate setting to identify control firms. 
To select the set of control firms, I next use the model to generate a propensity score for 
all firms in the sample and match each blockholder firm to the non-blockholder firm with the 
closest propensity score in the year before the blockholder acquires its block position.  I then 
calculate the changes, between the pre-treatment and treatment periods, in total compensation, 
17 
 
pay for luck, turnover-performance sensitivity, and the propensity to make a value destroying 
acquisition for both the blockholder firm and control firm.  Focusing on the changes in these 
measures around the time a firm shifts from the no-blockholder state to the blockholder state 
identifies whether the blockholders are responding to firm-initiated improvements (selection 
hypothesis) or initiating these changes themselves (influence hypothesis).  Filtering out similar 
changes to the control firms removes concurrent shifts in governance policies that are occurring 
at firms with similar characteristics and thus are not the product of blockholder monitoring. 
 
III. Results 
The following sections summarize the impact of blockholder attention on compensation policies, 
turnover decisions, and acquisition activity.   
 
A. Level of CEO Compensation 
I first look to executive compensation for signs of differential monitoring effects.  Both the 
level of pay and pay for performance have caught the ire of shareholders, regulators, and 
academics (Bebchuk and Fried (2005)).  To the extent CEOs are overcompensated, blockholders 
can work with directors to adjust the level of CEO pay. 
Table 3 presents a comparison of changes in total CEO compensation at firms with and 
without blockholders.  Model 1 (2) is estimated using the High Attention (Non-High Attention) 
sample.  The dependent variable in the models is the natural log of total compensation (TDC1).  
To control for outliers, total compensation is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  The 
average (median) CEO in the High Attention Block sample earns $3.9M ($2.8M) in the year 
prior to the block taking its position, while an average (median) CEO in the Non-High Attention 
Block sample earns $3.1M ($1.8M) (see Table 1).  Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) find 
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similar levels of CEO compensation in their sample, with a median value of $2.7M.  All models 
include the explanatory variables from Cai and Walkling (2011) and, therefore, control for firm 
size, firm performance, leverage, and book-to-market.  With two-way fixed effects (firm and 
year), the residual variation captures intra-firm changes in CEO pay in absence of inter-temporal 
shifts in executive compensation policies. 
Typically, when the literature measures the effect of monitoring on CEO pay, it is an average 
effect across all firms in the sample (see, for instance, Hartzell and Starks (2003) and Cronqvist 
and Fahlenbrach (2009)).  There is, however, considerable cross-sectional variation in the 
amount of unexplained compensation CEOs earn.  One would not expect shareholders to wage a 
campaign against relatively underpaid CEOs with the same intensity as one against a CEO who 
is grossly overpaid.  In fact, concern for the loss of managerial talent may lead investors to 
encourage the board to increase the pay of an underpaid CEO.  Hence, the pooling of overpaid 
and underpaid CEOs will attenuate the true effect of monitoring on CEO pay.  To control for the 
possibility of a differential effect, both samples are segmented by the level of unexplained CEO 
compensation.  Unexplained compensation is the residual from a (unreported) model of the 
natural log of total CEO compensation on firm size, firm stock return, leverage, book-to-market, 
accounting performance, industry effects, and year effects across all firms in the ExecuComp 
universe from 1998 to 2008.  Underpaid (Overpaid) CEOs are those with negative (positive) 
unexplained compensation in the year prior to the treatment period.       
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To implement the DID framework, the models are estimated using the following 
specification: 
 
yit ൌ ߚଵOPi ൈ TPit ൅ ߚଶOPi ൈ TPit ൈ Bi ൅ ߚଷUPi ൈ TPit ൅ ߚସUPi ൈ TPit ൈ Bi ൅ γ௜ ൅ ߯t ൅ ߙ௑Xit ൅ ߝi,t 
 
where yit is the natural log of total CEO compensation in firm i at time t, OP(UP)  is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the firm has an Overpaid (Underpaid) CEO, TP is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the firm-year is part of the treatment period, B is an indicator equal to one for 
firms that have a blockholder (treatment period) or will have a blockholder (pre-treatment 
period), i are firm fixed effects, t are time fixed effects, and Xit are firm-specific variables 
including firm size, stock return, leverage, ROA, and book-to-market.  The coefficients on the 
Treatment Period indicators (1 and ) measure changes in CEO pay at the control firms, while 
the coefficients on the interaction terms between Treatment Period and Block (2 and 4) capture 
the incremental effect of having a blockholder at the firm.  Thus, a negative (positive) and 
significant 2 (4) suggests blockholders are able to lower (raise) the residual compensation of 
Overpaid (Underpaid) CEOs.   
The results in Table 3 offer two main takeaways.  First, it is important to analyze changes in 
CEO pay conditional on whether unexplained compensation is positive or negative.  For the 
Underpaid CEOs, the coefficient on the Treatment Period indicator is positive and significant in 
both the High-Attention and Non-High Attention samples suggesting that the pay of these CEOs 
increases.  Conversely, the coefficient on Treatment Period is negative for the Overpaid CEOs, 
although only significant in the Non-High Attention sample.  Firms appear to reduce the pay of 
Overpaid CEOs.  Overall, the control firms in the sample exhibit mean reversion in CEO pay 
between the pre-treatment and treatment periods.   
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Second, High Attention Blocks reduce the compensation of Overpaid CEOs.  As shown in 
Table 3, the coefficient on the interaction between Treatment Period and Block for Overpaid 
CEOs in the High Attention Block sample is negative and significant.  The point estimate of  
-0.123 suggests the incremental effect of blockholders is to reduce total CEO compensation by 
an additional 11.6%.13  Non-High Attention Blocks, which are less likely to devote resources to 
monitoring the firm, have an insignificant marginal effect on the pay of Overpaid CEOs.14  Thus, 
the firms in which institutions with Non-High Attention Blocks invest do decrease unexplained 
pay, but only at a rate consistent with that of their control firms.  Taken together, the evidence 
suggests attention leads large shareholders to substantially reduce abnormally high CEO 
compensation.    
While neither High Attention Blocks nor Non-High Attention Blocks has a statistically 
significant impact on the compensation of Underpaid CEOs, High Attention Blocks appear to 
have an economically meaningful effect.  Control firms in the High Attention Block sample 
increase total compensation of Underpaid CEOs by 17.5% in the treatment period.  In contrast, 
firms with Underpaid CEOs and High Attention Blocks increase total CEO compensation by 
26.5%, or, in comparison, 51% more than control firms do.  Since the estimate of the incremental 
effect of the High Attention Blocks has a p-value of only 0.167, the evidence is far from 
conclusive.  Nevertheless, along with the results for Overpaid CEOs, the effects on Underpaid 
CEOs bolster the argument that institutions with High Attention Blocks are effective monitors.           
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Since the dependent variable is in logs, the marginal effect of an indicator variable equals e-1. 
14 In unreported tests, the difference between the High Attention Block and Non-High Attention Block coefficients 
is significant at the five percent level. 
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B. Pay for Luck 
Much of the angst against executive compensation stems from the perception that CEOs 
reward themselves ahead of their shareholders.  A prime example of such behavior is the issue of 
pay for luck, in which external factors, outside the control of the CEO, drive compensation.  
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) (B&M)  find pervasive evidence of pay for luck and show that 
blockholders, particularly those on the board, often sever the link between exogenous factors 
(e.g., industry performance) and CEO pay.  Building upon this work, I analyze the role of 
blockholder attention on eliminating pay for luck. 
To implement the B&M analysis, I modify the total compensation models of Table 3 and 
replace the firm’s stock return and ROA with B&M’s accounting measure of performance 
(operating income divided by total assets).  Following the B&M specification, the firm-level rate 
of accounting return is then modeled as an endogenous variable with industry return used as an 
instrument.  Specifically, B&M define the industry return in a given year as the weighted 
average rate of accounting return in that year in the two-digit SIC code industry the firms 
belongs to, excluding the firm itself from the calculation.  The weight of a given firm is the share 
of its total assets in the aggregate total assets of the industry.  The fitted value from a first stage 
model of the firm’s accounting performance regressed on the industry return instrument and all 
other compensation model regressors is used in the second stage total compensation model.  A 
positive coefficient on this fitted value suggests CEOs are rewarded for changes in the firm’s 
accounting returns directly attributable to changes in the performance of all other firms in the 
industry. 
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Given the structure of the DID analysis, the two-stage system of equations has the 
following specification: 
First Stage Models: 
perfit ൌ bଵଵoit ൅ bଵଶoit ൈ Bi ൅ bଵଷoit ൈ Tit ൅ bଵସoit ൈ Tit ൈ Bi ൅ g1i ൅ c1t ൅ a1XXit ൅ e1it  
 
perfit ൈ Bi ൌ bଶଵoit ൅ bଶଶoit ൈ Bi ൅ bଶଷoit ൈ Tit ൅ bଶସoit ൈ Tit ൈ Bi ൅ g2i ൅ c2t ൅ a2XXit ൅ e2it  
 
perfit ൈ Tit ൌ bଷଵoit ൅ bଷଶoit ൈ Bi ൅ bଷଷoit ൈ Tit ൅ bଷସoit ൈ Tit ൈ Bi ൅ g3i ൅ c3t ൅ a3XXit ൅ e3it  
 
perfit ൈ Tit ൈ Bi ൌ bସଵoit ൅ bସଶoit ൈ Bi ൅ bସଷoit ൈ Tit ൅ bସସoit ൈ Tit ൈ Bi ൅ g4i ൅ c4t ൅
a4XXit ൅ e4it  
Second Stage Model: 
yit ൌ βଵperf෢ it ൅ βଶperfit ൈ Bi෣ ൅ βଷperfit ൈ Tit෣ ൅ βସperfit ൈ Bi ൈ Tit෣ ൅ γ݅ ൅ ߯t ൅ ߙܺXit ൅ ߝit  
 
where perfit is the accounting return of firm i in time t, oit is the luck measure (industry returns), 
gi/i are firm fixed effects, ci/i are time fixed effects, Xit are the firm-specific control variables of 
the compensation model, and Tit and Bi are the Treatment Period and Block indicators, 
respectively. 
All four accounting return variables in the second stage model, the performance measure 
and the interactions, are endogenous and thus instrumented.  Following the specification of the 
models in B&M Table IV (see note b to their table), each endogenous variable is fitted using a 
separate first-stage model, in which the instruments are the industry accounting performance 
variable, described above, and the interactions of industry performance with the various indicator 
variables.  In the unreported first stage results, the coefficients on the industry instruments (b11, 
b22, b33, b44) are positive and highly significant.         
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Each of the instrumented firm performance variables measures pay-for-luck in a specific 
segment of the sample.  The coefficient on the fitted firm-level accounting return (1) captures 
pay-for-luck at control firms during the pre-treatment period.  The interaction between the 
performance measure and the Block indicator variable (2) captures the incremental pay-for-luck 
during the pre-treatment period at firms that transition to the blockholder state in the treatment 
period.  The interaction between the performance measure and the Treatment Period indicator 
(3) captures the change in pay-for-luck at control firms between the pre-treatment and treatment 
periods.  And the three-way interaction between the firm’s accounting return, the Treatment 
Period indicator, and the Block indicator (4) isolates the blockholder’s impact on the firm’s pay-
for-luck.  Since positive s indicate pay-for-luck (an increase in industry performance leads to an 
increase in the CEO’s pay), a negative and significant 4 would indicate blockholders improve 
the firm’s pay-for-performance.    
Given the results in Table 3 indicate differences in unexplained compensation in the pre-
treatment period lead to differential blockholder effects on compensation policies, the pay-for-
luck models are estimated using Overpaid CEO and Underpaid CEO subsamples of both of the 
High Attention and Non-High Attention samples.  Across all four samples in Table 4, the results 
are fairly consistent.  There is robust evidence of pay-for-luck at both control firms and soon-to-
be blockholder firms during the pre-treatment period.  The coefficient on the fitted accounting 
performance measure is positive in all models and significant in three of the models, while the 
coefficient on the interaction term with the Block indicator is always insignificant.  In the 
Overpaid CEO sample, pay-for-luck diminishes significantly at the control firms during the 
treatment period.  Conversely, pay-for-luck actually increases during the treatment period at 
control firms with underpaid CEOs.   
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With regard to blockholder effects, High Attention Blocks have a significant incremental 
effect on pay-for-luck at firms with overpaid CEOs.  The negative coefficient on the three-way 
interaction (-1.53) suggests one mechanism through which firms with High Attention Blocks 
lower CEO compensation is by reducing the loading of compensation on industry performance.  
Institutions with Non-High Attention Blocks do not, however, have a similar impact,15 nor does 
either type of blockholder have an effect on pay-for-luck at firms with Underpaid CEOs.  
Overall, the data shows that High Attention Blocks have a material effect on a firm’s pay-for-
performance and, specifically, on pay-for-luck. 
 
C. CEO Turnover 
Overpaid CEOs are emblematic of deeper agency issues at the firm.  Another symptom of 
these problems is the tenuous relation between firm performance and CEO turnover.  Although 
countless studies show that a CEO’s job security is inversely related to the firm’s performance 
(e.g., Kaplan and Minton (2010) (KM)), there is evidence that firms often wait too long to 
remove a poorly performing executive (see Taylor (2010)).  A large shareholder is positioned to 
hold executives accountable for their performance.  It not only has the ability to see that a change 
is necessary, but, given its significant ownership position in the firm, is also motivated to fight 
for that change.  Indeed, the literature offers some evidence that blockholders strengthen the link 
between turnover decisions and firm performance (see KM).  Again, the aggregation of all 
blockholders into a single group may, however, mask the true effect of blockholders on turnover-
performance sensitivity. 
                                                 
15 Again, the difference between the High Attention and Non-High Attention coefficients is significant at the five 
percent level. 
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A natural consequence of effective monitoring is an increase in accountability.  To see 
whether High Attention Blocks deliver this result, the models in Table 5 analyze the impact of 
blockholders on turnover-performance sensitivity.  Following the work of KM, I first identify all 
CEO turnover events during the pre-treatment and treatment periods that do not involve the death 
of the CEO.  As reported in Table 2, in the year prior to the blockholder taking its position, 
11.1% of firms in the High Attention Block sample changed CEOs, while 10.3% of firms in the 
Non-High Attention Block sample did so.  These rates are slightly lower than KM’s internal 
turnover rate of 12.3%, for the 2000-2007 period.     
I then use the following probit model, specified similar to those in KM, to relate the 
likelihood of CEO turnover to various performance measures:  
 
PሺTOitሻ ൌ ΦሺSPt‐1	ൈ	ሺߚଵ ൅ ߚଶBi ൅ ߚଷTit ൅ ߚସTitBiሻ ൅ 
IAit‐1	ൈ	ሺߚହ ൅ ߚ଺Bi ൅ ߚ଻Tit ൅ ߚ଼TitBiሻ ൅ 
FA௜௧ିଵ	ൈ	ሺߚଽ ൅ ߚଵ଴Bi ൅ ߚଵଵTit ൅ ߚଵଶTitBiሻ ൅ ߚ13AGE60it‐1 ൅ ߯tሻ  
 
where TOit is an indicator equal to one if firm i changes its CEO in year t, SPt-1 is the market 
return (S&P 500) in year t-1, IAt-1 is the industry return (return of the median firm in each two-
digit SIC code industry) of firm i less the market return in year t-1, FAt-1 is the firm’s industry-
adjusted return (firm return less industry return) in year t-1, AGE60it-1 is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the firm’s CEO is at least 60 years old in year t-1, t are time fixed effects, and Tit 
and Bi are the Treatment Period and Block indicators, respectively.   
Blockholder effects come into the models through interaction terms with each of the return 
variables.  The Block interaction terms measure differences in turnover-performance sensitivity 
between control firms and soon-to-be blockholder firms in the pre-treatment period.  The 
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Treatment Period interaction terms measure changes in turnover-performance sensitivity for the 
control firms.  And the Treatment Period-Block interactions capture the incremental effect of 
blockholders on turnover-performance sensitivity.  Given the negative relation between firm 
performance and turnover, a negative coefficient on the three-way interaction between the 
Treatment Period indicator, the Block indicator, and the firm’s industry-adjusted return (12) 
would support the hypothesis that blockholders increase the CEO’s accountability. 
Estimating the model on the High Attention Block sample, I find blockholders strengthen the 
relation between firm performance and CEO turnover.  During the pre-treatment period, both 
control firms and eventual blockholder firms exhibit the expected negative relation between the 
firm’s industry-adjusted return and the likelihood of turnover.  As the positive coefficient on the 
Treatment Period interaction with the firm’s industry-adjusted return suggests, the control firms 
exhibit a weakening in this relation moving from the pre-treatment to the treatment period.  
Thus, for these firms, there is a breakdown in the accountability of CEOs as time progresses.  
Conversely, firms with a High Attention Block actually experience a modest increase in the 
turnover-performance relation.  The -0.682 coefficient on the blockholder interaction term, 
which is significant at the 10% level, completely offsets the positive effect for control firms 
(coefficient of 0.447). 
As in the compensation analysis, there is little evidence Non-High Attention Blocks impact a 
firm’s turnover decisions.  In fact, the coefficient on the Non-High Attention Block interaction 
term is positive, which indicates that, relative to the control firms, firms with a Non-High 
Attention Block are less likely to condition turnover decisions on firm performance.  Although 
both the High Attention and Non-High Attention effects are marginally significant, the 
difference between the estimates, which is statistically significant at the 1% level, provides 
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further evidence that blockholders exert more effort monitoring firms that rank higher in their 
portfolios than they do on those that rank lower.  The results extend the work of KM, who find a 
negative and significant coefficient on the interaction between lagged industry-adjusted returns 
and the percent of total institutional blockholder ownership, and suggest blockholder attention is 
a key determinant of effective monitoring.       
 
D. Acquisitions 
The goal of monitoring is to reduce agency conflicts between the firm’s principals and agents 
and, consequently, encourage executives to make better decisions.  Neither improved CEO pay 
practices nor better turnover decisions provide direct evidence that large shareholders engender 
better managerial decision making.  These results are simply suggestive of an environment in 
which better decisions are more likely.   
In contrast, acquisitions provide a direct view of the quality of the firm’s decision making.  
As Chen et al (2007) argue, acquisitions are “large and visible investments” that have the 
“potential for wide disparity between shareholder and manager interests.”  One reason a large 
shareholder chooses to allocate its effort to monitoring a firm is the belief that it will lead to 
wealth creation or, at the very least, mitigate wealth destruction.  Therefore, it is natural to 
investigate whether the presence of a blockholder is associated with better acquisition decisions.  
Blockholders could serve an advisory role, in which their investment expertise and familiarity 
with the M&A market produces information of value to management, or their monitoring may 
simply reduce agency issues and indirectly lead to better decision making.  In either case, an 
attentive blockholder is positioned to help the firm make better acquisition decisions. 
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In this paper, I analyze both the decision to acquire and the outcome of that decision.  The 
acquisition data from SDC is restricted to takeovers of public, private, and subsidiary targets 
with a value of at least $1 million, in which the acquirer purchases at least a 50% position in the 
target.  Approximately a quarter of the High Attention Block firms and a fifth of the Non-High 
Attention Block firms made an acquisition in the year prior to the blockholder taking its position 
(see Table 2).  To quantify the role of blockholders in acquisition decisions, I first specify the 
following probit model of the likelihood a firm makes an acquisition during a given year in both 
the pre-treatment and treatment periods: 
 
PሺAcquisitionitሻ ൌ ΦሺߚଵBi ൅ ߚଶTit ൅ ߚଷTitBi ൅ ߯t ൅ ߱XXitሻ 
 
where Acquisition is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i makes an acquisition in year t, t 
are time fixed effects, and Xit are firm- and CEO-specific variables including firm size, stock 
return, ROA, leverage, market-to-book, CEO ownership, and Chairman-CEO duality.  Tit and Bi 
are the Treatment Period and Block indicators, respectively. 
To the basic probit model, I add the Block and Treatment Period indicator variables from the 
DID structure.  The coefficient on the interaction term between the Treatment Period and Block 
(3) isolates the incremental effect of blockholders on the decision to make an acquisition.  Since 
firms make acquisitions for a variety of reasons, some value enhancing, e.g., synergies, and some 
not, e.g., empire building, the coefficient on the interaction term, and hence the impact of 
blockholders on the decision to acquire, is ambiguous.   
What is not ambiguous is the ability of some acquisitions to destroy value.  For instance, 
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005) document that acquiring firms lost a total of $240B 
around acquisition announcements during the four-year period between 1998 and 2001.  If 
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blockholder monitoring, or advising, has a material impact, the incidence of value destroying 
acquisitions should decline. To separate the effects of blockholders on the decision to acquire 
and the outcome of that decision, I analyze the likelihood a firm makes a value destroying 
acquisition conditional on the decision to acquire.  Value destroying acquisitions are defined as 
those with negative market-adjusted returns during the three-day announcement period window.  
In the year prior to the block taking its position, 12.2% of the High Attention Block firms and 
10.1% of the Non-High Attention Block firms made a value destroying acquisition (see Table 2).  
The structure of the Value Destruction probit model, shown below, is similar to that of the 
Acquisition model: 
 
PሺValue	Destroyitሻ ൌ Φሺߚଵ∗Bi ൅ ߚଶ∗Tit ൅ ߚଷ∗TitBi ൅ ߯t∗ ൅ ߱X∗Xitሻ 
 
where Value Destroy is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i makes an value-destroying 
acquisition in year t and all other variables are defined as in the Acquisition model. 
Here, the coefficient on the interaction term between Treatment Period and Block (ߚଷ∗) 
captures the marginal effect of blockholders on the ability of management to conduct a value 
destroying acquisition.  A negative coefficient would suggest blockholders improve acquisition 
decisions. 
The results in Table 6 provide further evidence that High Attention Blocks are effective 
monitors.  Neither group of blockholders has an effect on the propensity to acquire, as evidenced 
by the insignificant coefficients on the interaction terms between Treatment Period and Block in 
the High Attention and Non-High Attention models.  Given acquisitions are neither categorically 
wealth creating nor wealth destroying, blockholders do not produce a significant effect on the 
propensity to deal.   
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When I restrict the sample to firm-years in which firms make an acquisition, blockholder 
effort has clear value.  While the positive coefficient on the Treatment Period indicator variable 
suggests control firms exhibit a shift toward more value destroying acquisitions over time, firms 
with an attentive blockholder not only offset this trend, but also reduce the propensity to make a 
bad acquisition.  Furthermore, this reduction practically eliminates the marginally higher 
propensity of soon-to-be blockholder firms to make a value destroying acquisition in the pre-
treatment period.  These effects are, however, limited to firms with High Attention Blocks.  Non-
High Attention Blocks do not generate any significant effects on the likelihood of making a 
value destroying acquisition.16 
 
IV. Additional Tests 
The following sections summarize the moderating effects of block size, investor 
classification, directorships, portfolio concentration, and the duration of the institution’s 
investment on the basic relation between blockholders and CEO pay.17  Since the analysis 
reveals significant blockholder effects on the compensation of Overpaid CEOs, but not on the 
pay of Underpaid CEOs, Table 7 only reports estimates of the effects on Overpaid CEOs.  All of 
the models do, however, include the (unreported) effects on Underpaid CEOs. 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 The difference in High Attention and Non-High Attention coefficients is statistically significant at the five percent 
level. 
17 Robustness tests on the pay-for-luck analysis provide similar results and are available upon request.  For many of 
the subsamples in the robustness analysis, there are too few turnover events and value destroying acquisitions to 
draw definitive conclusions on the turnover and acquisition analyses.  None of the robustness results, however, 
provide any evidence that contradicts the primary findings of this analysis.   
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A. Block Size 
Although the size of the blockholder’s ownership position is not a direct measure of 
blockholder attention, an increase in block size does provide higher visibility and, potentially, 
better access to management.  To analyze the effect of block size on CEO compensation, I 
interact block size with the Treatment Period and Block indicator variables in both the High 
Attention and Non-High Attention Block samples.  The results in Panel A of Table 7 indicate 
block size does have a significant effect on CEO pay, the higher the size of the ownership 
position, the lower the level of pay.  This is only true, however, for High Attention Blocks.  
Thus, the size of the blockholder’s ownership position does not explain the effect of blockholder 
attention on CEO compensation. 
 
B. Investor Classification 
The average effect of High Attention Blocks on CEO pay may mask cross-sectional variation 
in the effects of different types of institutions.  Using the classification system of Bushee (2001), 
I classify blockholders as either transient, quasi-indexer, or dedicated.18  Transient institutions, 
those that predominately hold small stakes in numerous firms and trade frequently, own 
approximately 20% of the High Attention Blocks.  Quasi-indexers, institutions that are highly 
diversified and have low portfolio turnover, hold 47% of the High Attention Blocks.  Dedicated 
institutions, those with large, long-term holdings concentrated in only a few firms, represent the 
remaining 33% of the High Attention Block sample.   
To test for differential effects by investor class, I add interaction terms between indicator 
variables for the dedicated and transient groups and the Treatment Period and Block indicator 
variables.  Under the revised specification, the interaction between Treatment Period and Block 
                                                 
18 Bushee provides his data online: http://acct3.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html 
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captures quasi-indexers (the omitted group).  Panel B of Table 7 reports that quasi-indexers have 
a significant effect on CEO pay, with a coefficient of -0.150 (p-value=0.04).  In fact, the 
insignificant coefficients on both the Dedicated and Transient interaction terms imply that there 
are no meaningful differences amongst the effects of the three types of institutions and that each 
of the groups has a significant effect on CEO pay.  On the contrary, Non-High Attention Blocks, 
regardless of their type, have no discernible impact on compensation policies.  Overall, the 
results suggest blockholder attention is an important determinant of monitoring effectiveness for 
a varied group of investors.             
 
C. Directorships 
As discussed in Section I, blockholders on the board of directors consistently generate 
positive effects on firm policies.  To analyze whether High Attention Blocks simply proxy for a 
higher incidence of board representation, I use Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) 
directorship data to identify High Attention and Non-High Attention Blocks that serve on the 
board of directors.  Overall, neither group demonstrates much board representation.  Of the 362 
(367) High (Non-High) Attention Blocks, only eight (four) serve on a board.  While the size of 
the sample of directors does not provide enough power to draw statistical conclusions, the mere 
dearth of board seats overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that the effects of blockholder 
attention are separate from the noted effects of blocks on boards.          
 
D. Portfolio Concentration 
Resource scarcity and limited attention affect all investors and institutions.  The effects are, 
however, magnified by the number of holdings in the investor’s portfolio.  An investor with a 
concentrated portfolio will find it easier to allocate resources to its holdings than will an investor 
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with a diversified portfolio.  In particular, the attention measure I develop, based on portfolio 
rankings, likely serves as poor indicator of blockholder attention for institutions with 
concentrated holdings.  Distinguishing between the top ten percent and bottom ninety percent of 
the portfolio of an investor that holds only ten stocks seems somewhat immaterial.  Conversely, 
the distinction is likely quite meaningful for an investor with a thousand holdings. 
To test the moderating effect of portfolio concentration, I segment the blockholder sample 
into three groups: institutions with no more than 50 holdings in their portfolios (“concentrated”), 
those with between 50 and 999 holdings (“diversified”), and those with at least 1,000 holdings 
(“highly diversified”).  Approximately 14 percent of the High Attention Block sample is 
relatively concentrated, 69 percent is diversified, and the remaining 17 percent is highly 
diversified.  Next, I create indicator variables for each of the concentration groups and interact 
them with the Treatment Period and Block indicator variables.  Panel C of Table 7 presents the 
results.  As predicted, the coefficient on the concentrated interaction term is insignificant; the 
portfolio rank attention measure fails to capture the allocation decision of institutions with 
relatively few holdings.  A measure tailored to these institutions is therefore needed to draw any 
meaningful conclusions.  The portfolio rank measure is more suitable for the diversified and 
highly diversified institutions.  And for firms with these types of institutions, high attention leads 
to better compensation policies.  While the marginal effect for diversified investors is a reduction 
in CEO pay of 12.7% (p-value=0.03), highly diversified institutions lower the compensation of 
Overpaid CEOs by an additional 26.1% (p-value=0.00).  None of the institutions, regardless of 
the concentration of their portfolios, have an effect in the Non-High Attention sample. 
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E. Pre-Block Holding Period 
Attention is a necessary condition to foster change.  It, however, may not be sufficient.  
Another crucial ingredient is time.  Without the time to develop a relationship with management 
or learn the complexities of the firm, an investor with a short holding period is unlikely to 
generate long-lasting improvements.  In the data, there is significant cross-sectional variation in 
the duration of the blockholder’s investment.  To assess the importance of time, I analyze the 
relation between the length of time the institution holds at least a 1% position in firm, in the 
period prior to the inception of its five percent blockholding, and the blockholder’s impact on 
CEO pay.  Within the High Attention Block sample, approximately 38% of blockholders have 
held at least a 1% position in the firm for less than a year (“<1 Year”), 26% have held it for one 
to two years (“1-2 Years”), and the remaining 36% have held it for more than two years (“> 2 
Years”).         
Panel D of Table 7 reports results from CEO pay models with interaction terms between 
indicator variables for each of the three holding period classes and the Treatment Period and 
Block variables.  For High Attention Blocks, there is a monotonic relation between the duration 
of the pre-block holding period and the effect on the compensation of Overpaid CEOs.  While 
both 1-2 Years and > 2 Years groups of blockholders are associated with a significant decline in 
CEO pay, those that have initiated their positions within the last year have little effect.  Thus, the 
longer an institution is with a firm, the greater its effect on firm governance.  This is consistent 
with Chen, Harford, and Li (2007), who find that institutions that hold a significant position in 
the firm for at least a year have a significant effect on post-merger performance.  Once again, 
Non-High Attention Blocks have no effect, regardless of the length of time they have held their 
positions.               
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Overall, the block size, investor classification, directorship, portfolio concentration, and 
holding period analyses bolster the argument that attention matters. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 The supply of blockholder effort is limited.  Therefore, we must ask, how do 
blockholders allocate their attention?  Block size, the traditional determinant of monitoring 
effort, does not incorporate the allocation decision blockholders make in deploying their scarce 
resources.  Hence, not all five percent blocks receive the same level of attention.  In line with 
survey evidence, blockholders appear to allocate their attention to those positions in which they 
have invested the most capital.  Based on the results of this study, High Attention Blocks, those 
which fall within the top ten percent of the blockholder’s portfolio, receive the resources 
necessary to bring about change.  Consistent with the Blockholder Allocation Hypothesis, firms 
with High Attention Blocks lower the pay of overpaid CEOs, mitigate the effects of pay-for-luck, 
strengthen the relation between turnover and firm performance, and improve acquisition 
decisions.  In contrast, firms with Non-High Attention Blocks do not experience any of these 
effects.   
 Though the blockholder effects cited above are consistent with a binding resource 
constraint that results in suboptimal monitoring of some blocks, there is an alternative 
interpretation: High Attention Blocks need attention and Non-High Attention Blocks do not.  
While it is true that not all five percent blocks receive the same attention, it is equally true that 
not all blocks should receive the same attention.  As modeled throughout the literature, 
blockholder effort is an outcome of an optimization process that weighs the costs and benefits of 
monitoring.  Limited resources simply add to the costs of allocating effort to one holding at the 
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expense of all other holdings.  Blockholders are, however, aware of this tradeoff when they 
acquire their position in the firm.  Thus, it is entirely plausible that the blocks that fall lower in a 
blockholder’s portfolio are precisely the ones that require less monitoring.  Moreover, one 
motivation to invest relatively large amounts of capital in a firm is the expectation that 
improvements in the firm’s governance will generate higher returns.  Consequently, the 
correlation between the position a block holds within a blockholder’s portfolio and observable 
changes in firm governance may stem from an optimal allocation of effort to all of the blocks.        
 The contributions of this study do not, however, rely on distinguishing between these two 
interpretations.  In either case, both the theoretical and empirical work on blockholders will 
benefit from an explicit recognition of the importance of limited blockholder attention.  
Extending the positive analysis in this study, theoretical models of the supply of blockholder 
effort, either in the context of voice or exit, can postulate the normative response of blockholders 
to limited resources.  Such work will shed light on whether the heuristic-based allocation 
decisions studied here are efficient.  Empirically, much of the mixed evidence on the 
effectiveness of blockholders may lie in the pooling of High Attention Blocks and Non-High 
Attention Blocks.  Focusing on blocks that receive the requisite attention will likely provide 
stronger evidence of the role of blockholders within the firm.          
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Appendix 
 
Variable Definition 
   
Amihud Illiquidity The average ratio of the daily absolute return to the dollar trading 
volume on that day estimated each year (see Amihud (2002)). 
Book-to-Market Ratio of book value of assets to market value of assets (AT / (AT + 
CSHO * PRCC_F - CEQ - TXDB)) 
CEO Age 60+ Dummy Equals one if the CEO is 60 years of age or older, and zero otherwise.   
CEO / Chairman Equals one if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board, and zero 
otherwise. 
CEO Ownership Percent of the firm's equity the CEO owns. 
CEO Total Compensation ExecuComp total compensation (TDC1) 
Leverage Ratio of long-term debt to total assets (DLTT / AT) 
Market-to-Book Ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets ((AT + CSHO * 
PRCC_F - CEQ - TXDB) / AT) 
Market Value of Equity Market value of equity as of the fiscal year end 
Portfolio Percentile The percent of quarterly holdings in an institution's portfolio with a 
market value lower than that of the block. 
ROA Earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets as of the 
beginning of the year (EBIT / AT) 
Stock Return (Past 1 or 3 Years) Firm's one-year or three-year stock return as of the fiscal year end 
Turnover Equal to one if the firm changed CEOs over the past year, and zero 
otherwise.  Turnover associated with death is excluded.  
Value-Destroying Acquisition Acquisition in which the market-adjusted return during the three-day 
announcement period window is negative.   
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Table 1
Sample Statistics
High Attention Block
(N=362)
Non-High Attention Block
(N=367)
Mean Median Mean Median
Characteristics of Firms Attracting Blockholders
ln(Market Value of Equity) 21.0 21.1 20.5 20.4
Stock Return (Past Year) 13.4% 12.4% 15.5% 14.5%
Leverage 20.9% 21.2% 19.2% 18.8%
Return on Assets (ROA) 16.0% 14.6% 15.1% 14.1%
Book-to-Market 0.66 0.65 0.69 0.70
Amihud Illiquiidty 0.0130 0.0022 0.0213 0.0048
CEO Ownership 3.4% 1.3% 4.1% 1.7%
CEO / Chairman 65.5% 100.0% 61.6% 100.0%
CEO Total Compensation ($M) $3.9 $2.8 $3.1 $1.8
Turnover 11.1% 10.3%
Firms making an Acquisition 24.3% 20.2%
Value Destroying Acquisition 12.2% 10.1%
Characteristics of Institutions Owning Blocks
Assets Under Management ($B) $14.2 $5.7 $11.0 $5.5
Number of Holdings 486.2 190.5 283.2 139.0
Number of Blocks 31.3 18.0 30.7 18.0
% Assets in Blocks 29.3% 23.5% 32.0% 26.9%
Characteristics of Blockholders' Investments
Block Size 7.7% 6.7% 7.6% 6.7%
Total Institutional Blockholders 1.3 1.0 1.2 1.0
Aggregate Blockholder Ownership 8.2% 6.9% 9.1% 7.2%
The table reports sample summary statistics of new blockholdings in non-financial S&P 1500 firms over the period 
1998 to 2008.  A blockholder is defined as a non-mutual fund institutional investor that owns at least five percent of 
the firm's equity.  High Attention Blocks are blockholdings that rank in the top ten percent of the blockholder's 
portfolio based on the market value of the institution's holdings.  Non-High Attention Blocks are those that fall below 
the top ten percent.  All Firm Characteristic variables are measured as of the year prior to the blockholder taking its 
position and are defined in the Appendix.  All other variables are calculated as of the year in which the blockholder 
takes its position.  Assets under management equals the total market value of the blockholder's 13F holdings.  Number 
of Blocks and % Assets in Blocks are the number of blockholdings in the blockholder's portfolio and percent of assets 
under management invested in blocks, respectively.  Block Size is the fraction of the firm's equity the blockholder 
owns.  Total Institutional Blockholders equals the total number of non-mutual fund institutional investors with at least 
a five percent ownership position in the firm.  Aggregate Blockholder Ownership is the sum of Block Size across all 
Institutional Blockholders in the firm.  
Table 2
Characteristics of Firms with Blockholders
HAB vs. 
No Block
Non-HAB vs. 
No Block
1 2
ln(Market Value of Equity) -0.243*** -0.400***
(0.000) (0.000)
[-0.095] [-0.146]
Stock Return (Past Year) 0.042 -0.043 
(0.358) (0.354)
[0.004] [-0.004]
Leverage 0.717*** 0.414***
(0.000) (0.002)
[0.027] [0.014]
ROA -0.201 -0.064 
(0.299) (0.750)
[-0.005] [-0.002]
Book-to-Market -0.268*** 0.042 
(0.007) (0.682)
[-0.018] [0.003]
Amihud Illiquiidty -1.777*** 0.226 
(0.004) (0.501)
[-0.015] [0.003]
CEO Ownership -0.603** -0.754**
(0.049) (0.012)
[-0.009] [-0.011]
CEO / Chairman 0.014 0.042 
(0.706) (0.275)
[0.002] [0.005]
ln(CEO Total Compensation) 0.015 0.012 
(0.504) (0.627)
[0.004] [0.003]
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y
Year Effects Y Y
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.16
Observations 8,156 8,162
The table reports results from probit models predicting the probability a firm has a blockholder.  The sample 
includes S&P 1500 firms with institutional holdings data available in Thomson's 13F database for the period 
1998-2008.  Financial firms and firms with dual-class shares are excluded.  Both models include all firms 
without an institutional blockholder.  In addition, Model 1 includes firms with a High Attention Block (HAB) 
and Model 2 includes firms with a Non-High Attention Block (Non-HAB).  Table 1 provides definitions of the 
two types of blocks.  The dependent variable in the models equals one if the firm has the specific type of 
blockholder, and zero otherwise.  All explanatory variables are lagged one year and defined in the Appendix.  
Models include industry (two-digit SIC code) and year fixed effects.  p-values are shown in parentheses and 
marginal effects of a one standard deviation change in the underlying variable are shown in brackets.  *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.
Table 3
CEO Compensation and Blockholders
HAB
Sample
Non-HAB
Sample
1 2
Overpaid CEO x Treatment Period -0.070 -0.159**
(0.224) (0.011)
Overpaid CEO x Treatment Period x Block -0.123** 0.097 
(0.035) (0.150)
Underpaid CEO x Treatment Period 0.161*** 0.240***
(0.006) (0.000)
Underpaid CEO x Treatment Period x Block 0.086 -0.034 
(0.167) (0.562)
ln(Market Value of Equity) 0.417*** 0.421***
(0.000) (0.000)
Stock Return (Past 3 Years) 0.047 -0.010 
(0.147) (0.763)
Leverage 0.075 0.072 
(0.699) (0.724)
ROA 1.039*** 0.813***
(0.000) (0.000)
Book-to-Market 0.537*** 0.217 
(0.001) (0.183)
Firm Fixed Effects Y Y
Year Effects Y Y
R-squared 0.80 0.79
Observations 2,480 2,464
The table presents estimates of the effect of blockholders on CEO pay.  High Attention Blocks (HAB) and Non-
High Attention Blocks (Non-HAB) are defined in Table 1.  In all models, the dependent variable is the natural 
log of total CEO compensation (TDC1),  which is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  The Treatment 
Period indicator variable equals one if the firm-year is part of the treatment period, and zero otherwise.  The 
Block indicator variable equals one for firms that have a blockholder (treatment period) or will have a 
blockholder (pre-treatment period), and zero otherwise.  The Overpaid (Underpaid) CEO indicator variable 
equals one if the CEO has positive (negative) unexplained compensation in the year prior to the treatment 
period, and zero otherwise.  Unexplained compensation is the residual from a model of the natural log of total 
CEO compensation on firm size, stock return, leverage, book-to-market, accounting performance, industry 
effects, and year effects across all firms in the ExecuComp universe from 1998 to 2008.  The control variables 
of the CEO pay models are based on the abnormal compensation models of Cai and Walkling (2011) and 
defined in the Appendix.  All models include firm and year fixed effects.  p-values are shown in parentheses.  *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.
Table 4
Pay-for-Luck and Blockholders
Overpaid CEOs Underpaid CEOs
HAB
Sample
Non-HAB
Sample
HAB
Sample
Non-HAB
Sample
1 2 3 4
Fitted Accounting Return 3.902* 4.117* 3.508** 2.359 
(0.079) (0.062) (0.033) (0.446)
Fitted Return x Block -0.470 -1.651 -0.522 1.469 
(0.604) (0.341) (0.620) (0.438)
Fitted Return x Treatment Period -1.211** -2.477*** 1.863*** 2.431***
(0.016) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Fitted Return x Treatment Period x Block -1.530*** 0.683 0.159 0.053 
(0.009) (0.372) (0.816) (0.945)
ln(Market Value of Equity) 0.529*** 0.581*** 0.108 0.101 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.361) (0.420)
Leverage 0.846** 0.371 0.118 0.762 
(0.039) (0.248) (0.722) (0.184)
Book-to-Market 0.951*** 0.792*** -0.038 -0.231 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.880) (0.473)
Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Year Effects Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R-squared 0.62 0.65 0.71 0.60
Observations 1,323 1,095 1,155 1,367
The table presents estimates of the effect of blockholders on CEO pay-for-luck.  Following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), pay-for-luck 
is estimated through a two-stage instrumental variable regression, in which industry accounting performance serves as an instrument for firm 
accounting performance.  Firm accounting performance is defined as operating income divided by total assets.  The loading on the Fitted 
Accounting Return variable, in the second stage model reported below, is an estimate of pay-for-luck.  The interaction terms with firm 
accounting performance are also endogenous and instrumented with industry-based interaction terms in the unreported first-stage 
regressions.  High Attention Blocks (HAB) and Non-High Attention Blocks (Non-HAB) are defined in Table 1.  Overpaid CEOs, Underpaid 
CEOs, and all indicator variables are defined in Table 3.  All other variables are defined in the Appendix.  All models include firm and year 
fixed effects.  p-values are shown in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.
Table 5
CEO Turnover and Blockholders
HAB Sample Non-HAB Sample
1 2
S&P 500 Return 0.502 -0.646 
(0.320) (0.159)
Industry Return - S&P 500 Return -0.348 0.116 
(0.227) (0.673)
Industry-Adjusted Firm Return -0.644*** 0.005 
(0.001) (0.961)
Block
x S&P 500 Return 0.231 -0.306 
(0.616) (0.509)
x Industry Return - S&P 500 Return 0.037 -0.518 
(0.916) (0.140)
x Industry-Adjusted Firm Return 0.253 -0.271 
(0.298) (0.102)
Treatment Period
x S&P 500 Return 0.627 -0.310 
(0.300) (0.592)
x Industry Return - S&P 500 Return -0.243 -0.637 
(0.590) (0.154)
x Industry-Adjusted Firm Return 0.447* -0.592**
(0.092) (0.013)
Treatment Period x Block
x S&P 500 Return -1.050 0.682 
(0.194) (0.386)
x Industry Return - S&P 500 Return 0.544 1.598***
(0.366) (0.008)
x Industry-Adjusted Firm Return -0.682* 0.543*
(0.070) (0.096)
CEO Age 60+ Dummy -0.626*** -0.473***
(0.000) (0.000)
Year Effects Y Y
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.03
Observations 2,456 2,438
The table presents estimates from probit models predicting the probability of CEO turnover, in which the 
dependent variable equals one if the firm changed CEOs over the past year, and zero otherwise.  Turnover 
associated with death is excluded. High-Attention Blocks (HAB) and Non-High Attention Blocks (Non-
HAB) are defined in Table 1.  The specification of the models is based on Kaplan and Minton (2010).  All 
return variables are lagged one year prior to the turnover decision.  S&P 500 Return is the annual return of 
the S&P 500 index, Industry Return equals the return of the median firm in the two-digit SIC code 
industry, and Industry-Adjusted Firm Return is the firm's return less Industry Return.  CEO Age 60+ 
Dummy equals one if the CEO is at least 60 years of age, and zero otherwise.  The Treatment Period and 
Block indicator variables are defined in Table 3.  All models include year fixed effects.  p-values are 
shown in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level, 
respectively.
Table 6
Acquisitions and Blockholders
P(Acquire) P(Value Destroy)
HAB Sample Non-HAB Sample HAB Sample Non-HAB Sample
1 2 3 4
Block 0.012 -0.038 0.254* 0.012 
(0.876) (0.631) (0.077) (0.938)
Treatment Period -0.189** -0.080 0.288* -0.067 
(0.031) (0.378) (0.097) (0.721)
Treatment Period x Block 0.061 -0.052 -0.533** 0.188 
(0.602) (0.673) (0.021) (0.461)
ln(Market Value) 0.154*** 0.143*** 0.116** 0.023 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.714)
Stock Return (Past Year) -0.142* -0.179** -0.368** -0.139 
(0.073) (0.026) (0.034) (0.412)
Leverage -0.056 0.044 -0.562 -0.116 
(0.779) (0.826) (0.155) (0.786)
ROA -0.048 1.009*** -1.498** -0.444 
(0.891) (0.005) (0.031) (0.553)
Market-to-Book -0.006 -0.021 -0.033 0.029 
(0.844) (0.538) (0.560) (0.687)
CEO Ownership -0.557 -0.661 -1.204 -5.163***
(0.284) (0.183) (0.247) (0.003)
CEO / Chairman -0.074 -0.060 -0.421*** 0.057 
(0.227) (0.344) (0.000) (0.665)
Year Effects Y Y Y Y
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.05
Observations 2,432 2,390 544 454
The table presents estimates from probit models predicting the probability a firm makes an acquisition (Models 1 and 
2) or makes a value-destroying acquisition (Models 3 and 4).  The dependent variable in Models 1 and 2 equals one if 
the firm acquires at least 50% of a public, private, or subsidiary target with a value of at least $1M in a given year, and 
zero otherwise.  The sample used in Models 3 and 4 includes firms that make an acquisition within the year and the 
dependent variable in these models equals one if the firm makes a value destroying acquisition, and zero otherwise.  A 
value destroying acquisition is one in which the market-adjusted return during the three-day announcement period 
window is negative.  High Attention Blocks (HAB) and Non-High Attention Blocks (Non-HAB) are defined in Table 
1.  Treatment Period and Block indicator variables are defined in Table 3.  All other variables are defined in the 
Appendix.  All models include year fixed effects.  p-values are shown in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.
Table 7
CEO Compensation and Blockholders: Robustness Tests
HAB
Sample
Non-HAB
Sample
1 2
Panel A: Block Size
Overpaid CEO x Treatment Period -0.030 -0.146**
(0.618) (0.024)
Overpaid CEO x Treatment x Block 0.094 0.055 
(0.411) (0.670)
Overpaid CEO x Treatment x Block x Block Size -3.215*** 0.410 
(0.009) (0.764)
Panel B: Bushee Classification
Overpaid CEO x Treatment Period -0.071 -0.160**
(0.217) (0.011)
Overpaid CEO x Treatment x Block -0.150** 0.102 
(0.041) (0.184)
Overpaid CEO x Treatment x Block x Dedicated 0.040 -0.069 
(0.718) (0.511)
Overpaid CEO x Treatment x Block x Transient 0.053 0.070 
(0.560) (0.552)
The table presents robustness tests of the effect of blockholders on CEO pay.  High Attention Blocks (HAB) and 
Non-High Attention Blocks (Non-HAB) are defined in Table 1.  In all models, the dependent variable is the 
natural log of total CEO compensation (TDC1),  which is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Table 3 
defines the Treatment Period, Block, and Overpaid CEO indicator variables.  In addition to the Overpaid CEO 
interaction terms reported in the table, all models include corresponding Underpaid CEO interactions terms, 
which are not reported.  Block size is the fraction of the firm's equity the blockholder owns.  Dedicated and 
Transient are indicator variables based on the institutional investor classification system of Bushee (1998) and 
Bushee (2001).  ≤ 50 Holdings, 50-999 Holdings, and ≥ 1000 Holdings are indicator variables equal to one if the 
institution has no more than 50 holdings, between 50 and 999 holdings, and at least 1,000 holdings in its 
portfolio as of the year in which it takes its block position, respectively, and zero otherwise.  < 1 Year, 1-2 
Years, and > 2 Years are indicator variables equal to one if, prior to the initiation of its block position, the 
institution has held at least a one percent position in the firm for less than a year, between one and two years, 
and for longer than 2 years, respectively, and zero otherwise.  All models include the CEO pay control variables 
of Table 3, firm fixed effects, and year fixed effects.  p-values are shown in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.
Table 7
HAB
Sample
Non-HAB
Sample
1 2
Panel C: Portfolio Concentration
Overpaid CEO x Treatment Period -0.072 -0.154**
(0.207) (0.014)
Overpaid CEO x Treatment x Block x ≤ 50 Holdings 0.124 -0.043 
(0.272) (0.694)
Overpaid CEO x Treatment x Block x 51-999 Holdings -0.136** 0.104 
(0.034) (0.151)
Overpaid CEO x Treatment x Block x ≥ 1000 Holdings -0.303*** 0.278 
(0.003) (0.125)
Panel D: Pre-Block Holding Period
Overpaid CEO x Treatment Period -0.071 -0.159**
(0.213) (0.011)
Overpaid CEO x Treatment x Block x < 1 Year -0.029 0.095 
(0.705) (0.269)
Overpaid CEO x Treatment x Block x 1-2 Years -0.185* 0.139 
(0.052) (0.173)
Overpaid CEO x Treatment x Block x > 2 Years -0.194** 0.065 
(0.016) (0.496)
Figure 1: Difference-in-Differences Framework
Blockholder CEO Pay = Blockholder Firm Mean CEO PayTreat ‐ Blockholder Firm Mean CEO PayPre
Control CEO Pay = Control Firm Mean CEO PayTreat ‐ Control Firm Mean CEO PayPre
H0: Blockholder CEO Pay – Control CEO Pay = 0
Blockholder Firm Mean CEO PayTreat
Control Firm Mean CEO PayTreat
Blockholder Firm Mean CEO PayPre
Control Firm Mean CEO PayPre
New 
Block
‐2 ‐1 0 1 2
Pre‐Treatment Period Treatment Period
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1.      Introduction 
Our paper uses data on mergers and acquisitions to test whether corporations and their 
managers possess different levels of skill.  Skill is clearly an important issue in business.  Firms 
pay large sums to executives, presumably because they are skillful. And executives pursue 
educational and training opportunities to acquire skill.  Nevertheless, research on skill 
differences across either firms or their executives has been limited.  For example, Bertrand and 
Schoar (BS) (2003, p. 1170) state, “How much do individual managers matter for firm behavior 
and economic performance?  Research in finance and economics so far has given little 
consideration to this question.”  Our study provides evidence that, at least for corporate 
acquirers, there are significant differences in skill.  And, the skill differences appear to reside 
with the CEO, not the acquirer as a whole. 
For two reasons, mergers are a natural place to look for skill differences.  First, as 
Harford and Li (2007, p. 918) point out, “…acquisition decisions may be the most significant 
corporate resource allocation decisions that managers make and the potential wealth destruction 
to firm shareholders is large, as Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) document.”  Second, 
mergers have distinct announcement dates, allowing one to measure the consequences of skill 
through abnormal returns around these dates.  In fact, a large literature has already examined 
short-run abnormal returns around merger announcements (see, for example, the review articles 
of Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Bruner (2002)).  However, the returns in this literature reflect 
the average performance or skill of acquirers, not differences in skill across acquirers.    
To examine skill differences across acquirers, we ask the following research questions: 
1. Do some acquirers create more value than others? 
2. Do some acquirers extract more value for their shareholders than others? 
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3. Do some acquirers bargain better than others? 
The methodology we use to answer these questions is simple; we relate the success of a 
firm’s last acquisition, as defined by abnormal returns around the announcement date, to the 
success of its current acquisition.  This approach follows from the literature on money managers.  
Beginning with Jensen (1969), academics have examined differential skill across money 
managers by measuring persistence, i.e., whether managers either over- or underperforming in 
one period are likely to repeat their performance in subsequent periods.  Similarly, persistence in 
acquisition performance indicates differences in acquisition skill. 
Each of our research questions examines a different type of persistence.  Acquirers with 
either a high or a low ability to create value should exhibit persistence in the combined returns 
on both targets and acquirers.  Acquirers with either a large or a small capacity to extract value 
for their shareholders should demonstrate persistent bidder returns.  And, acquirers with either 
high or low bargaining ability should exhibit persistence in the ratio of the bidder’s dollar gain to 
the combined dollar gain of both target and bidder.   
Our results indicate acquirers do indeed have different levels of skill.  The paper’s 
univariate analysis suggests differences in skill across bidders in both extracting value and 
bargaining.  However, our multivariate analysis only provides evidence of skill differences in 
extracting value.  These differences may reside with either the entire firm or specific executives.  
We find evidence of persistence only when successive deals occur under the same CEO, not 
when the CEO changes.  Thus, our findings suggest that some CEOs are better than others in 
extracting value from mergers and acquisitions.   
While the strong statistical relation in our study may be due to our large dataset, we argue 
that it is economically significant as well.  In particular, a firm that retains a CEO who was 
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successful in her last deal earns, on average, 1.02% more on its next acquisition than does a firm 
retaining a previously unsuccessful CEO.  This incremental return is far above the average return 
to acquirers and is equivalent to a $175 million difference in value creation for the shareholders 
of an average-sized bidder. 
Our findings are distinct from those of the prior literature.  While a few papers (Conn, 
Cosh, Guest and Hughes (2004), Croci (2005), and Deighton (2006)) study acquirers and 
persistence, these papers do not focus on skill differences.  To our knowledge, only a few papers 
do examine differences in acquisition skill. Holderness and Sheehan (1985) analyze the abilities 
of six individual investors to make acquisitions, Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) 
investigate the change in acquisition performance of acquirers before and after large loss deals, 
Falato (2007) evaluates the impact of CEO compensation on corporate acquisitions, Malmendier 
and Tate (2008) study the underperformance of overconfident CEOs, and Bao and Edmans 
(2009) examine the skill of advisors to mergers and acquisitions.  The focus of these papers is 
quite different than ours. 
Our results are important for a number of reasons.  Acquiring managers, as well as their 
directors, financiers and advisors, would like to predict the success of future acquisitions.  These 
parties should care whether the success of their previous acquisitions is predictive of future 
success.  Target firms care about this persistence as well.  If an acquirer that earned high returns 
on previous deals is likely to generate a high return on its next deal, the target may demand a 
larger takeover premium.  More broadly, as mentioned in the BS (2003) quote above, there 
appears to be little research on differential skill anywhere in corporate finance, suggesting that 
results on merger persistence may inform other areas of the field.1  Skill differences among 
                                                 
1 Bertrand and Schoar (2003), themselves, do provide evidence that differences in managerial practices are 
systematically related to differences in performance. 
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CEOs are of particular interest.  Models such as Gabaix and Landier (2008) imply that skilled 
CEOs merit high pay.  Models of this sort are meaningful only if CEOs possess skill in the first 
place.  Some authors argue that CEO pay reflects efficient contracting, while others conclude 
that CEO pay is due to rent extraction.  Results on merger persistence at the CEO level may shed 
light on this debate. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Our data are described in Section 2.  
Summary statistics are provided in the subsequent section.  Firm-level and CEO-level results are 
presented in Sections 4 and 5, respectively.  Robustness checks are conducted in Section 6.  
Conclusions are drawn in Section 7. 
 
2. Data 
Following Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (FNS) (2002), our sample includes all mergers 
and acquisitions, both foreign and domestic, from Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) Mergers 
and Acquisitions Database meeting the following criteria: 
 The announcement date occurred between January 1, 1981 and December 31, 2007. 
 The deal was completed and had a disclosed dollar value.   
 The value of the deal was at least $1 million. 
 The acquirer purchased more than 50% of the target firm in the transaction. 
 The acquirer was a U.S. public company traded on the New York Stock Exchange, 
American Stock Exchange, or NASDAQ. 
 The target was a private company, public company, or subsidiary of a public 
company. 
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 The takeover did not occur within two trading days of another takeover by the same 
bidder. 
 The bidder’s share price was above $2 two trading days prior to the announcement.  
Based on these criteria, we have 21,043 deals in our initial sample.  
Our stock data come from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) U.S. Stock 
Database.  For 720 of the deals in our sample, CRSP data on prices and/or returns are 
unavailable for the acquirer.  These transactions are excluded from our analysis.    
Since the announcement date for each deal is central to our analysis, we also exclude 
1,421 bids for two additional reasons:  (1) SDC can only estimate the announcement date and (2) 
SDC finds that the announcement date occurs after the date when the target company is first 
publicly disclosed as a possible takeover target.  The latter case typically occurs with competitive 
bidding.  Lastly, we exclude 26 deals for which industry data are unavailable.  Our final sample 
includes 18,876 mergers and acquisitions.   
In order to examine the impact of the acquirer’s CEO on persistence, we obtain data on 
CEOs from the ExecuComp database, which begins in 1992 and covers only S&P 1500 firms.  
Merging the SDC and ExecuComp databases, we identify the acquirer’s CEO at the time both 
the current and prior acquisitions were announced in 3,820 observations.  
Each merger in our sample is classified by method of payment.  Using the methodology 
of Loughran and Vijh (1997) and Schwert (2000), we assign deals in which the consideration is 
all cash or all equity to the “Cash” and “Stock” categories, respectively.  Takeovers which are 
funded with a combination of cash, equity, or other types of consideration are assigned to the 
“Combination” category.  We classify acquisitions for which SDC does not report the type of 
consideration as “Unknown.” 
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3. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 shows the number of acquirers and the number and average dollar value of 
acquisitions of various types.  The top row includes all acquisitions in our entire sample.  The 
first two columns report 18,876 acquisitions from 6,089 acquirers.  The next column indicates 
that the average deal size is $339.5 million.  Deal size is the value of the transaction, as reported 
by SDC, adjusted via the Consumer Price Index to end-of-2007 dollars.  The next eight columns 
break down the sample by method of payment.  The number of stock mergers is barely greater 
than the number of cash mergers over our entire sample period, with the number of combination 
mergers exceeding the number of either stock or cash mergers.  While fewer than the numbers in 
the other categories, a substantial number of mergers are of unknown consideration.  On average, 
stock deals are largest in size and unknown deals are smallest.  
The last six columns break down the sample by target listing status.  About 60% of 
targets are private companies.  There are somewhat more public targets than subsidiaries of other 
firms in the sample.  The average size of public targets is many times greater than the average 
size of private targets, an unsurprising result.  The average size of subsidiaries is slightly less 
than midway between the above two sizes.  A year-by-year breakdown of this sample is provided 
in Appendix A1. 
Since our paper measures persistence, we are interested in acquisitions where the acquirer 
had at least one prior acquisition in our sample.  Summary statistics on this sample, termed Firm-
Level, are provided in the second row of the table.  There are 11,797 firms here.  In terms of both 
percentage of observations and average deal size in each category, this row is similar to the 
previous one. 
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Summary statistics on the sample of all observations with available data on the acquiring 
firm’s CEOs at the time of both the acquirer’s current and prior acquisitions are presented in the 
third row, termed CEO-Level.  Since our data on CEOs starts in 1992 and is only available for 
S&P 1500 firms, this sample is much smaller than the samples in the previous two rows.  The 
average deal size in this row is about twice the average size in the previous row, due to the size 
difference between S&P 1500 and non-S&P 1500 firms.2  As opposed to the previous two rows, 
the numbers of cash and stock deals both exceed the number of combination deals.  In 
accordance with the previous two rows, the average deal size is still largest for stock acquisitions 
and lowest for unknown consideration.  Private firms are still the most common targets and deal 
size is still largest for public deals. 
The fourth row considers all observations where the acquirer’s CEO is the same at the 
time of both the current and the prior acquisition.  The fifth row considers all observations where 
the acquirer’s CEOs at the time of the current and prior acquisitions are different.  The number of 
acquisitions in these last two rows sum to the number in the third row.  For the most part, both 
the percentage of observations and the average deal sizes across the various categories in the last 
two rows are similar to those in the third row.                  
Various descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2.  The acquirer’s (target’s) average 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is defined as the difference between the return on the 
acquirer’s (target’s) stock and the return on the CRSP value-weighted market index over the 
three-day period centered on the merger announcement date.  This return is denoted as Bidder 
                                                 
2 Over the period 1992 to 2007, the median market capitalization of the bidder’s equity two days before the 
announcement is $3.5 billion for those firms in the sample with CEO data available for both the current and prior 
deals and $442 million for those firms without CEO data.  Both figures are adjusted via the Consumer Price Index to 
2007 dollars. 
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(Target) CAR(1,+1) in the table.3  The Target CAR of a subsidiary is based on the three-day 
abnormal return of the subsidiary’s parent.  One cannot obtain the CAR of a private target.  The 
Combined CAR(1,+1) is defined as:  
 
       
   TargetMVBidderMV
11,CARTargetTargetMV11,CARBidderBidderMV

 ,   (1) 
 
where MV(Bidder) and MV(Target) are the market values of equity for the bidder and target, 
respectively, two days before the announcement.   
The first column of the table shows various statistics on Combined CAR( 1,+1) for all 
deals (Panel A), all deals where there is at least one prior deal for the same acquirer in our 
sample (Panel B), and all deals where we have CEO data on both the deal and the acquirer’s 
prior deal (Panel C).  The average CAR is 1.26% over the entire sample period, though it is 
somewhat lower in the next two panels.  The average CARs for all three panels are significantly 
positive.4  The next column shows that the average Bidder CAR is 0.95% over the entire sample 
though, again, the CARs are lower in the next two panels.  The average CARs are significantly 
positive in the first two panels, but not the third.  The mean Target CAR of 14.43% across the 
entire sample is much higher than the mean Bidder CAR, a finding consistent with previous 
academic work.  The Target CARs are somewhat larger in Panels B and C than in Panel A. 
We have far fewer observations for either the Combined CAR or the Target CAR than for 
the Bidder CAR since, as stated above, the Target CAR cannot be obtained when a private 
                                                 
3 While we use the terms “bidder” and “target,” our sample includes only successful, not failed, bids. 
4 Unless otherwise stated, the phrase “statistical significance” implies a p-value below 5%.  All p-values in the paper 
come from two-sided test statistics. 
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company is acquired.  In addition, there is a lack of data for public and subsidiary targets, leading 
to even fewer observations for either Target CAR or Combined CAR than for Bidder CAR.5   
The next column shows Bidder Share, defined as: 
 
   
       TargetMV11,-CARTarget BidderMV11,-CARBidder 
11,CARBidderBidderMV

    (2) 
 
The average Bidder Share for the entire sample is 51.56% and is somewhat higher in 
Panels B and C.  However, the sample sizes in this column are much smaller than those in the 
previous columns because we exclude all observations where either Bidder CAR or Combined 
CAR is negative.  The reason for this exclusion can be explained in a simple example.  Imagine 
that the Bidder CAR and the Target CAR are 1% and 3%, respectively, and both firms are of 
equal size.  The Bidder Share is 0.5 (= 1% / (1% + 3%)).  If, alternatively, the Target CAR is 
4%, the Bidder Share becomes 0.33 (= 1% / (1% + 4%)).  The Bidder Share rises from the 
first to the second example, though an increase in Target CAR is the only difference between 
examples.  However, elimination of all acquisitions with negative Bidder CARs is itself 
problematical, so care must be exercised in interpreting our results.   
The next column reports acquirer size.  The acquirer’s average market value of equity 
(two days prior to the announcement date) across the entire sample period is over $6 billion, 
while the median value is above $600 million.  As in Table 1, size is presented in 2007 dollars.  
Size is much greater in Panel C.  Since Panel C’s sample includes only S&P 1500 firms, the 
increase in size is not surprising. 
                                                 
5 Moreover, we find four observations where CRSP provided returns, but not prices, for the target, resulting in four 
more observations for Target CAR than for Combined CAR. 
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The last column presents the relative size of the target, defined as the ratio of the value of 
the deal, as reported by SDC, to the market value of the acquirer’s equity two days prior to the 
announcement date.  While the mean ratio is slightly above 23% for the entire sample, the 
median ratio is below 8%.  These ratios are somewhat lower in Panels B and C. 
 
4. Firm-Level Persistence in Performance 
In this section, we relate the performance of an acquisition to the performance of the prior 
acquisition of the same acquirer.   
4.1 Univariate Results  
We first perform a univariate analysis before controlling for other factors.  All mergers in 
our sample where the acquirer has a later acquisition of a public or subsidiary target are ranked 
by Combined CAR(1,+1) and placed into ten decile portfolios.  The second column in Table 3 
displays the average Combined CAR for each of the ten deciles.  As can be seen, the spread 
between the CAR in decile 10 and the CAR in decile 1 is quite large.   
For each acquisition in our subsample, we then calculate the Combined CAR(1,+1) for 
the acquirer’s next acquisition of a public or subsidiary target.  The average of these CARs for 
each of the 10 deciles is displayed in column 3 of the table.  The last row of the table shows the 
difference between the two extreme deciles.  As can be seen, the difference of 1.02% is 
insignificantly different from zero. 
Next, we repeat the exercise using Bidder CAR in the fourth and fifth columns.  The 
difference in Bidder CAR between the extreme deciles is a statistically significant 1.26%.  
However, Bidder CAR is not monotonically increasing across the deciles, with the average CAR 
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rising very little from decile 2 to decile 8.  This may indicate that persistence is due to behavior 
in the tails of the distribution of Prior CAR, a point we explore later in the paper. 
The difference between the average CARs in the extreme deciles appears to be 
economically significant as well.  The average Bidder CAR for the subsample where the acquirer 
made a prior acquisition is 69 basis points, a number not reported previously.  With an average 
difference between the CARs in the extreme deciles of 1.26%, the average difference in 
performance between the extreme deciles is 183% (=1.26/0.69) of the average Bidder CAR.  
This ratio suggests economic significance to us.   
Finally, we rank all acquisitions in our sample on Bidder Share (1, +1) and place them 
into ten deciles, as shown in the next-to-last column in the table.  For each acquisition, we then 
calculate the Bidder Share for the next acquisition.  The average Bidder Share for each decile is 
shown in the last column.  The difference in extreme deciles is statistically significant, though 
the numbers in the column do not increase monotonically.  We rerun the results for Bidder Share 
after including negative values for Bidder CAR (as long as the Combined CAR was positive), 
obtaining statistical significance at the 1% level.   
Table 4 provides findings from regressions.  The first three models of this table are 
simple regressions.  In the first model, the Combined CAR(1,+1) of the acquirer’s current 
acquisition is regressed on the Combined CAR(1, +1) of the acquirer’s prior acquisition.6  The 
slope coefficient of 0.0518 is statistically insignificant, providing no evidence of persistence.7  
The Bidder’s CAR(1,+1) of the acquirer’s current acquisition is regressed on the Bidder’s 
CAR(1,+1) of the acquirer’s prior acquisition in Model 2.  In Model 3, the Bidder’s Share(
                                                 
6 In the Combined CAR and Bidder Share models, the prior acquisition is defined as the Bidder’s prior acquisition 
of a public or subsidiary target.  There may be intervening acquisitions of private targets, for which a Combined 
CAR cannot be calculated.  By contrast, in the Bidder CAR models, the prior acquisition is the one that immediately 
precedes the current one, regardless of the listing status of the target. 
7 For all regressions in the paper, p-values are calculated using clustered standard errors (see Petersen (2009)).  
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1,+1) of the acquirer’s current acquisition is regressed on the Bidder’s Share(1,+1) of the 
acquirer’s prior acquisition.  The slope coefficients are significantly positive in these two 
models.  Taken together, the univariate results in Tables 3 and 4 suggest persistence in Bidder 
CAR and Bidder Share, but not in Combined CAR.  
4.2 Multivariate Results 
Of course, much of the perceived persistence may be due to other variables.  We report 
some basic multivariate regressions in the rest of Table 4.  The prior literature provides many 
more regressions in which Bidder CAR is the dependent variable than those in which either 
Combined CAR or Bidder Share is the dependent variable.  Accordingly, the literature provides 
better justification for control variables when Bidder CAR is the dependent variable.  Thus, our 
explanations below for use of specific variables are more frequently cast in terms of their impact 
on Bidder CAR.   
4.2.1 Description of Control Variables 
We control for the following variables pertaining to the current acquisition in the rest of 
Table 4:    
 Status of Target Firm:  Hansen and Lott (1996), Chang (1998), and FNS (2002) indicate 
that acquirers’ CARs are higher for acquisitions of both private firms and subsidiaries 
than for acquisitions of public firms.  
 Method of Payment:  Travlos (1987) and Franks, Harris, and Mayer (1988) indicate that 
acquirers’ CARs are higher for takeovers of public targets funded with cash or other 
compensation than for those paid with equity.  FNS (2002) show that CARs stemming 
from acquisitions of private firms and subsidiaries paid for with stock are higher than 
those paid for with cash or other compensation.   
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In order to control for both the status of target and the type of consideration, we create a 
set of dummy variables, each of which is set equal to 1 for a specific combination, e.g., 
an acquisition of a public company using cash, which we label “public/cash,” an 
acquisition of a public company using stock, which we label “public/stock,” and so on. 
 Same Industry (Acquirer and Target):  Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) argue that 
firms benefit from focus, suggesting that mergers where the acquirer and target are in the 
same industry might be more beneficial than mergers with the two parties in different 
industries.  However, FNS (2002) do not find different returns across vertical, horizontal, 
and conglomerate mergers.  We create a dummy variable equaling 1 if the target and 
acquirer are in the same industry and zero otherwise.  Following FNS (2002), industry 
classifications are based on Fama and French (1997).   
 Time (in years) Since Last Acquisition, expressed as a natural logarithm:  For at least two 
reasons, one might expect poor performance from an acquisition following quickly on the 
heels of the prior one.  First, managers are likely to pick the best acquisition first.  
Second, the next merger may occur while the acquirer is still “digesting” the first one.  
However, one could argue that an acquirer gets “out of practice” if the time between 
acquisitions is too long.  Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (AdBR) (2008) find that larger CARs 
are associated with a longer time between deals. 
 Competitive Bids:  Based on the findings of Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), one would 
expect competition to reduce the acquirer’s performance.  Accordingly, a dummy 
variable is set equal to one if SDC reports multiple bidders for the target and zero 
otherwise.   
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 Acquirer Age (in years), expressed as a natural logarithm:  Gondhalekar (2002) finds that 
announcement-period bidder returns are positively related to a firm’s age. 
 Same Industry for Both Current and Prior Acquisitions:  A dummy variable is set equal to 
1 if the targets of both an acquirer’s current and prior acquisitions come from the same 
industry and zero otherwise.  This variable attempts to control for learning, although the 
expected sign is ambiguous.  Work on the prior deal may yield gains in the current deal.  
Conversely, AdBR (2007) hypothesize that learning improves target selection, which in 
turn decreases the risk, and thus the return, associated with the current deal. 
 International:  Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) find that U.S. firms acquiring 
international targets experience significantly lower announcement returns than do 
acquirers taking over domestic firms.  Accordingly, we set a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
SDC classifies the target as a non-U.S. firm and zero otherwise.   
 Hostile:  Servaes (1991) posits that hostile takeovers may reduce the gains to acquirers 
because the premium is larger or because takeover defenses have made the target firm 
less valuable.  Accordingly, we set a dummy variable equal to 1 if SDC classifies the deal 
as hostile and zero otherwise. 
 Year Dummies:  In order to control for the market environment, we create a set of 
dummy variables where each one takes the value of 1 for a given calendar year and zero 
otherwise. 
 Industry Dummies:  We create a set of dummy variables where each one takes the value 
of 1 for a given industry and zero otherwise.  As stated above, industry classifications are 
based on Fama and French (1997). 
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 Relative Size:  Following Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) and Moeller, Schlingemann, 
and Stulz (2007), we define relative size as the ratio of the size of the deal to the market 
capitalization of the acquiring firm’s equity two days before the announcement.  Asquith, 
Bruner, and Mullins (1983) show that CARs are higher when the ratio of the size of the 
target to the size of the acquiring firm is higher. 
 Acquirer Size, expressed as the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the 
acquirer’s equity two days prior to the announcement of the deal. 
Controlling for both relative size and acquirer size is important in avoiding a potential 
bias in our regressions.  To see this, imagine that the expected NPV per unit of merger 
investment is identical for all acquisitions across all acquirers.  It is hard to claim true persistence 
in this world.  Further, imagine a world with two types of acquirers, Type A (B), where all 
acquisitions are small (large) relative to the acquirer’s market capitalization.  Because of this 
difference in relative sizes, the expected CAR would be small (large) for any current or prior 
acquisition by a Type A (B) firm.  Thus, a regression of the CAR of the current acquisition on 
the CAR of the prior acquisition would produce a positive slope coefficient, with Type A firms 
lining up closer to the origin than Type B firms.  However, if relative size is added as an 
independent variable, its coefficient should be positive, reducing or eliminating the positive slope 
coefficient on the CAR of the prior acquisition.  To be on the safe side, we add the natural log of 
acquirer size as well. 
4.2.2 Combined CAR 
The above control variables are introduced in Models 4 through 8 of Table 4.  In Model 
4, the coefficient on Prior CAR is insignificantly positive, consistent with the null hypothesis of 
no persistence in Combined CAR.  The coefficient on relative size is significantly positive, and 
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the coefficient on acquirer size is significantly negative.  The coefficient on public/cash is 
significantly positive.  The coefficients on the other control variables are all insignificantly 
different from zero.   
While the coefficient on Prior CAR is not indicative of persistence, persistence may still 
occur among either bad or good acquirers.  This separation is important; we want to know both 
whether acquirers whose last acquisition was poorly received by the capital markets should avoid 
future acquisitions and whether acquirers whose last acquisition was well-received should 
expand their merger activity.  This question is analogous to persistence research in mutual funds.  
Studies showing performance persistence at the high end suggest that some managers have 
special ability.  By contrast, studies indicating persistence only at the low end merely show that 
some managers regularly falter, perhaps because their expense ratios more than offset any stock-
picking ability. 
To this end, we create Winner (Loser) Dummy, which takes on the value of 1 if 
Combined CAR on the prior acquisition is positive (negative) and zero otherwise.  In Model 5, 
these dummy variables are interacted with Prior Combined CAR(1,+1).  As can be seen, the 
coefficient on Prior CAR interacted with Winner Dummy is insignificantly positive and the 
coefficient on Prior CAR interacted with Loser Dummy is insignificantly negative, consistent 
with the null hypothesis of no persistence among either prior losers or prior winners.  The p-
values on the coefficients of the control variables in Model 5 are quite similar to those in Model 
4. 
4.2.3 Bidder CAR 
Models 6 and 7 of Table 4 use Bidder CAR as the dependent variable.  The coefficient on 
Prior CAR(1,+1) is significantly positive in Model 6, though the size of the coefficient is lower 
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here than in Model 2.  Thus, we still find evidence of persistence, even after taking the various 
control variables into account.  Except for public/stock and subsidiary/stock, the coefficients on 
all of the target/consideration dummies are significantly positive.  The coefficient on the log of 
acquirer size is significantly negative.  The coefficients on all other control variables are 
insignificantly different from zero.  Because of the potential for bias mentioned above, we tried 
alternative functional forms of both relative size and acquirer size, always with similar results. 
In Model 7, Winner (Loser) Dummy takes on a value of 1 if the acquirer’s CAR on the 
prior acquisition is positive (negative) and zero otherwise.  The two dummy variables are each 
interacted with Prior Bidder CAR.  As can be seen, the coefficients are both insignificantly 
positive. Also, the p-values on the coefficients of the control variables in Model 7 are quite 
similar to those in Model 6. 
4.2.4 Bidder Share 
In Model 8, the dependent variable is the bidder’s share of the acquirer’s current 
acquisition.  The coefficient on Bidder’s Share is insignificant, providing no evidence of 
persistence.  In addition, among all of the control variables, only the coefficients on public/cash, 
public/stock, public/combination, subsidiary/cash, and acquirer size are significantly different 
from zero.  We do not report results with winner and loser dummies, since only acquirers with 
positive CARs are included.  However, we also re-run Model 8 including acquirers with negative 
CARs, generating similar results.   
Since we restricted the number of observations on Bidder Share, as described in Section 
3, the lack of persistence in this variable is not surprising.  However, the bidder’s bargaining 
ability should also be reflected in the size of the takeover premium.  Defining offer premium as 
the natural logarithm of the ratio of the initial offer price to the target’s stock price 42 trading 
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days before the announced deal, Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (BET) (2008) present a model of 
the determinants of this premium.  Applying a similar model to acquisitions of public targets in 
our data, we find coefficient estimates close to those of BET.  To test for persistence, we then 
include the premium paid on the prior acquisition of a public target as an additional explanatory 
variable.  Because the restrictions on Bidder Share do not, for the most part, apply to the 
takeover premium, our sample size is 999, as opposed to the 194 observations in Model 8 of 
Table 4.  Consistent with our Bidder Share findings, the coefficient on the prior premium is 
statistically insignificant, a result we do not present in tabular form.  Taking the results on both 
Bidder Share and the offer premium together, we do not find evidence that acquirers exhibit 
persistence in bargaining ability.8   
The results of Table 4 suggest that, while bidders show persistence in extracting value, 
they do not show persistence in either creating value or bargaining.  However, the relation 
between Combined CAR, Bidder CAR and Bidder Share suggests that persistence in Bidder 
CAR comes from persistence in either Combined CAR or Bidder Share.  In particular, it follows 
from formulas (1) and (2) that:  
 
   
   TargetMVBidderMV
BidderMV11,-CARBidder   ShareBidder CAR Combined 
     (3) 
 
The only difference between this formula and Bidder CAR is that the denominator of the right-
hand side of (3) contains MV(Target).    
                                                 
8 We also estimate a modified version of BET’s model with Target CAR (1,+1) proxying for the premium.  The 
coefficient on Prior Target CAR (1,+1) is significantly positive here.  However, we place little weight on this 
finding, given BET’s argument that Target CARs are “noisy estimates of offer premiums.” 
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Perhaps the reason we find persistence in Bidder CAR, but not in either Combined CAR 
or Bidder Share, is just the difference in datasets.  For example, the sample size for Model 6 in 
Table 4 is 11,797.  The sample sizes for the same regression for Combined CAR and Bidder 
Share are only 1,625 and 194, respectively.  To examine the impact of different samples, we 
rerun the Bidder CAR regressions with the smaller sample sizes, no longer finding significance 
in persistence.  In addition, any calculation of Bidder Share is problematical.  We showed earlier 
that if Bidder Share is negative, an increase in Target CAR actually raises Bidder Share.  Our 
approach, to exclude all observations with a negative value for Bidder Share, appears to us to be 
the best of a bad lot. 
 
5. CEO-Level Persistence in Performance 
Model 6 of Table 4 shows evidence of persistence in Bidder CAR.  This persistence is 
likely to be stronger for firms experiencing little change and weaker for firms experiencing 
greater change.  The present section focuses on the CEO, the individual generally assumed to be 
the most powerful in a typical company.  We conjecture that persistence is stronger when the 
acquirer’s CEO is the same at the time of both the current and the prior acquisition than when the 
CEO changes.  The effect of the CEO on persistence is investigated in Table 5. 
5.1 Multivariate Results 
The Bidder CAR of the current deal is the dependent variable in all of the models of 
Table 5.  The table uses data on CEOs from ExecuComp.  Model 1 keeps all observations for 
which ExecuComp is able to identify the CEO of both the current and the prior deal.  The 
independent variables in this model are the Bidder CAR of the prior deal and the control 
variables in Table 4.  The coefficient of 0.0626 is significantly positive and higher than the 
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coefficient of 0.0307 on Bidder CAR in Model 6 of Table 4.  (The coefficients on the control 
variables for this and all other models in the table are not reported but are available from the 
authors upon request.) 
We introduce two dummy variables in Model 2.  “Same CEO Dummy” is set at 1 for 
observations where the acquiring firm’s CEO is the same for both the current and the prior 
acquisition and zero otherwise.  “Different CEO Dummy” is set at 1 for observations where the 
acquiring firm’s CEO at the time of the current acquisition is different from the CEO at the time 
of the prior acquisition and zero otherwise.  Consistent with Table 1, 3,427 of the 3,820 
observations have a value of 1 for Same CEO Dummy and 393 have a value of 1 for Different 
CEO Dummy.  These two dummy variables are separately interacted with Prior CAR.  The 
coefficient on the interactive term with Same CEO Dummy is significantly positive, while the 
coefficient on the interactive term with Different CEO Dummy is insignificantly negative.  Thus, 
while the results suggest persistence for firms retaining their CEO, we find no evidence of 
persistence for firms replacing their CEO.  However, the lack of persistence for the replacement 
subsample may be due to the relatively small sample size of 393.   
To test for a difference in persistence between the retention and replacement subsamples, 
Model 3 replaces the interactive term between Prior CAR and Different CEO Dummy with Prior 
CAR.  Here, the coefficient on the interactive term involving Same CEO Dummy is still 
significantly positive.  Since Models 2 and 3 are mere transformations of each other, the R-
squares must be identical and the coefficients in Model 3 must conform to those in Model 2.  
Nevertheless, the results of Model 3 indicate that, even with the small sample size for the 
replacement subsample, persistence is significantly greater when the CEO is retained than when 
she is replaced. 
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In Model 4, Prior CAR is interacted with either the Winner or Loser Dummy and either 
of the two CEO Dummy variables, yielding a total of four interaction terms.  The two interaction 
terms involving Same CEO are significantly positive at the 10% level.  Thus, the regression 
provides (weak) evidence of persistence when both winner and loser firms retain their CEO.  
Model 5 replaces the two interactive terms involving Different CEO Dummy with interactive 
terms without a CEO dummy.  The coefficient on the interactive term involving both Loser 
Dummy and Same CEO Dummy is significantly positive.  As with Models 2 and 3, Model 5 is a 
mere transformation of Model 4.  Nevertheless, the significant coefficient in Model 5 indicates 
that firms which replace their CEOs after an acquisition with a negative CAR do better on the 
next acquisition than firms whose CEOs are retained after an acquisition with a negative CAR. 
Lehn and Zhao (2006) find that a firm is more likely to fire a CEO after an unsuccessful merger 
than after a successful one.  Our results suggest this replacement decision is often a good one. 
So far, we have used the Bidder CAR of the prior acquisition as the measure of a firm’s 
past acquisition performance.  In Model 6, we replace this variable with the average Bidder CAR 
across all of the acquirer’s past acquisitions for which the acquiring firm’s CEO was the same as 
the CEO for the current deal.  On the one hand, error may well be reduced when using the 
average performance of many acquisitions rather than the performance of just the last one.  On 
the other hand, persistence might be a short-term phenomenon.  Even with the same CEO, 
turnover in lower-level executives, adjustments in firm policies, and changes in industry 
conditions may reduce the relation between the performance of today’s acquisition and a far 
earlier one.  The coefficient on Average Prior CAR with Same CEO in Model 6 is significantly 
positive, as was Prior CAR in Model 1.   
23 
Since the CAR of the prior acquisition enters the calculation of average CAR over past 
acquisitions, Model 6 cannot determine whether deals before the prior deal provide additional 
information on the success of the current deal.  As an independent variable in Model 7, we 
introduce the mean CAR of all past deals, exclusive of the prior deal, where the CEO is the same 
as the CEO of the current deal.  The coefficient on this variable is insignificantly negative, while 
the coefficient on Prior CAR interacted with Same CEO Dummy is significantly positive.  Thus, 
while the success of the prior deal is predictive of the success of the current one, we do not find 
evidence that the success of deals before the prior one is predictive of the success of the current 
deal.  
We believe that, overall, the results from Models 1 - 7 provide strong evidence that firms 
retaining their CEOs exhibit persistence in acquisition performance.  However, CEO skill may 
not drive this persistence.  Instead, a firm’s decision to retain or remove a CEO may correlate 
with other firm policies that are the true source of persistence.9  For example, Masulis, Wang, 
and Xie (MWX) (2007) argue that corporate governance impacts the profitability of acquisitions.  
Perhaps the impact of CEO retention on persistence disappears once corporate governance is 
considered. 
As with MWX, we use the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) (GIM) index on 24 
antitakeover provisions (ATPs) as a measure of corporate governance.  A firm’s GIM index is 
the number of antitakeover provisions for that firm.  Since ATPs impede the removal of 
managers, stockholders in high-GIM firms are considered to have weaker rights.  We obtain data 
on ATPs from the seven IRRC volumes, published in 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 
2006. 
                                                 
9 To separate firm and CEO skill, one could evaluate the persistence of CEOs making acquisitions at multiple 
companies.  Unfortunately, only 2% of the CEOs in our sample make acquisitions at more than one company.  
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In Model 8 of Table 5, we add the GIM Index as an independent variable.  As before, the 
coefficient on Prior CAR interacted with Same CEO Dummy is significantly positive and the 
coefficient on Prior CAR interacted with Different CEO Dummy is insignificantly different from 
zero.  While the sign of the coefficient on the GIM Index is negative, as expected, the coefficient 
is insignificantly different from zero.  Next, following the approach of both GIM and MWX, we 
classify each firm with an Index score of 5 and below as a “Democracy” firm and each firm with 
a score of 14 or above as a “Dictatorship” firm.  Model 9 presents results with these two dummy 
variables added as independent regressors.  Again, the coefficient on Prior CAR interacted with 
Same CEO is significantly positive, while the coefficient on Prior CAR interacted with Different 
CEO is insignificantly differently from zero.  The coefficients on both of the governance 
variables are insignificantly different from zero.  The results in Models 8 and 9 do not suggest 
that corporate governance can explain the impact of CEO retention on persistence.   
We repeat the regressions in Table 5, first replacing Bidder CAR with Combined CAR 
and then replacing Bidder CAR with Bidder Share.  None of the coefficients are statistically 
significant for either variable.  Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no persistence for 
either Combined CAR or Bidder Share.  Because all the coefficients are insignificant here, we do 
not present these results in a table.  In addition, we do not present any further results in this paper 
on either Combined CAR or Bidder Share. 
5.2 Economic Significance 
Table 6 measures the economic significance of persistence in bidder performance.  The 
first column of the table is based on the Firm-Level sample, as shown in Table 1, consisting of 
all transactions where the acquiring firm had a previous acquisition in the SDC database.  The 
second column is based on the Same CEO sample, also shown in Table 1, consisting of all 
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transactions where the acquirer’s CEO is the same at the time of both the current and the 
acquirer’s prior acquisition.  Line 1 of the first column shows the cross-sectional standard 
deviation, 0.0723, of the independent variable, Prior Bidder CAR(1,+1), for all observations 
where the acquiring firm had a previous acquisition.  Line 2 presents the coefficient on Prior 
CAR from Model 6 of Table 4, 0.0307.  Line 3 indicates that the impact of persistence is 
approximately 44 basis points.  That is, Line 3 provides the difference in the expected Bidder 
CAR of the next acquisition between an acquirer with a Bidder CAR on its last acquisition one 
standard deviation above the mean and an acquirer with a Bidder CAR on its last acquisition one 
standard deviation below the mean.   
The average market value of equity, measured two days before the acquisition, of bidders 
with at least one prior deal is $6,475 million, as shown in Line 4.  Since the impact of 
persistence, as given in Line 3, is 0.0044, the dollar impact of persistence is $29 million 
(=0.0044  $6,475 million).  That is, for a bidder of average size, the expected dollar gain on its 
next acquisition if it had a CAR on its previous acquisition one standard deviation above the 
average would be $29 million dollars more than the expected dollar gain if the acquirer had a 
CAR on its previous acquisition one standard deviation below the average.                 
We can also express our estimate of economic significance as a percentage.  The average 
Bidder CAR for the subsample where the acquirer made a prior acquisition is 69 basis points, as 
reported in Panel B of Table 2.  Our estimate of persistence, expressed as a percentage, is 64% (= 
0.0044/0.0069) of the average return to an acquirer, as reported in Line 5.   
Our estimate of economic significance is larger for the Same CEO sample, with line 5 
showing a dollar value of persistence of $175 million.  This increase in dollar value occurs 
because both line 2 (the persistence estimate) and line 4 (bidder size) are higher in the second 
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column than the first column.  A percentage estimate of persistence would be quite high, since 
the impact of persistence, 0.0102, is much bigger than the (previously unreported) average CAR 
of 0.0001 for the Same CEO sample.  Because both the dollar and the percentage estimates of 
persistence for both samples are substantial, we conclude that the persistence observed in our 
sample has economic significance. 
 
6. Alternative Measures of Performance 
Our basic results on persistence in the Same CEO sample were presented in Table 5, with 
CAR(1,+1) of the bidder’s prior acquisition measuring past performance.  We now present a 
few variations of the Same CEO bidder regressions in Table 7.10  The log of the time since the 
last acquisition was introduced as an independent variable in Table 4.  The coefficients were 
marginally significant (p-value below 10%) in the bidder regressions of Models 6 and 7, 
suggesting some evidence that time between acquisitions impacts bidder performance.  In Model 
2 of Table 5, however, the unreported coefficient on this control variable is statistically 
insignificant.  Taken together, there is little evidence that the log of the time since the last 
acquisition impacts CAR.  Nevertheless, this time variable may affect bidder persistence.  In 
particular, as stated earlier, we would expect persistence to decrease with time since the last 
acquisition, due to both executive turnover and changes in firm policies and industry conditions.  
To test this conjecture, we interact the log of time variable with the CAR(1,+1) on the prior 
acquisition and either Same CEO Dummy or Different CEO Dummy, adding the two variables to 
all the other variables in Model 2 of Table 5.  The coefficients on Prior Bidder CAR(1,+1) 
interacted with the CEO dummies are presented in the first two rows of Table 7.    (As with the 
                                                 
10 None of the conclusions reached in Section 6 change when we estimate the models using the full sample instead 
of the CEO sample. 
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results in Table 5, the coefficients on all the control variables are not shown in this regression or 
in any other regression of Table 7.)  As can be seen, the coefficient on Prior CAR  Same CEO 
Dummy is significantly positive, indicative of persistence.  The coefficient on Prior CAR  
Different CEO Dummy is marginally significant, but of the wrong sign.  More importantly, the 
coefficients on the two variables involving log of time are insignificant.  Thus, our results do not 
suggest that persistence declines with time between acquisitions. 
However, in order to focus on time between acquisitions in another way, we rerun Model 
2 of Table 5, ignoring any observations when the prior acquisition occurred more than five years 
before the current acquisition.  The coefficient on Prior CAR  Same CEO Dummy, reported in 
the second row of Table 7, is significantly positive and the coefficient on Prior CAR  Different 
CEO Dummy is insignificantly negative.  These results are similar to those in Model 2 of Table 
5, indicating little impact from the deletion of mergers more than five years earlier.            
We observed in Table 3 that a conclusion of persistence may be due to behavior in the 
tails of the distribution of Prior CAR.  To explore this possibility further, we introduce the cube 
of Prior CAR (1,+1) interacted with each of the CEO Dummies as two additional independent 
variables, with the results displayed in the third row of Table 7.  Though the coefficient on Prior 
CAR  Same CEO Dummy is significantly positive, again indicative of persistence, the 
coefficient on the cubed variable is insignificant.  Thus, we do not find evidence of unusual 
behavior in the tails. 
Academic studies in finance frequently exclude both financial firms and utilities.  In this 
vein, we rerun Model 2 of Table 5, excluding acquirers in the Fama and French (1997) industries 
of banking, insurance, real estate, trading, and utilities.  The results, reported in the fourth row of 
Table 7, still show a significant coefficient on Prior CAR  Same CEO Dummy.   
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Just as persistence may be high if two acquisitions occur within a short time frame, 
persistence may be high if consecutive acquisitions occur in the same industry.  To this end, we 
create a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the current and the prior acquisitions are in the same 
Fama and French industry and 0 otherwise.  We then interact this dummy variable with Prior 
CAR and one of the two CEO Dummies.  The results are shown in the fifth row of Table 7.  
Again, the coefficient on Prior CAR  Same CEO Dummy is significantly positive, indicative of 
persistence.  However, the coefficients on the variables involving Same Industry Dummy are 
insignificant, providing no evidence of additional persistence when the current and the prior 
target are in the same industry.   
There is a possible inconsistency in the models of Table 4.  The performance of any 
specific current acquisition can be viewed as the difference between the CAR from the 
acquisition and the fitted value from the regression.  Thus, performance of the current acquisition 
takes into account the effect of control variables.  To be consistent, one might measure the 
performance of the prior acquisition as the difference between its CAR and the fitted value from 
a regression employing control variables.  To this end, we regress CAR(1,+1) on our control 
variables,11 using all acquisitions in our sample.  We then calculate a residual CAR (1,+1) for 
each acquisition in our sample as the difference between the CAR and the fitted value from the 
regression.  Next, Model 2 in Table 5 is rerun where, for each prior acquisition, CAR(1,+1) is 
replaced by Residual CAR(1,+1).  As can be seen in row 6 of Table 7, the coefficient on Prior 
CAR  Same CEO Dummy is significantly positive while the coefficient on Prior CAR  
Different CEO Dummy is insignificantly negative.  The coefficients on these two variables are 
similar to their values in Model 2 of Table 5.  Because the residual approach provides little 
                                                 
11 Since many of these acquisitions are the first in the series of deals for a given bidder, we are unable to include the 
time since last acquisition and same industry (current and prior targets) as control variables. 
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difference from this model, we use CAR(1,+1), rather than Residual CAR(1,+1), in all 
remaining work. 
If the market is efficient, the effect of an acquisition on a firm’s market value should 
occur upon announcement.  It is unclear whether SDC’s source for the initial announcement of 
any particular acquisition is a periodical, e.g., The Wall Street Journal, or a press release.  If the 
source is a periodical, the precipitating announcement could have occurred either before or 
during business hours of the previous day, resulting in price movement on day 1, or after 
business hours of the previous day, resulting in price movement on day 0.  If the source is a press 
release, the release could have occurred before or during business hours, resulting in price 
movement on day 0, or the release could have occurred after business hours, resulting in price 
movement on day 1. 
Because of this timing issue, market efficiency implies that market impact occurs over 
the three-day interval from day 1 to day +1.  Thus, we have used CAR(1,+1) as our 
performance measure.  However, since previous authors sometimes measure performance over 
other periods, we repeat Model 2 of Table 5 using the performance measure, CAR(2,+2), in 
row 7 of Table 7.  As with Model 2 of Table 5, the coefficient on Prior CAR  Same CEO 
Dummy is significantly positive and the coefficient on Prior CAR  Different CEO Dummy is 
insignificantly negative.   
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (MSV) (1990, p. 33) conjecture that “Bad managers might 
make bad acquisitions simply because they are bad managers.”  MSV measure managerial ability 
by industry-adjusted operating income growth, defined as EBITDA in year -1 minus EBITDA in 
year -4 divided by EBITDA in year -4.  The empirical evidence in their Tables 3 and 5 suggests 
that the success of an acquisition is indeed affected by the ability of the acquiring firm’s 
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managers.  We introduce MSV’s measure of managerial ability in row 8 of Table 7.  The 
coefficient on this variable is insignificantly different from zero.  More importantly, the 
coefficient on Prior CAR interacted with Same CEO Dummy is significantly positive, and the 
coefficient on Prior CAR interacted with Different CEO Dummy is insignificantly negative. 
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002), Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004), and Dong, 
Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006) all hypothesize that a high Tobin’s Q indicates a well-
run firm and use market-to-book (M/B) as a proxy for Tobin’s Q.  Chung and Pruitt (1994) show 
that this proxy is highly correlated with the more computationally-complicated Lindenberg and 
Ross (1981) measure for Q.  Accordingly, we also measure the quality of the acquirer’s 
management by M/B in row 9, defined in our paper as the ratio of the market value of the 
acquirer’s equity to the book value of the acquirer’s equity at the end of the fiscal year prior to 
the announced deal.  The negative coefficient on M/B, while marginally significant, is of the 
wrong sign.  Again, the coefficient on Prior CAR interacted with Same CEO Dummy is 
significantly positive, while the coefficient on Prior CAR interacted with Different CEO Dummy 
is insignificantly negative.   
The regressions in Table 5 likely suffer from an errors-in-the-variables (EIV) problem.  
That is, we want to regress the impact of the current acquisition on the acquirer’s value on the 
impact of the prior acquisition on the acquirer’s value.  We measure impact by CAR.  Since, in 
addition to the merger announcement, other information concerning the acquirer’s value is 
simultaneously released, CAR measures impact with error.  Error is likely greater for 
acquisitions of small relative size, because the NPV of a small acquisition is presumably low 
relative to the dollar impact of other news.  EIV problems arise when the independent variable, 
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not the dependent variable, is measured with error.  Thus, one might expect to minimize the EIV 
problem by examining firms where the relative size of the prior acquisition is high. 
To this end, we rank all firms on the relative size of their prior acquisitions and select 
firms in the highest relative size quintile portfolio.  Then we rerun Model 3 of Table 5.  The 
findings, which are presented in row 10, indicate that the coefficient on Prior CAR  Same CEO 
Dummy is insignificantly different from zero.  Thus, our attempt to reduce the EIV bias has led 
to weaker, not stronger, results, perhaps due to a smaller sample size.  
All of our empirical results so far involve completed deals.  However, one could argue 
that all deals, both completed and withdrawn, should be included because the market does not 
know as of the announcement date whether the deal will actually be completed.  Therefore, we 
rerun Model 2 of Table 5 with the dependent variable now encompassing all deals, both 
completed and withdrawn.  As shown in row 11, the coefficient on Prior CAR interacted with 
Same CEO Dummy is significantly positive while the coefficient on Prior CAR interacted with 
Different CEO Dummy is insignificantly negative. 
Exogenous control variables were added to the various models of Table 5 to make the 
coefficient on Prior CAR more meaningful.  However, some of the control variables are 
endogenous.  For example, firms can choose between acquiring public and private companies.  
Since prior research (see Hansen and Lott (1996), Chang (1998), and FNS (2002)) indicates that 
the average CAR to acquirers is higher if the target is private, one can view firms as exhibiting 
positive (negative) skill if they repeatedly acquire private (public) companies. 
We test for repetition in Panels A and B of Table 8, restricting our sample to observations 
where the acquirer’s CEO is the same at the time of both the current and the prior acquisition.  
On the vertical (horizontal) dimension of the 33 table in Panel A, the target of each acquirer’s 
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previous (current) acquisition is classified as public, private, or subsidiary.  In an analogous 
manner, the target is classified in Panel B as either public or non-public, where a non-public 
target is either a private firm or a subsidiary.  Each of the cells reports the number of 
acquisitions.  The chi-square statistics in both panels are significant, implying that acquirers tend 
to repeat acquiring the same type of target.  Thus, the findings of Table 8 can be viewed as 
further evidence of differences in skill across acquirers. 
The results of a similar analysis for consideration paid indicate that firms tend to repeat 
the type of consideration from one merger to the next.  Prior research shows that the average 
Bidder CAR is higher when cash, rather than stock, is used (see Travlos (1987) and Franks, 
Harris, and Mayer (1988)).  However, research by Travlos (1987) and Shleifer and Vishny 
(2001) suggests that firms are more likely to issue stock (cash) when their companies are 
overvalued (undervalued).  Thus, the difference in CAR here may be due to signaling, not to a 
difference in value added from the acquisition.  Because of this, firms repeatedly acquiring with 
cash (stock) are not necessarily exhibiting positive (negative) skill.  We therefore do not present 
our results in a table. 
     
7.  Conclusions 
Our paper tests for skill differences among acquirers by relating the performance of a 
firm’s current acquisition to the performance of the firm’s previous acquisitions, where 
performance is measured by stock returns around the merger announcement.  In other words, we 
look for persistence in performance.  We examine acquirer performance from three perspectives:  
the ability to create value, the ability to extract value, and the ability to bargain.  Accordingly, we 
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investigate persistence in the combined return, the bidder return, and the ratio of the bidder’s 
dollar gain to the combined dollar gain of both bidder and target. 
In univariate regressions, we find evidence of differential skill among acquirers in both 
extracting value and bargaining.  However, multivariate analysis only provides evidence of skill 
differences in extracting value.  Skill differences in value extraction may reside with either the 
entire firm or specific executives.  We find persistence in performance if the acquirer has the 
same CEO for both the current and the prior acquisition but not if the acquirer has different 
CEOs for the two acquisitions.  Thus, skill appears to arise from the CEO, not the acquirer as a 
whole.   
Of course, the removal of the CEO may correlate with another firm policy that is the true 
source of persistence.  To examine this possibility, we consider measures of corporate 
governance, a likely candidate for the true source.  Since our results on the CEO still hold in the 
presence of corporate governance measures, the CEO, not the corporate governance structure, 
appears to be the source for the skill differences in mergers and acquisitions.  Nevertheless, one 
cannot rule out the possibility that other executives or other firm policies are the source of 
persistence in performance.  
Our analysis also estimates the value a skillful CEO extracts for its shareholders.  An 
acquirer that was successful in its last deal and kept its CEO earns, on average, 1.02% more on 
its next acquisition than does a previously unsuccessful firm that also kept its CEO.  This 
incremental return is equivalent to a $175 million difference in value creation for the 
shareholders of an average-sized bidder.  In our opinion, these differences in acquisition skill are 
economically meaningful. 
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Appendix A1
Numbers and Dollar Values for Various Classifications of Acquisitions
Acquisitions
Number of Consideration Target
Period Acquirers All Cash Stock Combination Unknown Private Public Subsidiary
1981 175 212 $71.4 2 $0.3 1 $0.6 207 $47.4 2 $23.1 141 $12.5 44 $52.0 27 $6.9
1982 226 295 $47.1 0 $0.0 0 $0.0 295 $47.1 0 $0.0 196 $12.5 62 $20.1 37 $14.4
1983 327 402 $61.9 0 $0.0 0 $0.0 402 $61.9 0 $0.0 234 $17.3 60 $26.2 108 $18.4
1984 384 465 $103.3 7 $10.4 7 $3.7 437 $86.1 14 $3.1 231 $9.5 105 $41.3 129 $52.4
1985 178 201 $107.6 66 $41.0 43 $19.7 42 $40.0 50 $6.9 49 $4.3 90 $84.8 62 $18.5
1986 264 300 $89.9 63 $22.6 82 $22.4 46 $17.6 109 $27.3 132 $16.4 95 $38.2 73 $35.4
1987 248 277 $59.0 64 $13.8 76 $13.6 53 $23.5 84 $8.2 110 $10.0 87 $32.8 80 $16.2
1988 254 278 $66.4 69 $25.2 50 $10.2 54 $13.8 105 $17.2 100 $13.6 85 $26.4 93 $26.4
1989 296 335 $109.5 78 $19.5 92 $34.3 71 $45.8 94 $9.8 150 $10.2 83 $58.6 102 $40.6
1990 255 291 $33.5 61 $12.4 65 $7.4 65 $6.6 100 $7.1 142 $8.8 54 $10.8 95 $13.9
1991 300 359 $46.0 74 $5.0 91 $22.0 113 $15.6 81 $3.4 192 $8.7 65 $23.2 102 $14.1
1992 432 523 $49.7 81 $7.8 173 $21.5 146 $14.0 123 $6.4 307 $14.3 86 $22.8 130 $12.5
1993 569 727 $121.1 139 $11.0 251 $51.0 188 $52.0 149 $7.2 443 $16.0 106 $56.6 178 $48.4
1994 744 973 $134.1 190 $33.0 304 $49.5 289 $39.7 190 $11.9 578 $33.2 190 $73.0 205 $27.8
1995 821 1,051 $212.0 226 $30.5 339 $88.6 256 $75.9 230 $17.0 604 $27.7 217 $151.1 230 $33.2
1996 916 1,228 $291.4 227 $27.0 423 $112.1 327 $133.4 251 $18.8 792 $45.3 235 $198.5 201 $47.5
1997 1,072 1,521 $383.6 247 $39.0 510 $211.5 446 $112.1 318 $21.0 995 $62.5 316 $241.7 210 $79.4
1998 1,119 1,618 $865.6 306 $65.0 497 $515.3 476 $264.7 339 $20.7 1,048 $68.6 369 $525.4 201 $271.6
1999 982 1,319 $626.3 261 $47.2 449 $306.7 326 $251.0 283 $21.4 825 $76.8 341 $410.2 153 $139.2
2000 908 1,204 $859.7 216 $40.4 441 $496.7 328 $298.0 219 $24.6 804 $132.8 266 $407.1 134 $319.9
2001 614 749 $331.4 186 $28.4 167 $62.0 243 $229.2 153 $11.8 437 $37.5 207 $167.8 105 $126.1
2002 537 654 $175.6 221 $29.2 80 $91.1 227 $44.9 126 $10.4 400 $28.2 146 $124.5 108 $22.8
2003 539 651 $248.9 199 $36.3 91 $114.4 211 $82.0 150 $16.2 404 $31.8 155 $172.5 92 $44.6
2004 657 841 $280.3 313 $48.0 75 $143.5 279 $73.8 174 $14.9 575 $47.3 171 $210.4 95 $22.6
2005 660 839 $396.0 324 $75.0 57 $96.4 295 $209.5 163 $15.2 589 $66.5 153 $289.7 97 $39.8
2006 672 833 $414.5 362 $86.9 54 $65.7 265 $241.0 152 $20.8 575 $55.8 175 $340.0 83 $18.7
2007 571 730 $222.1 308 $116.5 21 $14.7 247 $73.3 154 $17.5 541 $49.0 136 $132.7 53 $40.3
All 6,089 18,876 $6,407.8 4,290 $871.3 4,439 $2,574.5 6,334 $2,599.8 3,813 $362.1 11,594 $917.4 4,099 $3,938.8 3,183 $1,551.6
This table reports the number and dollar values of acquisitions classified by type of consideration, status of target, and calendar year.  Sample comes from SDC and includes completed acquisitions of at least $1 
million announced between 1981 and 2007 by U.S. acquirers traded on the AMEX, NASDAQ, or NYSE in which the bidder acquires at least 50% of the target company.  The sample excludes deals occurring within 
two trading days of another of the acquirer's acquisitions, deals of bidders with a stock price less than $2 two days prior to the announcement, deals for which CRSP data are unavailable for the bidder, deals for which 
SDC can only estimate the announcement date, deals for which SDC finds that the announcement date occurs after the date when the target company is first publicly disclosed as a possible takeover target, and deals 
for which industry data is unavailable.  Number of acquirers is the number of firms in each year making at least one acquisition.  Consideration in a cash (stock) merger is all cash (stock).  Combination deals use more 
than one type of consideration.  Consideration is classified as Unknown when SDC does not report the method of payment.  There are two columns for each type of consideration and each type of target.  The first 
column includes the number of acquisitions, and the second column shows the dollar value (in billions) of those acquisitions, adjusted for inflation using CPI and presented in 2007 dollars.
Appendix A2
Control Variables
Control Variable Description
Public/Cash Binary variable equal to one if SDC identifies the target as public and SDC's percent cash variable equals 100%; 
otherwise, equal to zero.
Public/Stock Binary variable equal to one if SDC identifies the target as public and SDC's percent stock variable equals 100%; 
otherwise, equal to zero.
Public/Combination Binary variable equal to one if SDC identifies the target as public, method of payment is known, and neither 
SDC's percent cash variable nor percent stock variable equals 100%; otherwise, equal to zero.
Public/Unknown Binary variable equal to one if SDC identifies the target as public and method of payment is unknown.
Private/Cash Binary variable equal to one if SDC identifies the target as private and SDC's percent cash variable equals 100%; 
otherwise, equal to zero.
Private/Stock Binary variable equal to one if SDC identifies the target as private and SDC's percent stock variable equals 
100%; otherwise, equal to zero.
Private/Combination Binary variable equal to one if SDC identifies the target as private, method of payment is known, and neither 
SDC's percent cash variable nor percent stock variable equals 100%; otherwise, equal to zero.
Private/Unknown Binary variable equal to one if SDC identifies the target as private and method of payment is unknown.
Subsidiary/Cash Binary variable equal to one if SDC identifies the target as subsidiary and SDC's percent cash variable equals 
100%; otherwise, equal to zero.
Subsidiary/Stock Binary variable equal to one if SDC identifies the target as subsidiary and SDC's percent stock variable equals 
100%; otherwise, equal to zero.
Subsidiary/Combination Binary variable equal to one if SDC identifies the target as subsidiary, method of payment is known, and neither 
SDC's percent cash variable nor percent stock variable equals 100%; otherwise, equal to zero.
Subsidiary/Unknown Binary variable equal to one if SDC identifies the target as subsidiary and method of payment is unknown.
Control Variable Description
Relative Size The ratio of the deal value (as reported by SDC) to the market value of the acquirer's equity  two days prior to the 
announcement.  Per SDC, deal value is the total value of consideration paid by the acquirer, excluding fees and 
expenses. The dollar value includes the amount paid for all common stock, common stock equivalents, preferred 
stock, debt, options, assets, warrants, and stake purchases made within six months of the announcement date of 
the transaction.
Same Industry: Acquirer/Target Binary variable equal to one if acquirer and target belong to the same industry (Fama and French 48).
Log(Acquirer Size) Natural log of the market value of the acquirer's equity two days prior to the announcement, adjusted for inflation 
using CPI and presented in 2007 dollars.
Log(Acquirer Age) Natural log of the time between the announcement and the date of the acquirer's first appearance in CRSP.
Competitive Bid Binary variable equal to one if SDC's Bidder Count variable is greater than one; otherwise, equal to zero.
Log(Time Since Last Acquisition) Natural log of the number of years since the acquirer's last acquisition.  If the prior deal is excluded from the 
sample, then time since last acquisition is set to missing and the current acquisition is excluded from the 
analysis.
Same Industry: Prior Acquisition Binary variable equal to one if the current target and the target in the prior acquisition belong to the same industry 
(Fama and French 48).
International Target Binary variable equal to one if the target is a non-U.S. firm (based on SDC's target nation code); otherwise, equal 
to zero.
Hostile Binary variable equal to one if the attitude of the deal is hostile (as reported by SDC); otherwise, equal to zero.
Table 1
Numbers and Dollar Values for Various Classifications of Acquisitions
Acquisitions
Number of Consideration Target
Sample Acquirers All Cash Stock Combination Unknown Private Public Subsidiary
All 6,089 18,876 $339.5 4,290 $203.1 4,439 $580.0 6,334 $410.5 3,813 $95.0 11,594 $79.1 4,099 $960.9 3,183 $487.5
Firm-Level 3,566 11,797 $378.8 2,935 $215.9 2,887 $640.7 3,582 $489.0 2,393 $97.9 7,186 $85.7 2,785 $1,022.5 1,826 $550.7
CEO-Level 1,053 3,820 $762.8 1,254 $321.9 948 $1,445.7 829 $1,257.0 789 $123.7 2,063 $144.2 1,166 $1,712.4 591 $1,048.6
Same CEO 979 3,427 $761.6 1,102 $325.8 892 $1,390.0 723 $1,277.2 710 $123.4 1,850 $145.3 1,056 $1,674.9 521 $1,099.0
Diff CEO 347 393 $773.2 152 $293.5 56 $2,332.1 106 $1,119.5 79 $126.4 213 $135.0 110 $2,072.5 70 $673.3
This table reports the number and mean dollar value of acquisitions calculated over five samples, each of which is classified by type of consideration and status of target.  All deals ("All") comes from SDC and includes 
completed acquisitions of at least $1 million announced between 1981 and 2007 by U.S. acquirers traded on the AMEX, NASDAQ, or NYSE in which the bidder acquires at least 50% of the target company.  It 
excludes deals occurring within two trading days of another of the acquirer's acquisitions, deals of bidders with a stock price less than $2 two days prior to the announcement, deals for which CRSP data are 
unavailable for the bidder, deals for which SDC can only estimate the announcement date, deals for which SDC finds that the announcement date occurs after the date when the target company is first publicly 
disclosed as a possible takeover target, and deals for which industry data is unavailable.  The "Firm-Level" sample is a subset of "All" deals; it includes transactions for which there is at least one acquisition preceding 
the current deal and the prior merger is included in the "All" deal sample.  "CEO-Level" includes all deals from the "Firm-Level" sample for which we are able to identify the acquiring firm CEO of the current and prior 
deal using ExecuComp data.  ExecuComp data begins in 1992, so all of the CEO samples ("CEO-Level", "Same CEO", "Diff CEO") include deals announced between 1992 and 2007.  The "Same CEO" ("Diff CEO") 
sample is a subset of "CEO-Level" and includes acquisitions for which the acquiring firm CEO is the same (different) in the current and prior deals.  Number of acquirers is the number of firms in each year making at 
least one acquisition.  Consideration in a cash (stock) merger is all cash (stock).  Combination deals use more than one type of consideration.  Consideration is classified as Unknown when SDC does not report the 
method of payment.  There are two columns for each type of consideration and each type of target.  The first column includes the number of acquisitions, and the second column shows the mean dollar value (in 
millions) of those acquisitions, adjusted for inflation using CPI and presented in 2007 dollars.  The value of an acquisition is the total consideration paid for the target, excluding fees and expenses, as reported by SDC.
Table 2
This table reports bidder and target performance for three samples of acquisitions, each of which is classified by type of 
consideration and status of target.  "All Deals" comes from SDC and includes completed acquisitions of at least $1 
million announced between 1981 and 2007 by U.S. acquirers traded on the AMEX, NASDAQ, or NYSE in which the 
bidder acquires at least 50% of the target company.  It excludes deals occurring within two trading days of another of the 
acquirer's acquisitions, deals of bidders with a stock price less than $2 two days prior to the announcement, deals for 
which CRSP data are unavailable for the bidder, deals for which SDC can only estimate the announcement date, deals 
for which SDC finds that the announcement date occurs after the date when the target company is first publicly disclosed 
as a possible takeover target, and deals for which industry data is unavailable.  The "Firm-Level with Prior Deal" sample 
is a subset of "All Deals"; it includes transactions for which there is at least one acquisition preceding the current deal 
and the prior merger is included in the "All Deal" sample.  The "CEO-Level with Prior Deal" sample includes all deals 
from the "Firm-Level with Prior Deal" sample for which we are able to identify the CEO of the current and prior deal using 
ExecuComp data.  ExecuComp data begins in 1992, so the "CEO-Level with Prior Deal" sample includes deals 
announced between 1992 and 2007.   Bidder (Target) Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR (-1,+1)) is the difference 
between the return on the acquirer's (target's) stock and the return on the CRSP value-weighted index over the three-day 
period centered on the merger announcement date.  Combined CAR (-1,+1) is the weighted-average cumulative 
abnormal return on the bidder's and target's stocks from the day before the merger announcement to the day after the 
announcement.  The weights are based on the market values of the bidder's and target's equity (the equity of the target's 
parent for subsidiaries) two days prior to the announcement.  Target return and pricing data are only available for public 
and subsidiary targets.  Bidder Share is the ratio of the value created for the bidder's shareholders (Bidder CAR (-1, +1)) 
multiplied by the market value of the bidder's equity two days prior to the announcement) to the value created for the 
stockholders of the combined firm.  The Bidder Share sample is limited to deals that create value for the combined firm 
(Combined CAR (-1,+1) is positive), do not destroy value for the bidder (Bidder CAR (-1,+1) is non-negative) and have 
Bidder Share less than 100%.  Acquirer size is the market capitalization of the bidder's equity two days before the 
announcement date of the deal, adjusted for inflation using CPI and presented in 2007 dollars.  Relative size is defined 
as the ratio of the size of the deal to the market capitalization of the acquiring firm's equity.  N is the number of 
observations.
Bidder and Target Performance for Various Classifications of Acquisitions
Period
Combined
CAR 
(-1,+1)
Bidder
CAR 
(-1,+1)
Target
CAR 
(-1,+1)
Bidder
Share
(-1,+1)
Acquirer 
Size 
($ millions)
Relative 
Size
Panel A: All Deals
1981-2007 Mean 1.26% 0.95% 14.43% 51.56% $6,078 23.31%
Median 0.70% 0.35% 8.19% 51.52% $608 7.26%
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 4,727 18,876 4,731 1,693
Panel B: Firm-Level with Prior Deal
1981-2007 1.06% 0.69% 15.84% 54.85% $7,710 18.37%
0.61% 0.21% 10.33% 55.80% $884 5.70%
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
3,056 11,797 3,059 1,075
Panel C: CEO-Level with Prior Deal
1992-2007 0.59% 0.04% 18.68% 61.77% $19,638 10.96%
0.24% -0.05% 13.42% 66.64% $3,543 2.75%
(0.000) (0.705) (0.000) (0.000)
1,240 3,820 1,240 436
Table 3
Decile
(Prior Acquisition)
Mean
Prior 
Combined
CAR
(-1,+1)
Mean
Combined
CAR
(-1,+1)
Mean
Prior 
Bidder 
CAR
(-1,+1)
Mean
Bidder
CAR
(-1,+1)
Mean
Prior 
Bidder 
Share
(-1,+1)
Mean
Bidder
Share
(-1,+1)
1 -7.56% 0.42% -10.58% 0.19% 5.61% 38.33%
(0.000) (0.340) (0.000) (0.434) (0.000) (0.000)
2 -2.94% 0.41% -4.17% 0.72% 15.55% 60.52%
(0.000) (0.347) (0.000) (0.026) (0.000) (0.000)
3 -1.60% 0.61% -2.27% 0.58% 25.38% 47.13%
(0.000) (0.097) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
4 -0.67% 0.90% -1.05% 0.37% 36.93% 52.67%
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.036) (0.000) (0.000)
5 0.20% 0.60% -0.10% 0.30% 51.01% 55.72%
(0.000) (0.090) (0.000) (0.131) (0.000) (0.000)
6 1.04% 1.60% 0.87% 0.70% 64.05% 52.36%
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
7 1.97% 1.03% 2.02% 0.70% 78.03% 59.60%
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
8 3.13% 0.43% 3.54% 0.84% 85.81% 60.68%
(0.000) (0.134) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
9 5.14% 0.98% 6.19% 1.08% 93.35% 73.76%
(0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
10 12.16% 1.43% 15.34% 1.45% 98.54% 77.82%
(0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Diff of Means
Decile 1 v. Decile 10
1.02% 1.26% 39.48%
(0.166) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1,625 1,625 11,797 11,797 194 194
This table reports the performance of bidders and targets for deciles ranked by performance of bidder’s prior acquisition.  
All mergers in our sample where the acquirer has a later acquisition are ranked by Combined CAR, Bidder CAR, and 
Bidder Share, respectively, and placed into ten decile portfolios.  Sample comes from SDC and includes completed 
acquisitions of at least $1 million announced between 1981 and 2007 by U.S. acquirers traded on the AMEX, NASDAQ, 
or NYSE in which the bidder acquires at least 50% of the target company.  The sample excludes deals occurring within 
two trading days of another of the acquirer's acquisitions, deals of bidders with a stock price less than $2 two days prior 
to the announcement, deals for which CRSP data are unavailable for the bidder, deals for which SDC can only estimate 
the announcement date, deals for which SDC finds that the announcement date occurs after the date when the target 
company is first publicly disclosed as a possible takeover target, and deals for which industry data is unavailable.  Bidder 
(Target) Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR (-1,+1)) is the difference between the return on the acquirer's (target's) 
stock and the return on the CRSP value-weighted index over the three-day period centered on the merger 
announcement date.  Combined CAR (-1,+1) is the weighted-average cumulative abnormal return on the bidder's and 
target's stocks from the day before the merger announcement to the day after the announcement.  The weights are 
based on the market values of the bidder's and target's equity (the equity of the target's parent for subsidiaries) two days 
prior to the announcement.  Target return and pricing data are only available for public and subsidiary targets.  Bidder 
Share is the ratio of the value created for the bidder's shareholders (Bidder CAR (-1, +1)) multiplied by the market value 
of the bidder's equity two days prior to the announcement) to the value created for the stockholders of the combined 
firm.  The Bidder Share sample is limited to deals that create value for the combined firm (Combined CAR (-1,+1) is 
positive), do not destroy value for the bidder (Bidder CAR (-1,+1) is non-negative) and have Bidder Share less than 
100%.  Prior CAR (-1, +1) is the CAR on the acquirer's last acquisition preceding the current merger.  Prior Bidder's 
Share (-1, +1) is similarly defined.  p-values are shown in parentheses.  
Bidder and Target Performance for Acquisitions 
Classified by Performance of Bidder’s Prior Acquisition
Table 4
Simple Regressions Multiple Regressions
Combined Bidder Bidder Combined CAR Bidder CAR Bidder
CAR CAR Share Pooled Win/Lose Pooled Win/Lose Share
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Intercept 0.0078 0.0064 0.4193
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Prior Combined CAR (-1,+1) 0.0518 0.0228
(0.125) (0.478)
Prior Bidder CAR (-1,+1) 0.0523 0.0307
(0.000) (0.013)
Prior Bidder's Share (-1,+1) 0.2855 0.0490
(0.000) (0.522)
Prior Combined CAR (-1,+1) x Winner Dummy 0.0415
(0.367)
Prior Combined CAR (-1,+1) x Loser Dummy -0.0137
(0.789)
Prior Bidder CAR (-1,+1) x Winner Dummy 0.0235
(0.204)
Prior Bidder CAR (-1,+1) x Loser Dummy 0.0432
(0.063)
This table reports results from regressions of the performance of the bidder's current acquisition the performance of the prior acquisition of the bidder and various control variables.  
Sample comes from SDC and includes completed acquisitions of at least $1 million announced between 1981 and 2007 by U.S. acquirers traded on the AMEX, NASDAQ, or NYSE 
in which the bidder acquires at least 50% of the target company.  The sample excludes deals occurring within two trading days of another of the acquirer's acquisitions, deals of 
bidders with a stock price less than $2 two days prior to the announcement, deals for which CRSP data are unavailable for the bidder, deals for which SDC can only estimate the 
announcement date, deals for which SDC finds that the announcement date occurs after the date when the target company is first publicly disclosed as a possible takeover target, 
and deals for which industry data is unavailable.  Bidder (Target) Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR (-1,+1)) is the difference between the return on the acquirer's (target's) stock 
and the return on the CRSP value-weighted index over the three-day period centered on the merger announcement date.  The dependent variable in the Combined CAR models is 
the weighted-average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the bidder's and target's stocks from the day before the merger announcement to the day after the announcement (-1, 
+1).  The weights are based on the market values of the bidder's and target's equity (the equity of the target's parent for subsidiaries) two days prior to the announcement.  
Combined Return regressions are limited to acquisitions of public and subsidiary targets.  The dependent variable in the Bidder CAR models is Bidder CAR (-1, +1).  The Bidder 
CAR models include all private, public, and subsidiary targets.  The Bidder Share sample is limited to deals that create value for the combined firm (Combined CAR (-1,+1) is 
positive), do not destroy value for the bidder (Bidder CAR (-1,+1) is non-negative) and have Bidder Share less than 100%.  The dependent variable in the Bidder Share models is 
the ratio of the value created for the bidder's shareholders (Bidder CAR (-1, +1) multiplied by the market value of the bidder's equity two days prior to the announcement) to the 
value created for the stockholders of the combined firm.  Prior CAR (-1, +1) is the CAR on the acquirer's last acquisition preceding the current merger.  Prior Bidder's Share (-1, +1) 
is similarly defined.  The Winner (Loser) dummy equals one if the prior CAR is positive (non-positive) and zero otherwise.  Combined Return and Bidder Return models include year 
and industry dummy variables, for which the coefficients are not reported in the table.  Results are from OLS regressions with firm-level clustered standard errors.  p-values are 
shown in parentheses.  See the Appendix for a description of the control variables. 
Regressions Examining Firm-Level Persistence in Acquisition Performance
Simple Regressions Multiple Regressions
Combined Bidder Bidder Combined CAR Bidder CAR Bidder
CAR CAR Share Pooled Win/Lose Pooled Win/Lose Share
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Private/Cash 0.0449 0.0457
(0.000) (0.000)
Private/Stock 0.0533 0.0541
(0.000) (0.000)
Private/Combination 0.0431 0.0439
(0.000) (0.000)
Private/Unknown 0.0486 0.0494
(0.000) (0.000)
Public/Cash 0.0703 0.0691 0.0458 0.0466 0.2682
(0.036) (0.038) (0.000) (0.000) (0.088)
Public/Stock 0.0477 0.0464 0.0213 0.0221 0.2643
(0.152) (0.161) (0.084) (0.077) (0.089)
Public/Combination 0.0586 0.0572 0.0270 0.0278 0.2728
(0.077) (0.083) (0.025) (0.022) (0.061)
Public/Unknown 0.0606 0.0594 0.0459 0.0467 0.1938
(0.073) (0.078) (0.000) (0.000) (0.426)
Subsidiary/Cash 0.0585 0.0572 0.0540 0.0548 0.3052
(0.079) (0.084) (0.000) (0.000) (0.031)
Subsidiary/Stock 0.0472 0.0457 0.0295 0.0304 0.1669
(0.169) (0.181) (0.034) (0.032) (0.459)
Subsidiary/Combination 0.0525 0.0513 0.0564 0.0572 0.2367
(0.117) (0.123) (0.000) (0.000) (0.158)
Subsidiary/Unknown 0.0463 0.0449 0.0511 0.0518 0.1442
(0.167) (0.176) (0.000) (0.000) (0.355)
Simple Regressions Multiple Regressions
Combined Bidder Bidder Combined CAR Bidder CAR Bidder
CAR CAR Share Pooled Win/Lose Pooled Win/Lose Share
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Same Industry: Acquirer/Target 0.0015 0.0015 -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0204
(0.663) (0.667) (0.239) (0.237) (0.689)
Log(Time Since Last Acquisition) -0.0005 -0.0006 0.0008 0.0009 -0.0058
(0.563) (0.535) (0.066) (0.061) (0.715)
Competitive Bid 0.0009 0.0009 0.0026 0.0026 0.1304
(0.945) (0.947) (0.731) (0.731) (0.213)
Log(Acquirer Age) 0.0011 0.0012 0.0004 0.0003 0.0263
(0.563) (0.512) (0.700) (0.743) (0.344)
Same Industry: Prior Acquisition -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0007 0.0701
(0.895) (0.903) (0.681) (0.675) (0.196)
International Target 0.0120 0.0115 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0005
(0.086) (0.098) (0.328) (0.330) (0.995)
Hostile Deal 0.0165 0.0163 -0.0051 -0.0051
(0.137) (0.137) (0.421) (0.420)
Relative Size 0.0231 0.0231 0.0013 0.0013 -0.1389
(0.000) (0.000) (0.496) (0.498) (0.091)
Log(Acquirer Size) -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0038 -0.0038 0.0665
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Adjusted R2 0.0023 0.0024 0.0773 0.1258 0.1256 0.0418 0.0417 0.8387
Number of Obs. 1,625 11,797 194 1,625 1,625 11,797 11,797 194
Table 5
Regressions Examining CEO-Level Persistence in Acquisition Performance
This table reports results from regressions of the performance of the bidder's current acquisition the performance of the prior acquisition of the bidder and various control variables.  The "CEO-
Level" sample comes from SDC and includes completed acquisitions of at least $1 million announced between 1992 and 2007 by U.S. acquirers traded on the AMEX, NASDAQ, or NYSE in which 
the bidder acquires at least 50% of the target company.  The sample excludes deals occurring within two trading days of another of the acquirer's acquisitions, deals of bidders with a stock price 
less than $2 two days prior to the announcement deals for which CRSP data are unavailable for the bidder deals for which SDC can only estimate the announcement date deals for which SDC        ,          ,          ,     
finds that the announcement date occurs after the date when the target company is first publicly disclosed as a possible takeover target, and deals for which industry data is unavailable.  It includes 
transactions for which there is at least one acquisition preceding the current deal, the prior merger also meets all of the aforementioned criteria, and we are able to identify the acquiring firm CEO 
for both the current and prior deals using ExecuComp data.  Bidder Cumulative Abnormal Return (Bidder CAR (-1,+1)) is the difference between the return on the acquirer's stock and the return on 
the CRSP value-weighted index over the three-day period centered on the merger announcement date.  The dependent variable in these models is Bidder CAR (-1, +1).  Prior CAR is the Bidder 
CAR on the acquirer's last acquisition preceding the current merger.  The Same (Different) CEO Dummy is equal to one when the acquiring firm CEO is the same (different) in the current and prior 
deals.  The Winner (Loser) dummy equals one if the prior CAR is positive (non-positive) and zero otherwise.  Mean of Deals with Same CEO is the average CAR across all of the acquirer's 
previous mergers for which the acquiring firm CEO is the same as the CEO in the current deal. Mean of Deals with Same CEO (excl. Prior Deal) is similarly defined, except that Prior CAR is                                    
excluded from the calculation.  Following Gompers, Ishii, Metrick (2003), a firm’s GIM index is the number of antitakeover provisions for that firm.  Moreover, we classify each firm with a GIM index 
score of 5 and below as a “Democracy” firm and each firm with a score of 14 or above as a “Dictatorship” firm.  All models include control variables shown in Table 4, year dummy variables, and 
industry dummy variables.  Intercept and coefficients on control and dummy variables are not displayed.  Results are from OLS regressions with firm-level clustered standard errors.  p-values are 
shown in parentheses.  See the Appendix for a description of the control variables.  
Bidder CAR (-1,+1)
CEO
Level
Same and
Different
Same vs.
Different
Same & Diff
Win/Lose
Same v Diff
Win/Lose
Mean Prior 
CEO Deals
Mean CEO
Excl Prior
Governance
Index
Democracy
vs.
Dictator
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Prior CAR (-1,+1) 0.0626 -0.0353
(0.009) (0.412)
Same CEO Dummy (Prior Deal) -0.0028 -0.0028
(0.389) (0.389)
Prior CAR (-1,+1) x Same CEO Dummy 0.0797 0.1149 0.0816 0.0763 0.0760
(0.003) (0.022) (0.030) (0.032) (0.033)
Prior CAR (-1,+1) x Different CEO Dummy -0.0353 -0.0331 -0.0320
(0.412) (0.478) (0.492)
Prior CAR (-1,+1) x Winner Dummy -0.0022
(0.971)
Prior CAR (-1,+1) x Winner x Same CEO 0.0777 0.0800
(0.070) (0.253)
Prior CAR (-1,+1) x Winner x Different CEO -0.0022
(0.971)
Prior CAR ( 1 +1) x Loser Dummy 0 0796  - ,    - .
(0.159)
Prior CAR (-1,+1) x Loser x Same CEO 0.0823 0.1619
(0.070) (0.011)
Prior CAR (-1,+1) x Loser x Different CEO -0.0796
(0.159)
Mean of Deals with Same CEO 0 0561     .
(0.047)
Mean of Deals with Same CEO (excl. Prior Deal) -0.0353
(0.259)
GIM Index -0.0004
(0.341)
Democratic Dummy (GIM <= 5) -0.0013
(0.762)
Dictator Dummy (GIM >= 14) -0.0009
(0.803)
Adjusted R2 0.0389 0.0406 0.0406 0.0404 0.0404 0.0363 0.0416 0.0365 0.0360
Number of Obs. 3,820 3,820 3,820 3,820 3,820 3,689 2,343 2,913 2,913
Table 6
Economic Significance of Persistence to Bidder
Firm-Level Same CEO
[1] Standard Deviation of Prior CAR (-1,+1) 0.0723 0.0643
[2] Persistence Estimate 0.0307 0.0797
[3] Impact of Persistence
(2 x [1] x [2])
0.0044 0.0102
[4] Mean Bidder Size Prior to Acquisition ($ millions) $6,475 $17,111
[5] Value Created by Persistence ($ millions)
([3] x [4])
$29 $175
This table provides estimates of the economic significance of persistence to bidders calculated over two 
samples of acquisitions.  The "Firm-Level" sample comes from SDC and includes completed acquisitions of 
at least $1 million announced between 1981 and 2007 by U.S. acquirers traded on the AMEX, NASDAQ, or 
NYSE in which the bidder acquires at least 50% of the target company.  The sample excludes deals 
occurring within two trading days of another of the acquirer's acquisitions, deals of bidders with a stock 
price less than $2 two days prior to the announcement, deals for which CRSP data are unavailable for the 
bidder, deals for which SDC can only estimate the announcement date, deals for which SDC finds that the 
announcement date occurs after the date when the target company is first publicly disclosed as a possible 
takeover target, and deals for which industry data is unavailable.  It includes transactions for which there is 
at least one acquisition preceding the current deal and the prior merger also meets all of the 
aforementioned criteria.  The "Same CEO" sample includes all deals from the "Firm-Level" sample for 
which the CEO of the acquiring firm is the same in the current and prior deals based on ExecuComp data.  
ExecuComp data begins in 1992, so the "Same CEO" sample includes deals announced between 1992 
and 2007.  Bidder Cumulative Abnormal Return (Bidder CAR (-1,+1)) is the difference between the return 
on the acquirer's stock and the return on the CRSP value-weighted index over the three-day period 
centered on the merger announcement date.  Prior CAR (-1, +1) is the Bidder CAR on the acquirer's last 
acquisition preceding the current merger.  Persistence Estimate is the coefficient on Prior CAR (-1,+1) from 
Model 6 in Table 4 for the "Firm-Level" sample and the coefficient on Prior CAR (-1,+1) x Same CEO 
Dummy from Model 3 in Table 5 for the "Same CEO" sample.  Mean Bidder Size Prior to Acquisition is the 
average market capitalization of acquirers in each sample two days before the acquisition in deals that 
were preceded by at least one merger by the same acquirer. 
Table 7
Alternative Specifications of Persistence Regressions Involving Bidder Performance
This table provides results from various regression specifications of a bidder’s performance from its current acquisition on the bidder’s performance from its past 
acquisitions and control variables Sample comes from SDC and includes completed acquisitions of at least $1 million announced between 1992 and 2007 by   .                     
U.S. acquirers traded on the AMEX, NASDAQ, or NYSE in which the bidder acquires at least 50% of the target company.  The sample excludes deals occurring 
within two trading days of another of the acquirer's acquisitions, deals of bidders with a stock price less than $2 two days prior to the announcement, deals for 
which CRSP data are unavailable for the bidder, deals for which SDC can only estimate the announcement date, deals for which SDC finds that the 
announcement date occurs after the date when the target company is first publicly disclosed as a possible takeover target, and deals for which industry data is 
unavailable.  It includes transactions for which there is at least one acquisition preceding the current deal, the prior merger also meets all of the aforementioned 
criteria and we are able to identify the acquiring firm CEO for both the current and prior deals using ExecuComp data Bidder Cumulative Abnormal Return,                    .      
(Bidder CAR (-1,+1)) is the difference between the return on the acquirer's stock and the return on the CRSP value-weighted index over the three-day period 
centered on the merger announcement date.  The dependent variable in these models is Bidder CAR (-1, +1).  Prior CAR is the Bidder CAR on the acquirer's 
last acquisition preceding the current merger.  The Same (Different) CEO Dummy is equal to one when the acquiring firm CEO is the same (different) in the 
current and prior deals.  Time Since Last is the number of years between the bidder's current acquisition and prior acquisition.  The "Mergers within 5 Years" 
model is based on a sample limited to deals in which the Time Since Last is less than or equal to five years.  The "Exclude Financials and Utilities" model is 
based on a sample that excludes acquirers from the following Fama and French (1997) industries: Banking Insurance Real Estate Trading and Utilities Same               , ,  , ,  .   
Industry is a dummy variable equal to one if the current target and the target in the prior acquisition belong to the same industry (Fama and French (1997)) and 
zero otherwise.  Prior Residual CAR equals the residual from a regression in which Bidder CAR (-1,+1) is regressed on all the control variables in Table 4, 
excluding Log (Time Since Last Acquisition) and Same Industry: Prior Acquisition.  CAR (-2,+2) is defined the same as CAR (-1, +1), except that CAR (-2, +2) is 
calculated over the five-day period centered on the merger announcement date.  Industry-adjusted operating income growth is defined as EBITDA in year -1 
minus EBITDA in year -4 divided by EBITDA in year -4.  M/B is equal to the ratio of the market value of the acquirer's equity to the book value of the acquirer's 
equity at the end of the fiscal year prior to the announced deal Errors in Variables model is limited to deals in which the relative size of the prior acquisition is in            .                      
the highest quintile across all acquisitions announced between 1981 and 2007 (including deals for which CEO data is unavailable).  The "Withdrawn Deals" 
model includes current acquisitions that are either completed or withdrawn.  All models include control variables shown in Table 4, year dummy variables, and 
industry dummy variables.  Intercept and coefficients on control and dummy variables are not displayed.  Results are from OLS regressions with firm-level 
clustered standard errors.  p-values are shown in parentheses.  See the Appendix for a description of the control variables.  
Row Model Persistence Measure
Bidder
CAR 
(-1,+1) N
1 Time Since Last Interaction Prior CAR (-1,+1) x Same CEO Dummy 0.0672 3,820
(0.038)
Prior CAR (-1,+1) x Different CEO Dummy -0.1090
(0.083)
Prior CAR x Same CEO Dummy x Log (Time Since Last) -0.0203
(0.375)
Prior CAR x Different CEO Dummy x Log (Time Since Last) 0.0761
(0.112)
2 Mergers within 5 Years Prior CAR (-1,+1) x Same CEO Dummy 0.0831 3,660
(0.002)
Prior CAR (-1,+1) x Different CEO Dummy -0.0668
(0.165)
3 Prior CAR Cubed Prior CAR (-1,+1) x Same CEO Dummy 0.0781 3,820
(0.005)
Prior CAR (-1,+1) x Different CEO Dummy -0.0775
(0.221)
(Prior CAR (-1,+1) x Same CEO Dummy)3 0.0127
(0.827)
(Prior CAR (-1,+1) x Different CEO Dummy)3 0.5715
(0.152)
4 Exclude Financials and Utilities Prior CAR (-1,+1) x Same CEO Dummy 0.0805 3,092
(0.005)
Prior CAR (-1,+1) x Different CEO Dummy -0.0460
(0.321)
5 Same Industry Interaction Prior CAR (-1,+1) x Same CEO Dummy 0.0970 3,820
(Current and Prior Target in Same Industry) (0.018)
Prior CAR (-1,+1) x Different CEO Dummy -0.0179
(0.721)
Prior CAR x Same CEO Dummy x Same Industry -0.0303        
(0.520)
Prior CAR x Different CEO Dummy x Same Industry -0.0431
(0.579)
Row Model Persistence Measure
Bidder
CAR 
(-1,+1) N
6 Residual CAR Prior Residual CAR (-1,+1) x Same CEO Dummy 0.0834 3,820
(0.002)
Prior Residual CAR (-1,+1) x Different CEO Dummy -0.0439
(0.339)
7 Five-Day Window Prior CAR (-2,+2) x Same CEO Dummy 0.0531 3,820
(0.023)
Prior CAR (-2,+2) x Different CEO Dummy -0.0323
(0.522)
8 Managerial Quality I Prior CAR (-1,+1) x Same CEO Dummy 0.0835 3,510
(0.005)
Prior CAR (-1,+1) x Different CEO Dummy -0.0195
(0.661)
Industry-Adjusted Operating Income Growth (3 Years) 0.0000
(0.548)
9 Managerial Quality II Prior CAR (-1,+1) x Same CEO Dummy 0.0769 3,808
(0.004)
Prior CAR (-1,+1) x Different CEO Dummy -0.0356
(0.412)
M/B -0.0004
(0.085)
10 Errors in Variables Prior CAR (-1,+1) x Same CEO Dummy 0.0229 760
(0.542)
Prior CAR (-1,+1) x Different CEO Dummy -0.0563
(0.426)
11 Withdrawn Deals Prior CAR (-1,+1) x Same CEO Dummy 0.0757 3,824
(0.006)
Prior CAR (-1,+1) x Different CEO Dummy -0.0467
(0.237)
Table 8
Panel A: Public, Private, and Subsidiaries
Current Acquisition
Prior Acquisition Public Private Subsidiary Total
Public 472 406 144 1,022
Private 416 1,199 226 1,841
Subsidiary 168 245 151 564
Total 1,056 1,850 521 3,427
Chi-squared p-value 0.000
Panel B: Public and Non-Public
Current Acquisition
Prior Acquisition Public Non-Public Total
Public 472 550 1,022
Non-Public 584 1,821 2,405
Total 1,056 2,371 3,427
Chi-squared p-value 0.000
Association Between the Status of an Acquirer’s Current 
Target and the Status of the Acquirer’s Prior Target
This table reports tests of the relation between the status (public, private or subsidiary) of an acquirer’s current 
target and the status of the acquirer’s prior target.  In Panel A, each target is classified as a public firm, a 
private firm, or a subsidiary of a public firm.  In Panel B, each target is classified as public or non-public, where 
a non-public target is either a private firm or a subsidiary.  In either panel, each cell shows the number of 
acquirers whose current acquisition has a particular status and whose prior acquisition has a particular status.  
Sample is the "CEO-Level" sample.  It comes from SDC and includes completed acquisitions of at least $1 
million announced between 1992 and 2007 by U.S. acquirers traded on the AMEX, NASDAQ, or NYSE in 
which the bidder acquires at least 50% of the target company.  The sample excludes deals occurring within 
two trading days of another of the acquirer's acquisitions, deals of bidders with a stock price less than $2 two 
days prior to the announcement, deals for which CRSP data are unavailable for the bidder, deals for which 
SDC can only estimate the announcement date, deals for which SDC finds that the announcement date occurs 
after the date when the target company is first publicly disclosed as a possible takeover target, and deals for 
which industry data is unavailable.  It includes transactions for which there is at least one acquisition preceding 
the current deal, the prior merger also meets all of the aforementioned criteria, and the acquiring firm CEO is 
the same in both the current and prior deals.  Chi-squared p-values are provided at the bottom of each panel.
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Prior studies conclude that bond prices reflect both an issuer’s event risk and a bond’s
contractual protections from event risk. Therefore, it is assumed that the market requires a
higher return for unprotected bonds than for comparable protected bonds. These prior
studies, however, struggle with the problem of isolating the pricing effect by controlling for
comparability. Issuers will differ from each other on a number of other attributes that could
affect their bond prices. The issue of comparability eludes a simple modeling solution given
the indefiniteness andmultiplicity of variables that could cause the market to distinguish one
issuer from another. Recent court decisions regarding the buyout of Bell Canada Enterprises
provide a natural experiment for evaluating the pricing effect of event-risk protection that
mitigates this comparability problem. Based on this experiment, we find support for the prior
conclusions that an exogenous shift in event-risk protection is priced by the market.
I. Introduction
Most studies have concluded that unprotected bondholders suffer abnormal losses in the
event the issuer of their bonds announces its intention to undergo a leveraged buyout. The
source of these losses is apparent. Assuming the bonds will remain outstanding after
completion of the transaction, bondholders will find themselves creditors of a firm with
substantially greater leverage. Despite the greater risk posed by this new credit profile,
bondholders’ returns are fixed by their existing bond agreements. Therefore, the price of
their bonds will fall in order to reset their yield to the level required by the market to reflect
the issuer’s new risk profile. Estimates of the losses suffered by bondholders upon
LBO announcements have varied (Asquith & Wizman 1990—2.8 percent; Billett et al.
2010—4.91 percent; Crabbe 1991—11.83 percent; Warga & Welch 1993—5–7.3 percent).
Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that bondholders face a risk of loss in the event of a
leveraged buyout.
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In response to this “event risk,” beginning in 1986 bondholders began to demand
protection in the form of “change-in-control” covenants (Lehn & Poulsen 1991). Although
there has been some variation, the form of this contractual provision has been consistent
over time and across bond issues. It generally takes the form of a “put” right that is triggered
by the occurrence of a change-of-control transaction that has the result of causing the
issuer’s credit rating to fall below a specified threshold. In other words, change-in-control
covenants give a bondholder the option to withdraw (and receive repayment of his or her
principal) from the new risk. Studies have found this form of protection to be highly
effective. Asquith and Wizman (1990) found that bonds with change-in-control covenants,
when faced with a leveraged buyout, experienced a positive abnormal return of 5.8 percent
versus a loss of 5.9 percent for those without. Billet et al. (2010) most recently concluded
that puts alone explain a 580 basis point spread between protected and unprotected bonds
and that protected bonds actually profit on average from LBO announcements. In short,
effective event-risk protection is available to bondholders in the form of a change-in-control
put.
Despite the existence of event risk and the availability of effective protection, the use
of event-risk protection has fluctuated greatly since 1986. Billet et al. (2010) provide data on
the percentage of bond-issuing firms that have protection in at least one bond issue over the
period from 1985 to 2006. The percentage fluctuates from a starting point of 3 percent to
a high of 33 percent in 2004. The percentage swings dramatically year to year. The question
posed by this variation is why bondholders of all firms (and not simply a high of 33 percent)
do not protect themselves from event-risk losses. This question falls within the larger
discussion of why and when firms decide to use bond covenants generally. Several studies
have attempted to tease out the calculus an issuer uses in determining whether to restrict
itself through covenants in order to mitigate the discount investors would otherwise impose
due to the risk of opportunistic behavior by the issuer (Smith & Warner 1979; Nash et al.
2003; Bradley & Roberts 2004; Reisel 2009). These discussions center on the so-called
agency theory or “costly contracting hypothesis.”
Under this view, bondholders are faced with a series of potential opportunistic
behaviors by an issuer. These risks are ameliorated by various factors and will vary from
issuer to issuer. Where not otherwise constrained, an issuer can lessen these risks for
bondholders through contractual restrictions. If not ameliorated, the risk posed by these
potential behaviors is assumed to lead bondholders to impose some price discount (or seen
differently, to demand some yield premium) to compensate them. Therefore, issuers are
expected to adopt an optimal balance between the financial benefit that comes from
avoiding an agency cost discount and the cost to managerial flexibility that comes from
accepting contractual restrictions. Generally, this leads to an expectation that bonds
without protection will command a higher yield than comparable, protected bonds.
Studies have attempted to test this expectation in the case of change-in-control
covenants. They have found that issuers of protected bonds do reduce their cost of funds
(Crabbe 1991; Bae & Klein 1997; Torabzadeh et al. 2000). These results are consistent with
the theoretical discussion. All else equal, we would expect unprotected bonds to command
a premium relative to protected bonds to compensate bondholders for the event risk they
are bearing. These studies suffer, however, from a common challenge. To measure the
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spread between protected and unprotected bonds, they are forced to compare two groups
of bonds and control for the idiosyncratic attributes of each bond in each group in order
to isolate the effect of event-risk protection. Beyond the well-known issues that plague bond
data generally,1 these studies are required to design around issues of both endogeneity and
comparability.
The pricing impact of event-risk protection will vary depending on the level of event
risk faced by a particular issuer. Firms that face a relatively low risk of an LBO event would
be expected to see a lesser pricing effect in their bonds from the absence of event-risk
protection. To isolate the pricing effect of such protection, it is necessary to control for this
endogeneity effect. Like prior studies, we find that controls for endogeneity have a mean-
ingful impact on our results. Beyond the issue of endogeneity, prior studies have needed to
attempt to control for a wide variety of differing attributes in order to identify a pricing
effect by comparing bonds from different issuers. Unless you can construct a pricing model
that accounts for all these differences, it becomes difficult to reach conclusions that isolate
the impact of event-risk protection. Given the relative uncertainty regarding a definitive
pricing model for bonds generally, attempts to discern this impact among a cross-section of
bonds is challenging. A recent event—the attempted leveraged buyout of Bell Canada
Enterprises (BCE)—offers an opportunity to examine the price impact of event-risk pro-
tection in a study that avoids this issue of comparability.
II. The BCE Event
On June 30, 2007, BCE announced that it had entered into a definitive agreement for the
acquisition of BCE in what was to be the largest LBO transaction in history. BCE owns and
operates the Canadian telephone company. At the time of the announcement, BCE and its
subsidiaries had outstanding 23 different publicly traded debt securities. These securities
had maturities ranging from two years to almost 50 years. The BCE debt issues are listed on
Table 1. All these securities had traded down substantially during the months preceding the
announcement based on broadly circulated market rumors of an LBO transaction. Figure 1
shows the performance of a size-weighted portfolio of the BCE bonds for the years 2007 and
2008. As can be seen from Figure 1, the BCE bonds traded off sharply in early March 2007
when rumors of a potential LBO transaction first began to circulate.
On December 11, 2008, almost 18 months after the LBO transaction was formally
announced, BCE announced its termination. The deal was another victim of the interven-
ing crisis in the financial markets. In those 18 months, however, the proposed BCE LBO
provided a potentially powerful natural experiment for evaluating the price impact of
event-risk bond covenants. At the time of the transaction, BCE had issued debt securities
under three different indentures, with differing covenant protections. None, however,
1See, e.g., Bessembinder and Maxwell (2008) (describing the opacity of bond market data before the 2002 introduc-
tion of TRACE).
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Table 1: BCE LBO Wealth Transfer
BCE and Bell Canada Bonds
Issue Date Maturity Date
Amount Out
(CAD $M)
(3/31/08)
Appeals Court Decision Supreme Court Decision
Market Value (CAD $M) Market Value (CAD $M)
Day Before
Announcement
Day of
Announcement Change
Day Before
Announcement
Day of
Announcement Change
1997 Trust Indenture
6/8/99 6/15/09 $700.0 $709.0 $708.8 -$0.1 $707.0 $703.2 -$3.8
2/12/03 8/12/10 $600.0 $602.8 $606.9 $4.2 $601.9 $595.6 -$6.3
7/16/01 12/15/11 $250.0 $252.1 $260.8 $8.7 $249.4 $250.1 $0.7
1/15/02 4/12/12 $500.0 $484.7 $501.9 $17.2 $487.6 $485.3 -$2.3
9/20/05 2/22/16 $200.0 $160.9 $177.7 $16.9 $166.1 $158.0 -$8.1
2/11/05 2/15/17 $700.0 $562.9 $627.2 $64.3 $582.1 $552.1 -$30.0
7/19/99 5/1/29 $200.1 $156.9 $176.9 $19.9 $168.0 $155.0 -$12.9
4/2/01 4/2/31 $400.0 $361.6 $407.3 $45.7 $387.4 $351.1 -$36.3
2/22/02 2/23/32 $400.0 $344.8 $383.2 $38.4 $362.2 $329.2 -$33.0
3/16/04 3/16/35 $450.0 $348.0 $389.2 $41.3 $358.5 $336.3 -$22.3
1976 Trust Indenture
12/15/89 12/15/09 $150.0 $160.3 $162.0 $1.6 $160.5 $159.3 -$1.2
4/18/90 4/15/10 $125.0 $137.6 $139.6 $2.0 $138.0 $136.8 -$1.2
10/16/95 10/15/10 $269.0 $272.8 $273.5 $0.7 $270.2 $270.6 $0.4
6/15/89 6/15/14 $149.6 $160.7 $177.0 $16.3 $168.6 $157.1 -$11.4
4/15/91 4/15/21 $125.0 $141.6 $158.3 $16.7 $152.4 $143.9 -$8.6
9/24/97 9/24/27 $150.0 $125.0 $140.0 $15.0 $133.2 $123.3 -$9.8
3/16/92 12/15/32 $125.0 $129.9 $152.6 $22.7 $144.3 $131.9 -$12.4
11/15/91 11/15/41 $400.0 $420.1 $499.1 $79.0 $470.3 $428.4 -$41.9
3/1/93 5/15/53 $150.0 $159.6 $192.3 $32.7 $180.5 $163.7 -$16.8
12/1/94 12/1/54 $150.0 $159.9 $193.0 $33.1 $181.1 $164.1 -$16.9
1996 Trust Indenture
4/17/96 4/17/26 $125.0 $112.4 $126.8 $14.5 $118.4 $109.1 -$9.4
12/30/96 12/30/31 $150.0 $116.8 $133.8 $17.0 $124.2 $113.3 -$10.9
BCE
10/30/02 10/30/09 $650.0 $675.2 $675.4 $0.2 $667.0 $667.7 $0.7
BCE and Bell Canada bond total $507.9 -$293.8
BCE Equity
Appeals Court Decision Supreme Court Decision
Market Value (CAD $M) Market Value (CAD $M)
Day Before
Announcement
Day of
Announcement Change
Day Before
Announcement
Day of
Announcement Change
BCE (NYSE) $29,989 $26,239 -$3,750 $27,932 $29,522 $1,589
Note: The table reports changes in market values of Bell Canada and BCE bonds and BCE equity around BCE court decisions. Bond
data from Datastream and equity data from Yahoo Finance.
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contained event-risk protection such as a change-in-control put. Facing substantial losses
and without recourse under the terms of their bond instruments, the BCE bondholders
resorted to the courts.
Initially and as most observers expected given the prevailing legal precedents, the
bondholders’ appeals to the judiciary were rejected. Then onMay 21, 2008, a Quebec Court
of Appeals rendered what was widely considered a surprising decision (the Appeals Court
Decision) blocking the proposed LBO transaction based on an evaluation of the “reason-
able expectations” of the bondholders. This decision was reversed by the Canadian
Supreme Court (the Supreme Court Decision) within a month. Albeit short-lived, the Court
of Appeals decision had a significant impact on the market for BCE bonds. This impact is
illustrated by Figure 2, which depicts the performance of the BCE bond portfolio around
the dates of the two court decisions. Table 1 summarizes the wealth transfer effects of the
two decisions for the various BCE stakeholders. In aggregate, BCE bondholders captured
over a half-billion dollars in value following the Appeals Court Decision (and equityholders
lost over 3.7 billion). When the Supreme Court announced its reversal of this decision,
bondholders gave back almost $300 million and equityholders recaptured more than 1.5
billion. There is little doubt that these two decisions were significant for the market in BCE
securities.
More interesting, however, is the question of what significance the BCE court deci-
sions had for other bonds trading in the market. These events allow us to examine the
impact in the market for other Canadian corporate bonds. Both theory and prior empirical
studies would lead us to assume that these exogenous events would change the spreads that
Figure 1: Performance of Bell Canada and BCE bonds (2007–2008).
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we assume exist between bonds that are protected and those that are unprotected from
event risk. In other words, these court decisions provide a natural experiment to test the
prevailing hypotheses regarding event risk and the pricing of event-risk protection.
Analysts unanimously regarded the Appeals Court Decision as a “shock,” referring
to the decision as “quite aggressive,”2 “a highly unanticipated turn of events,”3 “surprising
legal precedent,”4 and a “huge surprise.”5 As one report noted, the “very surprising deci-
sion . . . has far-reaching implications beyond this deal as it brings into question previous
legal rulings that have ultimately placed shareholders’ interests above other stakeholders
when they are at odds in M&A deals.”6 An article in a leading Canadian newspaper stated:
“The decision that gave the debenture holders new power could not only derail the
$35-billion phone company buyout, but have far-reaching impact on the way companies
2Canaccord Adams, Daily Letter 1 (May 23, 2008).
3Credit Suisse, Equity Research 1 (May 21, 2008).
4Scotia Capital, Equity Research Daily Edge 1 (May 22, 2008).
5National Bank Financial, The NBP Daily Bulletin 1 (May 22, 2008).
6Id. at 2.
Figure 2: Performance of Bell Canada and BCE bonds (May 2008–June 2008).
95
98
101
104
107
110
5/1/08 5/7/08 5/13/08 5/19/08 5/25/08 5/31/08 6/6/08 6/12/08 6/18/08 6/24/08 6/30/08
5/21/08 (After Market)
Court of Appeals decision to block 
transaction because of the "reasonable 
expectations" of bondholders
6/20/08 
Supreme Court's decision 
rejecting bondholders' 
claim
Note: The figure charts the performance of an issue-size weighted portfolio of Bell Canada and BCE court decisions.
Price Effects of Event-Risk Protection 883
and boards do business.”7 The Appeals Court Decision was a significant and unexpected
event for both BCE and all Canadian bond issuers.
There was, however, less surprise at the eventual Supreme Court outcome. Because of
the Court’s traditional emphasis on shareholder primacy, some analysts predicted that the
Supreme Court would overrule the Appeals Court Decision, particularly after the Supreme
Court heard oral argument in the case.8 Others, however, assessed the probability of a
Supreme Court reversal as lower.9 “While we would not rule out a favorable outcome by the
SupremeCourt, theQuebec Court decision shows that the predictability of Court judgments
is very low and accordingly we attribute a higher probability that the current decision is
upheld.”10 In short, while many predicted that the Appeals Court Decision would ultimately
be reversed, there was considerable uncertainty until the actual reversal was announced.
Given the theory and practice of change-in-control covenants mitigating event risk,
these decisions lead to the following hypotheses: (1) the Appeals Court Decision would
cause the spread between protected and unprotected bonds to diminish; and (2) the
Supreme Court Decision would cause the spread to expand. The decrease in the spread
would arise because market participants were given a form of extra-contractual event-risk
protection by the Appeals Court Decision. This rendered the differential value of the
contractual protection less important. This value, and therefore the spread, was, in turn,
reestablished by the Supreme Court Decision. We refer to these predictions regarding the
impact of the two court decisions collectively as the “pricing hypothesis.” Although, as we
describe below, our sample size is too small to provide conclusive results, we do find
economically meaningful changes in the spreads in our sample of comparable bonds that
are consistent with the pricing hypothesis.
In addition to its small sample size, our study is hampered by the noisy quality of the
bond data. We attempt to overcome this by supplementing our study with an analysis of the
equity returns experienced by our sample. Since absent a change in enterprise value, any
change in bond values should correspond with a similar and opposite change in equity
values, we can predict that where we expected bond prices to outperform in response to an
event (i.e., we expected low protection bonds to outperform in response to the Appeals
Court Decision), we would also expect equity returns to underperform. We refer to this as
the “equity pricing hypothesis.” We find economically significant support in our results for
the equity pricing hypothesis.
7Willis (2008:B5).
8Credit Suisse, Equity Research 1 (June 17, 2008) (“The Supreme Court of Canada completed its hearing this
morning of the BCE bondholder dispute and decided to reserve judgment . . . Overall, we felt that BCE most likely
carried the day.”); see also Credit Suisse, Equity Research 1, June 20, 2008 (“A Supreme Court reversal of the QCA
decision was generally considered to be the highest probability outcome and following the hearing we concurred.”).
9See National Bank Financial, supra note 4, at 1 (“The Supreme Court appeal application maintains some hope that
this decision will be overturned, especially since it has wide-ranging implications. That said, we have to think the risk
of deal failure has just significantly increased.”).
10Credit Suisse, supra note 2, at 3.
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Despite the small sample issue, the results overall are meaningful in that they confirm
the prior findings of price impact in a study that avoids the issue of comparability. By
providing a discrete event, the BCE court decisions allow us to isolate the impact of
event-risk protection without the need to develop a complete model of and controls for
other potential variables affecting spreads. In addition, this event allows us to examine the
endogeneity issue that prior studies have attempted to resolve (Torabzadeh et al. 2000)—
namely, what impact differing expectations regarding takeover risk have on the pricing
impact. The hypothesis, which we refer to as the “endogeneity hypothesis,” is that firms with
lower expectations of becoming subject to an LBO will see lesser pricing impact from the
Appeals Court Decision and that, conversely, when firms with comparable event risk are
compared, the pricing impact predicted by the pricing hypothesis will be stronger. We
would expect the impact to vary because the value of the extra-contractual protection will
vary depending on the level of risk for which this protection is insurance ex ante. Again,
we find economically significant differentials based on various proxies for probability of
takeover risk.
III. Data and Sample Selection
To analyze the systemic effects of the BCE court decisions, we construct a sample of
Canadian corporate bond issues using Mergent’s Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD).
We identify “Canadian” issuers as firms with “Canada” listed as both their “Country of
Domicile” and the country in their mailing address. For the 355 Canadian issuers in FISD,
we obtain data, including offering date, maturity date, offering amount, and credit rating,
on all bonds issued between January 1990 and May 2008 that mature after the Supreme
Court Decision (June 2008). After excluding convertible bonds, private placements, vari-
able and zero-coupon bonds, Yankee bonds, medium-term notes, bonds issued by govern-
mental entities, bonds with exotic features, short-term bonds, and bonds with missing data,
our initial sample includes 214 Canadian corporate bonds with at least five years until
maturity as of the date of the Appeals Court Decision (May 2008).
Our bond pricing data come from Datastream, in which the stated price is an average
price across all market makers for the bond (Chen et al. 2007). Although transactional
prices or dealer quotes are preferable (Warga & Welch 1993), no such database is publicly
available for Canadian corporate bonds. Therefore, bond prices from Datastream give us
our best indication of how the BCE court decisions reverberated throughout the Canadian
corporate bond market. We are able to obtain pricing data for 146 of the 214 bonds in our
initial sample. For this group of bonds, we collect prices for the period March 2007 through
June 2008.
Next, we review bond prospectuses to identify which bonds have covenants shielding
them from event risk. Based on searches of EDGAR (most of the bonds were registered
under the U.S. federal securities laws), SEDAR (the Canadian equivalent to EDGAR),
company websites, the Internet, and requests to companies’ investor relations departments,
we are able to find a prospectus for 117 of the bonds. Using the information in the
prospectus, we code each bond as having either “high” or “low” event protection; high
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protection indicates that the bond has a change-in-control covenant, that is, a poison put,
and low protection signifies that the bond does not.
The 117 bonds with prospectuses are issued by 52 Canadian firms. Since we rely on
stock returns to inform our inferences about the effect of the BCE court decisions on the
market for Canadian corporate bonds, we exclude the 29 bonds issued by the 19 com-
panies in our sample that are unlisted. We also exclude three bonds issued by two listed
firms for which complete stock data are unavailable. Given that we ultimately compare
the price reaction to the BCE court decisions of firms with and without change-in-control
covenants, we exclude 13 bonds associated with two of the public issuers that have both
low and high protection bonds outstanding.11 Prior studies have found that the presence
of protective covenants in one issue protects all bondholders of the firm even if their
individual bonds do not contain protection (Billet et al. 2010). Rather than include the
bonds issued by these “mixed firms” within the “high protection” subsample, we simply
exclude them from the study. For the remaining 29 public issuers (with 72 bond issues),
we collect stock price data from Yahoo Finance for the period March 2007 through June
2008.
As described in Section IV, our event-study method requires an estimation period of
at least 30 trading days. Five bonds do not meet this requirement and are ultimately
excluded from the analysis. In the process, we lose an additional issuer whose only bonds
are among these five issues. Our final sample includes 67 bonds issued by 28 publicly traded
Canadian firms.
Our event study uses returns on Canadian Treasury securities to estimate expected
returns. We use daily yield data from the Bank of Canada on selected Government of
Canada bond issues that have a 5-year, 7-year, 10-year, or long-term maturity (benchmark
bonds). The long-term bond has a maturity of approximately 30 years. To create a time
series of daily Treasury returns for the benchmark bonds, we calculate the price of each
Treasury bond using the prevailing yield to maturity and an assumption that the bond was
issued on the prior trading day with a coupon rate equal to the yield on that day, that is, the
bond was issued at par.
Compustat data are used to compile firm characteristics, including firm size (total
assets), asset tangibility (net property plant and equipment (PPE) to total assets),
cash flow (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization
(EBITDA) to total assets), and firm valuation (enterprise value to EBITDA) for all
the firms in our final sample.
11One of these issuers, Canadian National Railway (CNR), provides a telling example of how issuers and bondholders
react to changes in event risk. On July 18, 2007, one of CNR’s competitors, Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR),
confirmed that it had received a takeover inquiry from Brookfield Asset Management earlier in the year (Stewart et al.
2007). CPR ultimately rejected the overture. If the bid had been successful, it would have been one of the largest
leveraged buyouts in Canadian history, second only to the BCE deal. Prior to the announcement of Brookfield’s
interest in CPR, CNR had issued all its bonds without change-in-control covenants. The revelation of possible LBO
activity in the railroad sector, however, had an immediate effect. Starting with bonds it issued just two months after
the CPR release, CNR included poison puts in all its subsequent bond issues during our sample period. Thus, a shock
to the firm’s perceived event risk led bondholders to demand and the firm to acquiesce in increased event-risk
protection.
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IV. Event-Study Analysis
To test for differential effects of the BCE court decisions on the valuation of Canadian
corporate bonds with and without event-risk protection, we employ an event study analyzing
the reaction of the bonds in our sample to the announcements of the court decisions (see
Kothari and Warner (KW) (2007) for an overview of event-study methods and Bessem-
binder et al. (BKMX) (2009) for an analysis of event-study methods using bond data).12
A. Event Study Using Bond Data
Our sample includes 15 low protection firms with 50 bonds outstanding as of the BCE
court decisions and 13 high protection firms with 17 bonds.13 As illustrated in Table 2,
one reason for the discrepancy in number of bonds per issuer between the two groups is
that firms without change-in-control covenants are primarily investment-grade firms,
while the majority of high protection firms have a high-yield credit rating. In the United
States, at least, investment-grade firms dominate the corporate bond market in terms of
number of bonds issued and aggregate market value. In addition, Table 2 shows that,
based on total assets, low protection firms are significantly larger than high protection
firms. Unprotected firms also issue larger bonds and have bonds with longer maturities
than do protected firms.
12See the Appendix for a description of our event-study methodology.
13Small sample size is not an uncommon challenge in bond-event studies (see Bessembinder et al. 2009:Table 1).
Using the available data, our sample remains even smaller than most.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Low Protection High Protection Difference
N Mean N Mean Mean p Value
Firm Characteristics
Investment-grade firms 13 5
High-yield firms 2 8
Cash flow 0.18 0.13 0.05 (0.109)
Total assets ($B) $20.8 $8.6 $12.2 (0.009)
Asset tangibility 0.55 0.48 0.07 (0.324)
Enterprise value/EBITDA 7.9 11.0 -3.1 (0.120)
Bond Characteristics
Bond issues 50 17
Years to maturity 17.8 9.2 8.6 (0.013)
Years since issuance 3.9 2.3 1.6 (0.104)
Offering amount ($M) $469.8 $286.3 $183.5 (0.024)
Note: The table reports summary statistics on firm characteristics and bond characteristics for a sample of
15 firms without change-in-control covenants (low protection) and 13 firms with change-in-control covenants (high
protection).
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According to the literature, the appropriate way to implement an event study that
includes firms with multiple bond issues is to treat each firm as a portfolio (firm-level
approach) (see BKMX).14 We first calculate the abnormal return for each of the firm’s
bonds and then form a value-weighted portfolio across all of the issuer’s bonds:
AR w ARk i i
i
J
=
=
∑
1
, (1)
where J is the number of bonds outstanding for firm k and w is the market value weight for
bond i relative to the total market value of bonds outstanding for firm k. The firm-level
abnormal returns are used to calculate the average abnormal return (AAR) for the
portfolios of low and high protection issuers. Table 3 presents results from the firm-level
approach.
Table 3 is split into two panels: in the upper (lower) panel, the event studied is the
BCE Appeals (Supreme) Court Decision. The first row in each panel presents the results for
the full sample. For each event, we present results for two event windows around the
announcements. Since both announcements come after the Canadian bond market is
closed, we measure the one-day reaction on the first trading day following each announce-
ment. We also analyze a two-day window, which includes the first two trading days following
the release of each of the court decisions. The two-day window allows for the time it may
take for bond prices to fully reflect the implications of the rulings. It also captures any price
response lag due to the nature of the Datastream data.
Given the size of our sample, we conduct several statistical tests to gauge the robust-
ness of our results. In Table 3, there is a set of three p values based on these tests. As
described in the Appendix, we first test the significance of the difference in low and high
protection firms’ abnormal returns using a t statistic with a standard error adjusted for both
within-group and between-group cross-sectional dependence.
Since the distributional properties of our difference portfolio are not well specified
with such small samples, we also use a bootstrap methodology similar to Cai and Walkling
(2011) to estimate the p value of the difference of means. First, we randomly select a day
during the estimation period. Second, starting on the randomly selected day, we calculate
the return of the difference portfolio for both a one-day and two-day period. Third, we
repeat this process 1,000 times to generate an empirical distribution of the return of
the difference portfolio on nonevent days. Lastly, we compare the return of the difference
portfolio during each of our event windows to this empirical distribution. The bootstrapped
value equals the percent of the 1,000 nonevent returns that are higher (lower) than the
event window return if the event window return is positive (negative).
BKMX (Table 10) show that nonparametric tests have more power than parametric
tests in small sample bond-event studies with daily data. Thus, our third statistical test
is a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank test estimated with exact nonparametric methods. In
14As compared to alternative approaches, the firm-level approach is free from large-firm and selection bias (see
Bessembiner 2008).
888 Okamoto et al.
T
ab
le
3:
B
on
d
E
ve
n
t
St
ud
y
A
pp
el
la
te
C
ou
rt
D
ec
is
io
n:
5/
22
/0
8
N
o
C
IC
C
C
IC
C
Ev
en
t
W
in
do
w
5/
22
/2
00
8
(0
,+
1)
A
ll
fi
rm
s
15
13
-0
.0
2%
0.
00
%
(0
.9
43
)
(0
.9
94
)
{0
.4
41
}
{0
.5
10
}
[0
.5
55
]
[0
.9
64
]
In
ve
st
m
en
t
gr
ad
e
13
5
0.
40
%
0.
11
%
(0
.1
81
)
(0
.7
89
)
{0
.0
51
}
{0
.2
95
}
[0
.1
73
]
[0
.8
49
]
In
ve
st
m
en
t
gr
ad
e
an
d
m
at
ch
ed
ca
sh
fl
ow
9
3
0.
60
%
0.
40
%
(0
.0
51
)
(0
.3
22
)
{0
.0
14
}
{0
.1
13
}
[0
.0
64
]
[0
.2
82
]
In
ve
st
m
en
t
gr
ad
e
an
d
m
at
ch
ed
si
ze
4
4
0.
40
%
0.
02
%
(0
.2
66
)
(0
.9
65
)
{0
.0
65
}
{0
.4
32
}
[0
.4
86
]
[1
.0
00
]
In
ve
st
m
en
t
gr
ad
e
an
d
m
at
ch
ed
ta
n
gi
bi
lit
y
8
2
-0
.0
4%
-0
.0
9%
(0
.9
31
)
(0
.8
77
)
{0
.4
70
}
{0
.4
84
}
[1
.0
00
]
[0
.7
11
]
In
ve
st
m
en
t
gr
ad
e
an
d
m
at
ch
ed
va
lu
e
5
3
0.
77
%
0.
64
%
(0
.0
59
)
(0
.2
21
)
{0
.0
40
}
{0
.0
85
}
[0
.2
50
]
[0
.3
93
]
Price Effects of Event-Risk Protection 889
T
ab
le
3
C
on
tin
ue
d
Su
pr
em
e
C
ou
rt
D
ec
is
io
n:
6/
23
/0
8
N
o
C
IC
C
C
IC
C
Ev
en
t
W
in
do
w
6/
23
/2
00
8
(0
,+
1)
A
ll
fi
rm
s
15
13
-0
.0
6%
-0
.0
1%
(0
.8
64
)
(0
.9
86
)
{0
.4
16
}
{0
.5
10
}
[0
.5
55
]
[0
.9
64
]
In
ve
st
m
en
t
gr
ad
e
13
5
-0
.0
2%
-0
.2
6%
(0
.9
48
)
(0
.5
23
)
{0
.4
35
}
{0
.1
71
}
[0
.1
73
]
[0
.8
49
]
In
ve
st
m
en
t
gr
ad
e
an
d
m
at
ch
ed
ca
sh
fl
ow
9
3
-0
.0
1%
-0
.2
0%
(0
.9
66
)
(0
.6
06
)
{0
.4
84
}
{0
.2
89
}
[0
.0
64
]
[0
.2
82
]
In
ve
st
m
en
t
gr
ad
e
an
d
m
at
ch
ed
si
ze
4
4
0.
03
%
-0
.0
8%
(0
.9
21
)
(0
.8
72
)
{0
.4
04
}
{0
.4
34
}
[0
.4
86
]
[1
.0
00
]
In
ve
st
m
en
t
gr
ad
e
an
d
m
at
ch
ed
ta
n
gi
bi
lit
y
8
2
-0
.0
4%
-0
.3
7%
(0
.9
26
)
(0
.5
33
)
{0
.4
70
}
{0
.1
55
}
[1
.0
00
]
[0
.7
11
]
In
ve
st
m
en
t
gr
ad
e
an
d
m
at
ch
ed
va
lu
e
5
3
-0
.0
1%
-0
.0
4%
(0
.9
88
)
(0
.9
27
)
{0
.5
06
}
{0
.4
34
}
[0
.2
50
]
[0
.3
93
]
N
o
te
:
T
h
e
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
m
ea
n
di
ff
er
en
ce
s
be
tw
ee
n
bo
n
d
re
tu
rn
s
of
lo
w
pr
ot
ec
ti
on
(n
o
ch
an
ge
-in
-c
on
tr
ol
co
ve
n
an
t
(N
o
C
IC
C
))
an
d
h
ig
h
pr
ot
ec
ti
on
(c
h
an
ge
-in
-c
on
tr
ol
co
ve
n
an
t(
C
IC
C
))
fi
rm
s.
Fi
rm
-le
ve
lr
et
ur
n
sv
al
ue
-w
ei
gh
te
d
av
er
ag
e
re
tu
rn
sa
cr
os
sfi
rm
’s
ou
ts
ta
n
di
n
g
bo
n
ds
;w
ei
gh
ts
ba
se
d
on
m
ar
ke
tv
al
ue
.B
el
ow
ea
ch
m
ea
n
di
ff
er
en
ce
th
re
e
p
va
lu
es
.
Fi
rs
t
p
va
lu
e
(p
ar
en
th
es
es
)
re
pr
es
en
ts
st
at
is
ti
ca
l
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
ba
se
d
on
t
st
at
is
ti
c
w
it
h
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
r
ad
ju
st
ed
fo
r
w
it
h
in
-g
ro
up
an
d
be
tw
ee
n
-g
ro
up
cr
os
s-
se
ct
io
n
al
de
pe
n
de
n
ce
.S
ec
on
d
p
va
lu
e
({
br
ac
ke
ts
})
sh
ow
ss
ta
ti
st
ic
al
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
ba
se
d
on
bo
ot
st
ra
pp
ed
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
.F
in
al
p
va
lu
e
([
br
ac
ke
ts
])
fr
om
a
W
ilc
ox
on
-M
an
n
-W
h
it
n
ey
ra
n
k
te
st
.
“A
ll
fi
rm
s”
in
cl
ud
es
in
ve
st
m
en
t-g
ra
de
an
d
h
ig
h
-y
ie
ld
fi
rm
s;
“i
n
ve
st
m
en
t
gr
ad
e”
in
cl
ud
es
in
ve
st
m
en
t-g
ra
de
fi
rm
s;
“i
n
ve
st
m
en
t
gr
ad
e
an
d
m
at
ch
ed
si
ze
”
in
cl
ud
es
in
ve
st
m
en
t-g
ra
de
fi
rm
s
w
it
h
to
ta
la
ss
et
s
le
ss
th
an
$9
.8
B
;“
in
ve
st
m
en
tg
ra
de
an
d
m
at
ch
ed
ta
n
gi
bi
lit
y”
in
cl
ud
es
in
ve
st
m
en
t-g
ra
de
fi
rm
s
w
it
h
n
et
PP
E
to
to
ta
la
ss
et
ra
ti
os
gr
ea
te
r
th
an
sa
m
pl
e
m
ed
ia
n
;“
in
ve
st
m
en
tg
ra
de
an
d
m
at
ch
ed
ca
sh
fl
ow
”
in
cl
ud
es
in
ve
st
m
en
t-g
ra
de
fi
rm
s
w
it
h
E
B
IT
D
A
to
to
ta
la
ss
et
ra
ti
os
gr
ea
te
r
th
an
sa
m
pl
e
m
ed
ia
n
;“
in
ve
st
m
en
t
gr
ad
e
an
d
m
at
ch
ed
va
lu
e”
in
cl
ud
es
in
ve
st
m
en
t-g
ra
de
fi
rm
s
w
it
h
en
te
rp
ri
se
va
lu
e
to
E
B
IT
D
A
ra
ti
os
gr
ea
te
r
th
an
8.
890 Okamoto et al.
addition to the increase in power, the rank test does not require an assumption of the small
sample distribution of daily bond returns. We estimate the p values with exact nonparamet-
ric methods, as they remain valid for very small sample sizes.
According to the pricing hypothesis, bonds issued by low protection firms should
outperform those of high protection firms following the Appeals Court Decision. We find,
however, that there is essentially no difference between the returns of unprotected and
protected firms. After the Supreme Court Decision, the bond returns of the low protection
firms are again equivalent to those of high protection firms. This, again, is contrary to the
pricing hypothesis that the bonds of the two different types of firms should react differently
to the Court’s decision.
Closer examination, however, suggests that these contrary results simply reflect the
impact of the endogeneity hypothesis. The decision to include a change-in-control cov-
enant is endogenous: bondholders of firms with higher levels of event risk are more likely
to demand a poison put than are bondholders of firms with less event risk. Thus, the
insignificance between bond returns of low and high protection issuers based on our full
sample of firms may simply reflect different levels of event risk across the portfolios of
bonds examined. To separate the impact of this endogeneity problem from the pricing
impact of the changed legal environment caused by the court decisions, we must
compare returns of firms with different levels of event-risk protection, but similar levels
of event risk.
The finance literature offers several studies of firm-specific factors associated with
event risk. Lehn and Poulsen (1991) identify firms that are or are rumored to be a target
of a leveraged buyout (LBO) and those with high levels of insider ownership as ones with
a higher likelihood of a leveraged takeover. The authors also point to credit rating as an
important consideration. Opler and Titman (1993) conclude that firms with high free cash
flow and few profitable projects (low q firms) are more likely to undertake an LBO. Also,
LBO firms are ones with relatively low levels of financial distress costs, as proxied by low
R&D expenditures. More recently, Billet et al. (2010) find that investment-grade firms and
firms with lower levels of free cash flow have a significantly lower probability of an event.
Lastly, Eisenthal (2009) shows that high event risk firms are those with high and steady cash
flows, few growth opportunities, tangible assets, high levels of leverage, and a low market
capitalization of equity.
Based on the proxies of event risk identified in these studies, we refine our portfolios
of low and high protection firms to include firms with comparable event risk. We then redo
our event study using the refined difference portfolio. First, we use credit rating as our
proxy for event risk. Since almost all low protection firms have an investment-grade rating,
we exclude all high-yield issuers from the subsequent analysis. The second row of the top
panel of Table 3 shows that when we control for event risk via credit rating, the returns of
low protection firms outperform the returns of high protection firms following the
announcement of the Appeals Court Decision. Although the difference between returns is
statistically insignificant, a positive difference is consistent with our pricing hypothesis.
The elimination of the implicit event-risk protection following the Supreme Court
Decision causes bonds of low protection firms to slightly underperform those of compa-
rable high protection firms, as seen in the second row of the lower panel of Table 3. Again,
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this difference is statistically insignificant but directionally consistent with the pricing
hypothesis.
Next, we improve the comparability of the firms in our sample further by restricting
the portfolios to investment-grades firms that have similar cash flow, size, asset tangibility,
or valuation. The results from these models are shown in the remaining rows of Table 3.
Based on the cash flow, size, and valuation models, low protection firms have higher
average abnormal bond returns than high protection firms during the appellate court event
windows. More importantly, the return of the difference portfolio of investment-grade firms
is statistically significant in the cash flow and valuation models based on the one-day event
window and five of the six statistical tests employed. Furthermore, the results appear
economically meaningful. For investment-grade firms, BKMX (p. 4231) use a threshold of
15 basis points (or one-sixth the historical risk premium) to test the power of event-study
models using bond data. Thus, our differences of 60 and 77 basis points in the cash flow and
valuation models, respectively, are four to five times this threshold. Consistent with the
pricing hypothesis, this suggests that once we control for a firm’s event risk, the adoption
of event-risk protection creates measurable value for bondholders.
All the Supreme Court event-study results are, however, insignificant. In other words,
having found significant differential pricing impacts between protected and unprotected
bonds with comparable event-risk characteristics, we do not find the expected reversal of
these effects when the Supreme Court reverses the lower court’s ruling. As was noted above,
several market observers anticipated the Supreme Court’s reversal of the lower court. Our
suspicion is that given this anticipation by the market that the Supreme Court would
overturn the Appeals Court Decision, investors may have already incorporated the effect of
the decision into bond prices prior to the actual ruling. Indeed, a casual look at the trading
in BCE bonds as shown in Figure 2 supports the idea that the probability of a reversal was
being priced into the market. Therefore, we may be simply failing to capture the effects
within the event window we are using in our studies. We cannot rule out, however, that the
results we find are impacted by our small sample size.
Taken together, the event-study results based on the firm-level approach are consis-
tent with the pricing hypothesis and the endogeneity hypothesis. The BCE Appeals Court
Decision appears to have transferred significant value to the bondholders of firms without
event-risk protection. These bondholders, who at the time the bonds were issued, negoti-
ated a higher yield in exchange for bearing the issuer’s event risk, temporarily enjoyed
implicit protection from a leveraged buyout. This benefit came at no cost to the bondhold-
ers and, thus, the increase in value of their bonds was as expected. This benefit was greater
for bondholders of those firms that faced a greater likelihood of an LBO event.
Our results are supportive of the theory and prior studies of event-risk protection, but
they are not conclusive. Our data do not support statistically significant findings. The BCE
case offers a potentially powerful natural experiment, but also brings the data challenges
that come with examining Canadian bond events. Because there are far fewer issues, the
sample sizes are small. In addition, Canadian bond data suffer from integrity issues related
to the Datastream database for Canadian bond prices. Rather than using actual transaction
prices like the TRACE database for U.S. bonds, this database relies at least partially on
matrix pricing. Matrix pricing data are based on the bid/ask spreads reported by dealers
892 Okamoto et al.
for the particular bonds (for a discussion of the problems with matrix pricing data, see
Warga & Welch 1993). Since these prices may not be based on real trades, reliance on
Datastream data is likely to add noise to the bond study (see Ince & Porter 2006; Dick-
Nielsen et al. 2009). Nevertheless, we consider the results both meaningful and interesting.
B. Equity Event Study
Because the available bond data are less than ideal, we supplement the bond analysis with
event studies using equity returns to evaluate the effect of the court decisions on firm value.
We present the results in Table 4.
Although we now use equity returns, instead of bond returns, the structure of the
analysis is nearly identical. We first analyze differences in returns of low and high protection
firms for the full sample of issuers and then refine the portfolios to include firms with
similar levels of event risk. The only substantive difference is in the interpretation of the
results. Since debt and equity claimants in a firm are often playing a zero-sum game, we
would expect increases in the value of one type of claim that do not coincide with an
increase in enterprise value to come at the expense of the other. Given this general
principle of the conservation of investment value, our equity pricing hypothesis predicts
that the portfolio of low protection firm equities will underperform (outperform) the
portfolio of high protection firm equities upon the announcement of the Appeals
(Supreme) Court Decision.
The upper panel of Table 4 provides positive evidence in support of this equity
pricing hypothesis. Regardless of the sample or event window, the portfolio of low protec-
tion equities underperforms the portfolio of high protection equities after the Appeals
Court Decision. Across all firms in the sample, the difference portfolio has a statistically
significant return of –1.96 percent on the first trading day following the ruling. Thus, even
before controlling for differences in event risk, we find evidence that the Appeals Court
Decision has a significant impact on firm value.
Controlling for event risk leads to an increase in both the statistical and economic
significance of this change in value. When we limit the sample to investment-grade firms,
the return of the difference portfolio falls to –4.2 percent over the one-day window.
Moreover, for the first time, the difference between the returns of low and high protection
firms is significant over the two-day window, as well. These results provide evidence that the
ruling had a material effect on the value of Canadian firms with unprotected bonds.
Matching firms on additional characteristics associated with event risk induces a
tradeoff between comparability and sample size (and, consequently, statistical power).
Despite this loss of power, we find that the difference between equity returns of low and
high protection firms remains economically large for all measures and event windows and
is almost always statistically significant. In fact, the return of the difference portfolio
increases, in an absolute sense, as the comparability of the firms increases. As mentioned,
limiting the sample to investment-grade firms leads to a doubling of the return of the
difference portfolio, from –2.0 percent to –4.2 percent. Refining the sample further using
size and asset tangibility drives the differential return to –4.5 percent and –4.6 percent,
respectively. When we screen by cash flow, the measure most often associated with event risk
across the financial literature cited above, the difference between stock returns of firms
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without and with change-in-control covenants is –6.1 percent. Thus, given an exogenous
shock to event-risk protection, firms without protection experience a substantial one-day
decline in value as compared to those firms that already had ample protection. Ostensibly,
investors assessed that the Appeals Court Decision caused a substantial decline in the
likelihood that a buyout firm would take an unprotected firm private through a highly
levered transaction. This, in turn, led to either a loss in the value of these firms or a transfer
of value to the firms’ bondholders. Our bond event study results at least partially support
the latter explanation, a transfer of value from shareholders to bondholders.
Whereas these appellate court findings, in part, confirm the evidence from the bond
study, the equity event study sheds new light on the impact of the Supreme Court Decision.
The equity pricing hypothesis predicts that the BCE Supreme Court Decision will cause
firms without change-in-control covenants to experience an increase in their stock prices
relative to that of firms with poison puts. The lower panel of Table 4 reports empirical
results consistent with this prediction. Across the whole sample of firms, we find that the
average one-day abnormal stock return of low protection firms exceeded that of high
protection firms by 1.4 percent. This difference is marginally significant at the 10 percent
level. When we control for event risk by limiting the analysis to investment-grade firms, the
one-day difference increases to 2.6 percent and is significant at the 5 percent level. As with
the study of equity returns around the Appeals Court Decision, we often see an increase in
the magnitude of the impact of the Supreme Court Decision when we refine the compa-
rability of the firms in the portfolios. Firms matched by asset tangibility and cash flow
exhibit stock return differences following the Supreme Court ruling of 4.2 percent and 3.3
percent, respectively.
Overall, the equity event study offers support for the conclusion that event risk is
priced. Firms experience significantly different outcomes following the BCE court decisions
based on their levels of event-risk protection. Combined with the bond study, the equity
analysis also supports the theory that leveraged buyouts transfer substantial wealth from
bondholders to stockholders and, thus, any event that lowers the probability of a leveraged
takeover has the reverse effect.
C. Matched-Case Analysis
Despite numerous controls for event risk, the event-study analysis is silent on the impact of
industry as a prime determinant of leveraged buyouts. Industry, however, is often vitally
important. Eisenthal (2009) finds evidence of increased interindustry clustering in buyout
activity during the recent LBO wave and significant intraindustry reactions to LBO
announcements. To analyze the role of industry, at least anecdotally, we conduct a
matched-case analysis in which we match a low protection firm to a comparable high
protection firm on the basis of industry, credit rating, and event risk. Given the size of our
sample, we only find two pairs of matched firms. In both cases, the firms have an
investment-grade rating and similar cash flow, size, and asset tangibility. Thus, there is
strong reason to believe the firms faced similar event risk prior to the BCE court decisions.
The first pair of matched firms is Agrium, Inc., which does not have a change-
in-control covenant in any of its bonds, and Potash Corporation, which does have event-risk
protection. Both companies operate in the fertilizer industry, according to the firms’ SIC
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codes. Figure 3 displays a comparison of the bond and stock returns of Agrium and Potash
following the Appeals and Supreme Court Decisions, along with a tabular summary of the
firms’ characteristics. As in the firm-level bond study, the bond returns are weighted
averages across each of the firm’s bonds, where the weights are based on the market values
of the bonds. Consistent with the pricing hypothesis, we find that Agrium’s bonds outper-
form those of Potash after the Appeals Court Decision. Conversely, the creation of implicit
protection for Agrium’s bonds leads Agrium’s stock to lag behind Potash’s stock, as pre-
dicted by the equity pricing hypothesis. Upon announcement of the Supreme Court
Decision, Agrium’s stock outperforms Potash’s stock, which is again consistent with the
equity pricing hypothesis. We also find that the Agrium’s bonds have a negative return after
the Supreme Court Decision, which is consistent with their loss of event-risk protec-
tion. The negative return, however, is less than the loss suffered by Potash’s bonds on the
same day.
We repeat the analysis with a pair of firms in the telecommunications industry: Telus
Corporation and Rogers Communication. As shown in Figure 4, the firms have similar cash
flow ratios, total assets around $16 billion, and roughly half their total assets in tangible
assets. As with our first pair of matched firms, the low protection firm (Telus) has a higher
bond return and lower stock return than those of the high protection firm (Rogers) after
the Appeals Court Decision. Following the Supreme Court ruling, both firms’ bonds have
Figure 3: Matched case (Agrium Inc. vs. Potash Corp.).
edoCCISgnitaRtiderCnoitcetorPmriF
Cash 
Flow 
Total 
Assets 
($B) 
Tangible 
Assets 
EV to  
EBITDA 
AGRIUM INC Low Investment Grade 2870 0.20 $4.3 0.35 13.0 
POTASH CORP High Investment Grade 2870 0.21 $8.5 0.44 25.4 
-1.00%
-0.50%
0.00%
0.50%
1.00%
1.50%
2.00%
2.50%
3.00%
3.50%
Bond Return Stock Return Bond Return Stock Return
Agrium (Low Protection) Potash (High Protection)
Appellate Court Decision Supreme Court Decision
Note: Figure compares one-day bond and stock returns of matched firms following announcements of BCE court
decisions. Bond return of each firm is weighted average across all the firm’s outstanding bonds; weights are market
values of bonds.
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returns close to zero, but Telus bonds do outperform those of Rogers. Lastly, Telus stock
outperforms Rogers stock after the Supreme Court announcement.
Although we cannot draw definitive conclusions from this analysis, the evidence
supports the event-study results.
V. Conclusion
As the wave of leveraged buyouts occurred in the 1980s, legal and financial scholars
became interested in the potential wealth expropriation from bondholders to stockhold-
ers. For instance, Morey McDaniel noted that “[l]everaged takeovers, buyouts and recapi-
talizations are having a devastating impact on existing bondholders. Stockholders are
getting rich in part at bondholder expense.”15 Unlike stockholders, who are protected
against certain event risks by judicially imposed fiduciary and legal duties, bondholders
15McDaniel (1987–1988:206).
Figure 4: Matched case (Telus Corp. vs. Rogers Communications).
edoCCISgnitaRtiderCnoitcetorPmriF
Cash 
Flow 
Total 
Assets 
($B) 
Tangible
Assets 
EV to  
EBITDA 
TELUS CORP Low Investment Grade 4813 0.21 $16.9 0.43 5.6 
ROGERS COMM High Investment Grade 4812 0.25 $14.8 0.47 9.8 
-3.00%
-2.00%
-1.00%
0.00%
1.00%
2.00%
3.00%
4.00%
5.00%
6.00%
Bond Return Stock Return Bond Return Stock Return
Telus (Low Protection) Rogers Communications (High Protection)
Appellate Court Decision Supreme Court Decision
Note: Figure compares one-day bond and stock returns of matched firms following announcements of BCE court
decisions. Bond return of each firm is weighted average across all the firm’s outstanding bonds; weights are market
values of bonds.
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are generally only protected by the provisions in their bond contracts.16 “In general, the
stockholder contract is an implicit relational contact while the bondholder contract is an
explicit contingent contract.”17 Put another way, “the implication typically drawn from
[the prevailing legal doctrine on bondholder rights] is that the corporation owes its
bondholders no extra-contractual duties.”18 Many scholars, such as McDaniel, ultimately
concluded that the only way to prevent this expropriation and promote fairness to a
corporation’s bondholders was to impose some type of fiduciary duty to bondholders on
corporations.19 McDaniel, for example, proposed that “[s]ince bondholders are not
always adequately compensated ex ante for expropriation loss, the fiduciary duties of
corporate law provide a mechanism for compensating bondholders ex post.”20 Others,
such as Dale Tauke, argued for a greater judicial role in interpreting bond contracts.21
He proposes the “employment of a flexible or modern mode of bond contract interpre-
tation . . . [that] accepts that contracting is the basic method by which bondholders
achieve their desired degree of protection but also allows for a limited degree of court
policing to redress debtor corporation attempts to take advantage of unintended conse-
quences of, or gaps in, contract language.”22 These scholars’ arguments for greater pro-
tection of bondholders rest on the assumption that the bond market does not already
price such protections into bond prices.
Admittedly, McDaniel and these other commentators were writing at a time before
event-risk protection and change-of-control puts had become common.23 However, this
vein of argument appears to continue to have some vitality.24 Our findings here suggest
that the market does, in fact, price the event risk, and related protections, bondholders
face in their bond investments. These results are consistent with the results of prior
studies but offer an experimental design that mitigates the challenge of comparability
faced by prior studies. By using a sample of bonds that experienced an exogenous shock
to firms’ event risk, we are able to isolate the effect of event-risk protection on bond
16McDaniel (1987–1988:233).
17Id.
18Mitchell (1990:1175).
19See McDaniel, supra note 15, at 245; see also Barkey (1987).
20McDaniel, supra note 15, at 245.
21Tauke (1989:135).
22Tauke (1989:134–35).
23We are grateful to Bill Bratton for pointing out our ahistorical critique of these authors.
24See, e.g., Peer Zumbansen and Simon Archer (2008) (arguing for a “wider view” when courts approach competing
stakeholder claims) and Viswanth and Eastman (2003) (arguing that expost court determinations are lower costs than
ex ante contracting).
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pricing. Finding that event risk is priced suggests that judicial intervention, such as the
Court of Appeals Decision, simply upsets an existing bargain that is embedded in the
market price for corporate bonds. It provides bondholders more than they “reasonably
expected.”
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Appendix
An event study typically tries to examine the return behavior for a sample of firms experi-
encing a common type of event (KW). The events we examine are the announcements of
the Appeals Court Decision and the Supreme Court Decision on May 21, 2008 and June 20,
2008, respectively. In a standard event study, one first calculates the abnormal return (AR)
of each firm in the sample around the event dates, where AR is the difference between the
observed return (Ri,t) for a firm and the expected return (E[Ri]) for the firm had the event
not occurred:
AR R E Ri i t i= − [ ], . (2)
One would then calculate an average abnormal return (AAR) across all firms in the sample:
ARR
AR
N
ii
N
=
=
∑ 1 . (3)
Lastly, based on the historical volatility of the returns of the firms in the sample, one can
judge whether the realized AAR is significant, in a statistical sense, or simply due to chance.
Formally, the standard test statistic is AAR divided by an estimate of its standard deviation,
that is, standard error:
t
AAR
AAR
=
( )σ 2
,
(4)
where s (AAR)2 is the variance of AAR. We estimate s (AAR)2 using the variances of the
historical returns of the firms in the sample and the assumption that the firms’ abnormal
returns are independent. The test statistic is assumed to have a unit normal distribution
and, thus, one can determine the probability of observing the calculated AAR. If this
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probability is below a specified threshold (typically 5 percent), then one concludes that the
event caused a statistically significant change in the average value of the firms in the sample.
The characteristics of our study, however, require a few modifications to the typical
event-study methodology. First, the most frequently used method of calculating abnormal
returns for bonds rather than equities is the mean-adjusted model (BKMX), which departs
slightly from the typical equity event-study method outlined above. The initial step of the
mean-adjusted model is to calculate, for each bond i, the premium holding period return
(PBR), which is the difference between the observed bond return (BR) and the return to the
Treasury security with the most similar maturity date (TR):
PBR BR TRi i i= − . (5)
Next, the mean expected excess return (EBR) is equal to the average PBR for each bond
during an estimation period (typically a 126-day or six-month window):
EBR PBRi i t
t
=
⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟=−
−∑ , .
1
126 1
126
(6)
After calculating the expected excess return, the AR for bond i is calculated as:
AR PBR EBRi i i= − . (7)
The second unique feature of our study is that the independence assumption used in
the construction of the standard error does not hold. Unlike studies of corporate actions,
for example, stock splits, for which the event dates are randomly distributed across the firms
in the sample, the firms in our sample share a common event date. Therefore, the abnor-
mal returns of the firms in our sample are not independent. The standard technique to
address this bias is to form an equal-weighted portfolio of the firms in the sample and set
s (AAR)2 equal to the historical variance of the returns of the portfolio (see Campbell et al.
1997:167). The portfolio returns will account for any cross-sectional dependence and
provide an unbiased estimate of the standard error of AAR.
Finally, our hypothesis is that the events impact bonds with and without event-risk
protection differently. Therefore, instead of testing whether the AAR across all firms in the
sample is statistically significant, we ask whether the difference between the AAR of low
protection firms (AARl) is significantly different from the AAR of high protection firms
(AARh). Our test statistic is defined as:
′ =
−
−( )
t
AAR AAR
AAR AAR
l h
l hσ
2
, (8)
where s (AARl - AARh)2 is the variance of the difference between the AARs of the low and
high protection samples. To control for cross-sectional dependence within each group, we
form equal-weighted portfolios of firms with and without change-in-control covenants
902 Okamoto et al.
(high protection portfolio and low protection portfolio, respectively). Moreover, to account
for correlation between the abnormal returns of low and high protection firms, that is,
between-group dependence, we form a long-short portfolio using the low and high
protection portfolios (difference portfolio). The historical variance of the returns of the
difference portfolio provides an estimate of the standard error of AARl - AARh that
accounts for both within-group and between-group dependence.
All our event-study results using bond data are based on the foregoing approach.
Specifically, Equation (6) is used to estimate the abnormal return in Equation (1), the EBR
in Equation (5) is estimated over a six-month period (for the event window, we use a fixed
six-month period from October 22, 2007 to April 21, 2008), and the variance of our
difference portfolio is calculated over a one-year period (April 22, 2007 through April 21,
2008).
We also conduct event studies using equity data. The primary difference between our
equity and bond event studies is the model used to estimate the expected return. Whereas
we use the mean-adjusted model for the bond study, we use a market-adjusted return model
(Brown & Warner 1980) for the equity analysis. In the market-adjusted return model, the
expected return of a security is equal to the return on the market:25
E R Ri m[ ] = . (9)
We then use Equation (8) in the calculation of the abnormal return in Equation (1). The
remainder of the equity analysis follows the methodology outlined for the event study using
bond data.
25Since the market-adjusted model assumes that expected returns are equal across all securities, our difference
portfolio eliminates the effect of the market return on the analysis. Thus, we do need to specify an empirical proxy
for the market return.
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